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ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains an examination and test 
of the conditions under which aggregates of individuals 
sharing class and racial characteristics are found to ex­
hibit distinctive patterns of political participation.
The argument is made that these objective characteristics 
lead to distinctive political activity chiefly through 
the presence of an intervening variable, namely, an organi­
zational factor. In short, it is argued that the hierarchy 
of organizations found in a community represent a prime 
agent of that community's salient features of social dif­
ferentiation, especially those of class and race.
An ecological perspective is employed in develop­
ing the operationalization of these basic concepts. Eleven 
selected elections from the 1972, 1973, and 1974 Democratic 
primaries in New Orleans are analyzed. Measures of the 
class, race, and political participation variables are de­
rived from census materials and precinct data. The class 
and racial characteristics of areal units are refined into 
a combined race/class index consisting of black, lower 
white, and upper white dimensions. Election data examined 
here include voter registration, voter turn out, and votes 
cast for various candidates. There is no corresponding 
data repository for the organizational variable. Thus, a 
large part of the dissertation is devoted to establishing
xiii
ABSTRACT, Continued
the hierarchy of political organizations in New Orleans. 
Interview data is presented for nineteen political organi­
zations found to be active in the recent New Orleans 
elections. Organizational leaders and candidates for office 
were asked to rate these political organizations in terms 
of their effectiveness in the elections. Composite ratings 
derived from this procedure are used to apply the reputed 
effectiveness labels of the organizations themselves to 
their corresponding areas of operation, thus converting 
organizational effectiveness into an ecological variable as 
well.
Descriptive summaries of the structural and com­
positional characteristics of the nineteen political organi­
zations are presented. Contrary to expectations, there is 
much more formal political organizational activity and a 
higher reputation for organizational effectiveness among 
black than white areas and among lower white than upper 
white neighborhoods. Cast within a typology of political 
organizations, upper white organizations were said to ex­
hibit normative compliance structures, while black and lower 
white organizations were characterized as utilitarian com­
pliance organizations. Examination of registration levels 
by the race/class designation and organizational effective­
ness ratings of areal units generally indicates a positive 
relationship between race/class and registration levels and
xiv
ABSTRACT, Continued
the absence of any relationship between organizational 
effectiveness and registration levels. Likewise, voter 
turn out is highest in upper white areas in two of the years 
considered and shows no significant difference by organiza­
tional effectiveness levels. However, in 1973, turn out in 
black and lower white areas matches that found in the upper 
white neighborhoods. Analysis of votes cast in the elections 
offers some strong support for the organizational thesis. 
Voting cohesiveness (the tendency to "bloc vote") is found 
to be greatest in black neighborhoods and to be fairly pro­
nounced in upper white areas as well. Such cohesiveness is 
much more negligible in lower white areas. Voting cohesive­
ness is greater in higher rated organizational effectiveness 
areas than in lower rated neighborhoods only occasionally—  
mainly, it seems, when the candidates involved are politi­
cally identifiable in either class or racial terminology.
A factor analysis of the basic variables confirms 
these contentions. Voter registration, voter turn out, and 
candidate choice are shown to be independent indicators of 
political participation. Black and upper white organizations 
emerge as distinct factors comprising both their respective 
ecological characteristics and candidate choices. No inde­
pendent factor is shown for the lower white areas.
xv
CHAPTER I
A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS 
OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
Introduction 
In the minds of many professionals and laymen 
alike, the study of political organizations and voting 
behavior belongs in the realm of political science. Dating 
back in the contemporary era to Rice's (1928) Quantitative 
Methods in Politics, the investigation of electoral dynam­
ics and trends has, in fact, been a mainstay of political 
science research. However, since Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and 
Gaudet's (1944) classic study of the impact of a presiden­
tial campaign upon candidate choice in Erie County, a 
goodly number of sociological works have dealt with the 
social aspects of the electoral process. It is now common­
ly acknowledged that sociologists have made a contribution 
to the understanding of electoral behavior, although the 
extent of that contribution is often a matter of lively 
debate.^
Nevertheless, as if subliminally aware of to whom 
the study of elections "really belongs," sociologists have 
shied away in their analyses from factors too obviously po­
litical in content. While some of this bias may be
defensible on theoretical grounds, this informal division 
of labor clouds the fact that many overtly political factors 
have dimensions of legitimate theoretical interest to soci­
ologists as well as political scientists. To illustrate, 
the composition, structure, and operation of political or­
ganizations, an undeniable factor of some sort in most 
elections, has often fallen into the "obviously political" 
category. However, analyses of such organizations would 
seem to include questions of the following variety: under
what domain and specific conditions do different types of 
organizations emerge? How are they formally organized?
What informal variations arise in day-to-day operations?
How do they attract and retain membership? What consequen­
ces, intended or otherwise, do they entail? These are the 
sorts of questions a sociologist would ask instinctively 
about any group. It is suggested that answers to these 
and similar questions about the nature of political organ­
izations merit extended sociological investigation.
The Sociological Context of Political Organizations 
Sociological studies abound in the analysis of 
various social characteristics of the voter in relation to 
his party identification and candidate choice. It has been 
well established that party and candidate preferences tend 
to vary in a number of settings by social class, race, re­
ligious affiliation, ethnicity, and other distinguishable 
social characteristics. For example, in summarizing re­
current themes reported in voting studies, Lipset (1963: 234)
3offers the following generalization:
. . . the most impressive single fact about political 
party support is that in virtually every economically 
developed country the lower-income groups vote mainly 
for parties of the left, while higher-income groups 
vote mainly for parties of the right.
Studies of socially mobile individuals further confirm
this contention. The remarks of Parkin (1971: 49-51) are
representative:
As a rough general estimate, between about a quarter 
and a third of those born into the manual working 
class in modern Western countries will move to the 
ranks of the middle class. . . . There is little 
doubt that the overall tendency is for the upwardly 
mobile to shift their political allegiances from 
parties of the Left to parties of the Right.
Likewise, in an assessment of the persistence of racial,
ethnic, and religious bloc voting, Wolfinger (1965: 897)
concludes:
Ethnic politics constitute one of those features of 
American life that are always said to be on the point 
of disappearing, but that somehow endure. . . . From 
the stump. . . politicians righteously deplore any 
suggestion that their red-blooded American constituents 
might be influenced by bloc-voting patterns; off the 
stump they find it hard to discuss strategy in any 
other terms.
These findings reiterate the basic premise of a
sociological approach to the study of electoral behavior,
namely, that the electorate may be correctly viewed as a
collection of social categories, groups, and organizations,
rather than simply a composite of individuals. Carried a
step further, an entire corpus of sociological literature
has developed over the years concerning the role of "groups"
in disseminating, legitimating, and interpreting information
2
for its members and sympathizers. Many a politician has
learned from campaign experience that, while it is impossi­
ble to approach and persuade each voter individually, a 
personal touch can be indirectly effected through the medi­
ating capacity of groups. Therein lies the practical and 
sociological wisdom of the candidate seen eating gumbo, 
blintzes, kielbasa, pizza, and the like.
Given this bit of insight, one may be moved to pon­
der the question of how such collectives of individuals 
come to act in varying degrees of unison. If, for a moment 
a social category may be defined as an aggregate of persons 
sharing some characteristics, and groups and organizations 
are thought of as social categories in which recurrent in­
teraction is increasingly structured, it can be easily 
shown that concerted, unified action is by no means auto­
matic. Dealing first with social categories, it is quite 
evident that not all characteristics shared with a number 
of other persons result in joint behavioral effort. The 
lack of a "left-handed bloc vote" is a trivial yet true 
example. It is also true that, of characteristics which 
are somehow deemed important, not all lead to identical 
action. The Italian, working class vote in the eastern 
seaboard cities, is solidly Democratic— except in New Haven 
where it is staunchly Republican. Such variation may be 
found among organizations as well. Since 1952, Democratic
presidential candidates have rarely won a plurality in
3
Deep South states despite Democratic party registration 
levels there exceeding ninety percent of the electorate.
5These examples are by no means uncommon, and the 
fact that one can conjure some explanation for these varia­
tions does not negate the basic point. Thus, the central 
concern of this dissertation is to investigate the electoral 
role of political organizations in a metropolitan setting 
and, in doing so, to advance and test some explanation of 
collective political action. Without being very systematic 
about it at this point, it is speculated that political 
organizations play a key role in effecting: (1) the spec­
ification of which social characteristics come to be 
considered a matter of political importance, and (2) the 
conversion of otherwise dormant categories of individuals 
sharing these characteristics into persons acting to a 
significant degree in unison.
This dissertation, therefore, purports to test pro­
positions regarding the organizational factor in defining 
salient cleavages, especially along class and racial lines, 
and in mobilizing these portions of the electorate into 
political action. The activity of political organizations 
during recent local elections in the city of New Orleans 
will be used as a relevant case in point. With some mod­
ifications to be specified as the argument unfolds, the 
investigation essentially entails: (1) elaborating the
distribution of salient features of social differentiation 
in New Orleans, namely, those of class and race, (2) 
specifying the political organizational framework of the 
city vis-a-vis these features of differentiation, and (3)
ascertaining the role of this political organizational 
structure in inducing collective action along these lines 
of differentiation in the electoral process.
The Electoral Context of Political Organizations
Rationales for the treatment of political organi­
zations within an electoral context are both theoretical 
and practical. A prominent characteristic of democratic 
and quasi-democratic systems is that a large number of key 
governmental and judicial figures are selected by popular 
ballot. Since such selection is subject to periodic re­
newel, again by ballot, elections may be viewed as controll­
ed, legitimized struggles for access to the apparatus of 
government (Lipset, 1963: 230-233). The formation and 
persistence of political organizations has typically been 
an integral part of this process. The question of types 
of political organizations aside, it has been generally 
observed that no candidate or ideology has ever made much 
headway in this system without some organizational base 
(Barnes, 1966: 522). The diminished chances of success 
commonly ascribed to those candidates and platforms buck­
ing established political organization are further evidence 
of this theme.
Therefore, success in the electoral sphere is a 
commonplace if not primary goal of political organizations. 
The potential theoretical importance of this item lies in 
the fact that many social scientists have followed the 
lead of Weber and Michels in analyzing organizational
functions in terms of organizational goals. This trend 
has received further impetus and sanction in the Parsonian 
scheme in which "goal orientation" is a central defining 
characteristic of organizations (Parsons, 1956: 64-67).
As shall be shown in the next chapter, there are some 
problems with equating functions with goals. Nonetheless, 
at least one good reason for studying political organiza­
tions within an electoral context is that these organizations 
generally consider electoral activity and success to be their 
raison d'etre.
The electoral context of organizations is important 
in other respects as well. Discussion of the role of po­
litical organizations in a metropolitan setting is predicated 
initially upon an assessment of the nature of political par­
ties in the American political system. In this regard, 
American political parties are seldom "organized" in the 
European political sense of the word. To begin with, being 
a Democrat or a Republican in the United States is largely 
a matter of self-definition, party membership requiring 
only a minimum of active support and participation. The 
structure of both parties, therefore, consists of full­
time politicians, professional staff, a small number of 
party activists, and an immense pool of formally inert 
party identifiers (Dye and Zeigler, 1972: 199-200). This 
description is likewise appropriate in the one-party South 
where factional politics prevails. Here, the party struc­
ture tends to consist of emergent factions, usually
temporary coalitions of professionals, activists, and 
formally inactive identifiers hinging upon the personality 
and force of individual political leaders (Key, 1949: 
302-305) .
This situation implies that the influence and 
sphere of operation of political organizations extend far 
beyond their formal and immediate membership. The best 
test of the operating domains of such organizations would, 
therefore, be found in an actual election, or preferably, 
a series of elections. Consequently, eleven recent elec­
tions in New Orleans have been selected to provide a test 
of the relationship between political organizations and 
patterns of political action.
Footnotes
■*Tor an illustration of the debate, see Key and 
Munger (1959) and Sartori (1969). Key and Munger argue 
that most sociological studies of the vote exhibit a form 
of "social determinism" which essentially takes the 
politics out of the study of political behavior. Sartori 
is in agreement with this point and, of particular rele­
vance here, suggests party organization as an intervening 
variable in the relationship between social class and 
political as a theoretical remedy.
2
Pertinent examples include Festinger (1959), Homans 
(1951, 1961), Sherif and Sherif (1953), Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955), Blau (1964), and Laumann (1973).
3
Deep South states are here defined as Alabama, 
Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North and 
South Carolina.
CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate some 
of the thoughts and efforts of others who have considered 
issues related to the context and operation of political 
organizations. This is considered essential for the usual 
reasons. First, a goodly number of capable scholars have 
previously tackled the basic or similar problems and have 
advanced a wide range of theoretical observations and em­
pirical findings. Their insights can be of assistance in 
choosing those approaches and perspectives with greater 
potential utility, weeding out by experience those most 
likely to prove untenable or irrelevant. Secondly, such 
review aids in delimiting the focus of the study by iden­
tifying a coherent series of propositions to be investi­
gated.
In this spirit, there are several topic areas which 
receive close inspection in this chapter. These topics 
suggest a central theme of the dissertation, namely, that 
the organizational structure of a community may be thought 
of as a prime agent of the community's salient lines of 
social differentiation, especially those of class and race.
10
Social Differentiation, Political Action, 
and the Organizational Factor
Social Class and Political Action. If any one
independent variable has become associated with the socio­
logical perspective, it is probably,that of social class.
One can scarcely find any research done recently within the 
discipline, or indeed within the social sciences or the 
polling industry, which does not routinely include social 
class in an associative, predictive, or explanatory role. 
Apparently, many social scientists and laymen .alike think 
that some relevant class-type phenomenon does in fact exist.
The historical and intellectual impetus for this 
interest may be traced to the works of Karl Marx, whose 
efforts roughly a century ago mark sociology's first com­
prehensive treatment of class. It is not totally an 
exaggeration to assert, as does Zeitlin (196 8), that the 
principal lines of investigation in the general area of 
social stratification since that time constitute an "on­
going debate with Marx's ghost." Nevertheless, Marx would 
explicitly reject as relevant to class analysis much of 
what modern sociologists do in the name of social strati­
fication. For Marx, class constitutes a dynamic concept 
rooted in a dialectical materialistic theory of social 
change. In this scheme, classes are depicted as the po­
tential vehicles of conflict capable of inducing real 
change. Marx did not assume that a group identity was re­
quired for the existence of classes (Klasse an sich).
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However, a class was not conscious of itself (Klasse fiir 
sich) until there was organization for the purpose of 
political, that is, class, action.
It is apparent from this that few American socio­
logists are truly Marxists in their approach to social 
class. Class is now most often treated as a static con­
cept in a theory of social stratification. The referents 
in this scheme are categories of individuals differentiated 
by varying income, educational, or occupational levels and 
their corresponding life-styles. Consider as a plausible 
illustration the tone of the following comments by Berger 
(1963: 80-81) :
A sociologist worth his salt, if given two basic 
indices of class such as income and occupation, can 
make a long list of predictions about an individual 
. . . [the sociologist] will be able to make in­
telligent guesses about the part of town in which 
the individual lives. . . give a general descrip­
tion of the interior decorating. . . predict the 
voluntary associations [he] has joined, guess [his] 
political affiliation. . . predict the number of 
children sired and also [predict] whether the indi­
vidual has sexual relations with the lights turned 
on or off.l
The sheer bulk of empirical data linking social 
class with behavioral correlates seems to have lulled many 
sociologists and social scientists into accepting the po­
sition that class characteristics sui generis lead to class 
action. In the absence of a further rationale, the position 
is untenable for two simple reasons. One, not all class 
conditions lead to political action. Secondly, identical 
class conditions do not necessarily lead to identical po­
litical actions. These two factors strongly suggest that
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objective class conditions, by themselves, lack the 
mechanisms conducive to political action. In short, class 
conditions do not constitute a sufficient condition for the 
emergence of class action.
The focal point of this section then is this: in
the absence of dialectical materialistic themes, how may 
one account for the class consciousness component of social 
class and, by extension, class action. The suggestion is 
not that Marx holds the only answer to this question. 
Rather, it is being argued that if the class terminology 
is to be theoretically useful, Marx's explanatory mechan-
2
isms must be replaced when his basic tenets are set aside.
Of course, class consciousness and political organ­
ization, essential properties of Marx's concept of class, 
have received attention from contemporary sociologists.
For instance, the interest of political sociologists in po­
litical action corresponds quite closely to that of Marx. 
However, the manner in which class has typically been used 
as an independent variable in this regard is more congruent 
with the stratification than with the change approach of 
class. Likewise, the extensive attention devoted to the 
study of the organizational factor has taken place mainly
I
under the guise of organizational analysis rather than with­
in the rubric of class analysis.
Some sociologists have preferred to rephrase the 
issue of social class and class consciousness in terms of
3
the concepts of social status and status self-perception.
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Though some have used the terms of social class and social
4
status synonymously, the connotations are clearly not iden­
tical. By way of definition, social status indicates the 
acknowledgement of a stratification hierarchy comprising a 
gradient of prestige ranks. Status self-perception (or 
status awareness), then, refers to the capacity or inclina­
tion of the individual to locate himself within that hier­
archy. This is quite a different matter than that of social 
class and class consciousness. As has been shown, social 
class connotes the existence or imminent emergence of a 
conscious class ideology. Through class consciousness, 
perception of the stratification system is reduced to the 
simple dichotomy of "we," one's class, versus "they," the 
class enemies (Sartori, 1969). Marx dispels any notion 
that he might consider the two approaches synonymous in 
observing that only the "vulgar mind" treats "differences 
in the size of purses" as class differences (Dahrendorf, 
1959: 11).
If one is properly convinced that status self­
perception and class consciousness refer indeed to empiri­
cally independent phenomena, questions arise concerning the 
significance this situation holds for a theory of class 
action. It can be shown that indices used to measure ob­
jective class conditions, such as levels of occupation and 
income or variations in life-styles, correlate highly with 
indicators of status self-perception. Thus, the transition 
from objective class conditions to some form of status
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self-perception does not appear to be problematic. Rather, 
the theoretical crunch hinges instead upon the transition 
from status self-perception to some form of political 
action. While one can see quite easily how class conscious­
ness may lead to political action, it is by no means clear 
that status self-perception is capable of inducing such 
action as well.
In dealing with this latter problem, it has been a 
fairly common practice among sociologists to assume that 
primary relationships among individuals sharing objective 
class characteristics, rather than the objective class 
conditions themselves, lead to political action. The use 
of the primary interaction variable here does have some 
advantage. Simply stated, it stipulates that personal in­
teraction networks accrue high degrees of conformity and 
solidarity among their respective members. To the extent 
that these sorts of relationships can be shown to appear 
among those sharing given objective class characteristics, 
this strategy stands as a theoretically plausible alterna­
tive.
However, this formulation falls somewhat short of 
expectations on two counts. First, the strategy would still 
be insufficient in explaining why identical class conditions 
often lead to different kinds of action. In this respect, 
the strategy shows little improvement in correcting problems 
incurred by simply assuring that class characteristics in 
and of themselves lead to political action. Secondly,
FIGURE 1
DIAGRAM OF SOCIAL CLASS AS A CONCEPT IN A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 
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primary interaction networks are, by implication if not 
definition, relatively small in size and limited to indi­
viduals who are well known to each other. Since many of 
the types of political action in which sociologists are 
interested involve large categories of individuals, many of 
whom are unknown to each other, one may realistically won­
der about the adequacy of informal, personal networks as 
the key intervening variable.
The distinctions between social status and social 
class developed in this section are depicted in figure 1.
Much of the current confusion regarding the concept of 
class stems from the fact that it has become what Rosenberg 
(1965: 17) has termed a "global concept," that is, the 
concept as commonly used by sociologists has more than one 
referent. Put within the context of the introductory re­
marks, the term social status refers more nearly to what 
is intended by the stratification approach to class, while 
the term social class intimates the change approach to 
class. Furthermore, while the sharing of similar life­
styles and status self-perceptions may lead to primary in­
teraction networks, this development is not theoretically 
useful in accounting for the occurrence of political action. 
Rather, the study of political action requires the study 
of class organizations as a device for generating and 
mobilizing class consciousness.
Race and Political Action. The discussion in this 
section has thus far dealt with social class as the dimension
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of social differentiation. This concentration has not been 
totally unintentional. As suggested earlier, the concept 
of social class has been accorded exhaustive, quasi- 
systematic attention in sociological thought. Of course, 
numerous other features of social differentiation have re­
ceived extensive consideration as well. Dominant among 
them is the analytical concern focused upon race.
If it can be said that empirical instances of class 
consciousness, that is, the polarization of individuals in­
to the "we" vs. "they" dichotomy, occur in rather weakened 
dosages in this country, such is certainly not the case 
with the racial variable. Perceptions of racial differ­
ences and the ensuing constraints placed upon interactional 
patterns have figured prominently in the history and culture 
of the U.S. The tone and tenor of these patterns may be 
gleaned from sociological writings earlier this century 
which characterized the system of black-white relationships 
as being "if not a caste, at least castelike," to use 
Warner's (1936: 234) phrase. A similar characterization 
was advanced by Myrdal (1944: 674-675). Key (1949: 5) was 
likewise led to assert in the introduction to his classic 
work that "whatever phase of Southern politics one seeks 
to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads 
to the Negro" and his place in society.^
Interest in the relationship between race and 
stratification, or more specifically, race as a dimension 
of stratification, has been extended since the early
statements of Warner and Myrdal through the "debate" between 
Cox and Berreman concerning the applicability of the term 
caste to stratification in contemporary America. Cox 
(1945: 362-368) has argued that the American system of stra­
tification varies significantly from the caste prototype 
in a number of basic respects. Two factors are primary 
among these differences. First, the concept of caste has 
generally implied the existence of heredity groups consti­
tuting a hierarchy of occupational specialties. Further, 
the systematized inequality engendered by distinctions 
among castes has been portrayed as normatively acceptable 
and legitimated by religious authority and tradition.
In contrast, blacks in the U.S. have theoretically 
been expected to embrace the work/achievement ethic as are 
whites, although structural barriers may in fact have pro­
hibited them from fulfilling this expectation. Of equal 
or even greater importance, the constitutionality and 
legitimacy of blatantly discriminatory aspects of the system 
have been shown to stand in serious question. In fact, it 
is this discrepancy between the ideal and interactional 
norms which Cox identifies as the distinguishing feature 
of the American stratification system on the criterion of 
race.
Berreman (1960: 120-127) disagrees. According to 
Berreman, it is highly unlikely that persons near the 
bottom of any stratification system fully accept the "ra­
tionales" intended to justify their comparatively meager
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lots. Conversely, those occupying favored positions can 
be expected to employ and perpetuate an elaborate series 
of values and sanctions conducive to the maintenance of 
their advantage. Given these considerations and the 
relative rigidity of the ascribed racial proscriptions, 
the American "class" system is argued to vary little from 
the Indian "caste" system in several important respects.
Whichever viewpoint is more valid, the racial issue 
clearly continues to register highly upon any list of 
attributes by which individuals in this country are likely 
to be differentiated. Further, the mere suggestion of the 
term caste arouses considerable interest given the develop­
ing context of this study. The term projects the image of 
a stratification system containing an independent racial 
dimension in addition to the one based upon class character­
istics. Likewise, the usage serves as a heuristic device 
leading one to entertain the notion that many of the same 
sorts of mechanisms operating in the conversion of objective 
class characteristics to class action may be indigenous to 
the social reification of racial attributes as well.
Political Action and the Organizational Factor.
From the preceding discussion, it seems clear that some 
respecification is necessary in order to meaningfully ex­
press the relationship between objective characteristics 
of social differentiation and ensuing political action. 
Sartori (1969: 84-86) has argued strongly for the consid­
eration of an organizational factor in just such a
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respecification. In a critical assessment of Alford's 
(1963: 289-290) conclusion that England represents a 
relatively "pure" case of class voting, Sartori notes that 
almost one-half of the Conservative Party electoral support 
has traditionally come from the working class. This 
support constitutes the deviation of fully one-third of the 
working class vote. Other .national studies show further 
apparently bewildering variations in the class vote. How­
ever, consistency of sorts is to be found by the introduc­
tion and interpretation of an intervening organizational 
variable. For example, class voting in the English case 
is correlated with union membership; that is, union members 
vote overwhelmingly for the Labour Party, while nonunion 
members split their vote almost evenly between the Conser­
vative and Labour parties. Further comparative data 
strongly suggest that!' the direction of the vote is often 
a product of the relationship between the organizational 
variable (for example, labor union membership) and the 
larger socio-political context (such as local governmental 
form). Thus, through their organizational identifications 
and ties, members in one specific setting may vote to the 
"left," while their associational counterparts in another 
setting may vote to the "right."
Summarizing these data, Sartori (1969: 84) asserts:
To put it bluntly, it is not the "objective" class 
[class conditions] that creates the party, but the 
party that creates the "subjective" class [class 
consciousness] . . . .  The party is not the conse­
quence of the class. Rather, and before, it is the 
class that receives its identity from the party.
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Hence class behavior presupposes a party that not 
only feeds, incessantly, the "class image," but 
also a party that provides the structural cement 
of "class reality."
The model implicit in this discussion is that 
certain sources of social differentiation may be said to 
receive salience and direction through an organizational 
factor, leading in turn to forms of political activity.
In any population, there are obviously a wide range of 
objective features which could be used to identify and 
classify individuals into socially meaningful categories.
It is being argued here that this definition process occurs 
in the organizational structure of the community. This 
formulation seems to hold promise in treating many of the 
questions left unanswered by other of the theoretical 
strategies raised thus far in this chapter.
Organizational Dimensions of the Urban Community
Organizations as a Prime Feature of Urban Life.
The term "mass society" is frequently heard in both public 
and professional circles. The referent of this term appears 
most often to be modern, or more specifically, urban
g
society. This usage is apparently intended to emphasize 
certain commonly assumed characteristics of contemporary 
urban social structure, primarily its size, complexity, 
and heterogeneity. Much of the sociological literature 
applicable to the urban scene bears this theme. The classic 
formulations of Toennies (1940) and Simmel (1940) almost a 
century ago and the more recent statements of Wirth (1938)
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and others tend to emphasize urban structure as hetero­
geneous, impersonal, fragmentary, and, hence, destructive 
of enduring social relations. Concerning this point, the 
words of Wirth (1938: 12-13) are particularly instructive:
The contacts in the city may indeed be face-to-face, 
but they are nonetheless impersonal, superficial, 
transitory, and segmental. Whereas the individual 
gains, on the one hand, a certain degree of emanci­
pation or freedom from the personal and emotional 
controls of intimate groups, he loses, on the other 
hand, the spontaneous self-expression, the morale, 
the sense of participation that comes with living 
in a integrated society. This constitutes the state 
of anomie. . .
However, research concerning the interactional 
patterns of urban dwellers in recent years indicates that 
life in the city may not be as isolated and purely con­
tractual as some of these latter theorists seem to imply. 
The efforts of Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954), 
Whyte (1955), Wilensky and LeBeaux (1965), Babchuck (1965), 
and Laumann (1973), as well as the recent work of urban 
anthropolotists (Barnes, 1969), go a long way in establish­
ing the identity and persistence of primary networks in 
urban settings. Objectively, the city-dweller may indeed 
live in a complex, heterogeneous structure of considerable 
size. However, from his perspective, day-to-day inter­
action on the job and at home tends to be restricted to a 
microcosm of peers and relatives.
Nor are all secondary contacts with the larger 
social context inevitably fragmentary, segmented, and 
destructive of integrative social bonds. On the contrary,
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Tocqueville's (1963: 71) pronouncement almost one hundred 
fifty years ago concerning the busy participation of sub­
stantial portions of Americans in relatively stable or­
ganizational structures indicates just the opposite to be 
true:
In no country in the world has the principle of 
associations been more successfully used. . . 
than in America. Besides the permanent associa­
tions which are established by law. . . a vast 
number of others are formed and maintained by 
the agency of private citizens. . . .  If a 
stoppage occurs in a thoroughfare. . . the 
neighbors immediately form themselves into a 
deliberative body; . . .  if some public pleasure 
is concerned, an association is formed. . . .
Societies are formed to resist evils (and) to 
diminish vice(s). In the United States, assoc­
iations are established to promote the public 
safety, commerce, industry, morality, and re­
ligion. There is no end which the human will 
despairs of attaining through the combined power 
of individuals. . .
Empirical evidence accumulated in the last few 
decades favors de Tocqueville's early assessment. In their 
widely acclaimed study of "Middletown," for instance, Lynd 
and Lynd (1929: 528) report that ninety-five percent of 
the "business class" and forty-six percent of the "working 
class" in their sample were members of one or more volun­
tary associations. Axelrod (1956: 13-18) found strikingly 
similar proportions in a more recent case study, and a 
national sample placed the number of adults participating 
in at least one voluntary association at sixty-one percent 
(Wright and Hyman, 1958: 286). Likewise, cross-national 
comparisons with other industrialized countries have re­
vealed participation levels of forty-seven percent and
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forty-four percent of adults sampled in Great Britain and 
Germany respectively (Almond and Verba, 1965: 249).
Organizational Structure as a Reflection of Social 
Differentiation. Hollingshead's (1952: 685-687) appraisal 
of New Haven, Connecticut, provides apt illustration of the 
presumed relationship between social differentials and or­
ganizational structure. The intent of the study was to 
identify class distinctions, in part through the examina­
tion of the associational patterns of a sample of respond­
ents. Interestingly, Hollingshead reports finding vertical 
social divisions based upon racial, ethnic, and religious 
differences in addition to the expected horizontal cleavages 
due to social class criteria. An important conclusion of 
the study is that these vertical and horizontal divisions 
create highly compartmentalized subsystems of interaction 
vividly reflected in the composition of voluntary associa­
tions in the New Haven community. In short, these organ­
izations demarcate imaginary social grids within which 
interaction among socially, ethnically, and religiously 
compatible individuals routinely takes place.
It does not appear that Hollingshead has stumbled 
across an isolated phenomenon. Warner and Srole (1945) 
earlier documented such an occurrence in a study appro­
priately entitled, The Social Systems of American Ethnic 
Groups. Similar findings are reported by Greer (1962) ,
Gans (1962) and Wolfinger (1965). Nor has the emergence of
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suburbia as a dominating feature of the urban scene 
necessarily altered the basic picture. After analyzing 
ten metropolitan areas, Lieberson (1962: 681) is led to 
conclude that the same groups which are the most highly 
segregated from "native" whites in the central city are 
also the most residentially concentrated in the suburbs.
This finding, he suggests is an indication that interac­
tional patterns thought endemic to the central city persist 
to a large extent in suburbia as well.
Parenti's (1967: 717-720; 1969: 173-180) comments 
regarding observed patterns of acculturation and assimila­
tion provide a helpful perspective for assessing this 
situation. Specifically, a cultural system refers to an 
ideational or belief set, while a social system denotes a 
behavioral or interactional set. If one can assume that 
there is "no inevitable one-to-one relationship between 
the various processes" in the two systems and that "imper­
atives in one system are not wholly dependent upon the 
other" (Parenti, 1967: 718), then it is theoretically de­
fensible to expect that groups which are segregated socially, 
that is, in terms of their interactional patterns, may 
nonetheless exhibit a high degree of integration culturally, 
that is, in terms of shared values and beliefs. Hence, 
individuals may be culturally assimilated yet also "segre­
gated" as evidenced, among other things, by participation
in socially, ethnically, racially, or religiously homo-
7geneous organizations. To the extent that these observations
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are valid, the organizational structure of the community 
may be viewed as an expression of its salient features of 
social differentiation, including class and racial differ­
ences.
The Mediating Capacity of Organizations. A further 
set of implications contained in the organizational struc­
ture of the urban environment lies in the mediating 
capacity of organizations. Durkheim (1964: 27-32) has 
stressed the view that organizations in the modern setting 
have the unique capacity to stand as a counterbalance be­
tween the isolated individual and the larger social context. 
To Durkheim, this mediating capacity is of importance in 
toro basic respects. On the one hand, organizations provide 
the social mechanism for integrating scattered individuals 
into a common stream of values, beliefs, and sentiments
g
in settings otherwise often conducive to anomie. On the 
other hand, this mediating capacity helps insure indi­
vidual emancipation and freedom from the domination of the 
state.
This interpretation by Durkheim attributes a stab­
ilizing function to the mediating capacity of organizations. 
For those who do not share his optimistic appraisal of or­
ganizations, it is generally not the mediating capacity or 
the internal integrative potentials which are objects of 
contention. The dissensus involves the probable role with 
which these characteristics are said to be most amenable.
As the tone of this disagreement implies, the dispute may
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be characterized as falling within a pluralist-elitist 
clash of perspective.
In the spirit of Durkheim's critique of organiza­
tions, pluralists are apt to emphasize several positive 
aspects of the mediating potential of organizations 
(Truman, 1951; Almond and Verba, 1965; Smith, 1966). 
Pluralists, for example, are more likely than elitists to 
assert that membership and participation in organizations 
is fairly widespread. Thus, if organizations are indeed 
selective in terms of who is representated, the wide range 
of social origins from which participants are drawn never­
theless equalizes the effect. The statements of Rose 
(1967: 244) in this respect are typical:
. . . a significant portion of the lower classes 
is organized into labor unions, an increasing 
proportion of the middle class is assuming leader­
ship in the social-influence associations, the 
ethnic minorities have organized their own social- 
inf luence groups, and all of these are taking 
stronger interest in politics. Thus power has be­
come more widely distributed through greater 
participation in voluntary associations.
Pluralists likewise resist the notion that organizations 
are an inherently conservative force. They note that or­
ganizations potentially may be utilized either to induce 
change or to defend the status quo. Whichever the case, 
what is of importance they claim, is that organizations 
do provide an effective and powerful medium for gaining 
access to the political process.
Shifting the focus to this political process, plura­
lists further contend that the interests represented by any
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number of competing organizations merit consideration 
apart from potential power differentials, such as organi­
zational size, force, or resources. Incumbent with but 
not restricted to this position is the belief that the 
exercise of power resides for the most part in the formal 
machinery of government. In a critique of various 
strategies in measuring power, Bonjean and Grimes (1974: 
378) summarize this contention as follows:
. . . the question, "Who Governs?" (and, by impli­
cation, who has power?) was answered very much in 
the same manner by social scientists and the lay 
public. Those persons occupying important offices 
. . . were assumed to be those making key community 
decisions and thus exercising power.
Broad access to these positions of power is further pur­
ported to be well insured by a public electoral system, 
by a widespread acceptance of a core of "democratic" 
values, and by open competition among polycentric, socially 
diverse organizations (Rose, 1967: 55-58; Truman, 1968:
134). Obviously not all organizations are equally effec­
tive in gaining access to these positions of power. How­
ever, given the alleged democratic spirit of the organi­
zational competition, pluralists argue that organizational 
participation has positive consequences in and of itself. 
Independent of the "success" of the organization, organi­
zational identification and participation is thought to 
provide a sense of political efficacy and a satisfaction 
with democratic processes among its latent and active mem­
bers. Elitists, on the other hand, are more likely to 
dote upon the question of who tends to benefit most from
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the mediating capacity of organizations. Turning first to 
the question of "who participates" in organizations, 
elitists admit that participation is indeed fairly wide­
spread. But, they add, participation also tends to be 
consistently and positively correlated with social class.
The empirical findings quoted earlier concerning organi­
zational participation support this interpretation (Lynd 
and Lynd, 1929; Axelrod, 1956; Wright and Hyman, 1958;
Almond and Verba, 1965). To summarize, the studies show 
relatively substantial levels of participation in organ­
izations, proportions ranging from forty to sixty percent 
of samples including representation from all classes.
However, the distribution is clearly skewed by class, in­
dicating greater participation among upper status individ­
uals. Lipset (1963: 201), for example, notes that the 
higher participation level "of the more privileged" in 
organizational activities has been documented in virtually 
every comparison between those of higher and lower status. 
Therefore, if the political system is in fact responsive 
to the operation of organizations, and if persons partici­
pating in various organizations can reasonably be assumed 
to pursue their own interests, the mediating role of 
political and parapolitical organizations may indeed operate 
in favor of the higher classes by virtue of differential 
participation.
Elitists are apt to delineate other discriminating 
aspects of organizational life as well. The classic treatise
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of the Italian sociologist Michels (1959) over fifty years 
ago has alerted subsequent social scientists to the 
oligarchic proclivity of organizations. Michels avered 
that organizational control is inevitably reduced to the 
hands of a few, even in democratically contrived organi­
zations. This oligarchic tendency is said to be rooted 
in a number of factors, most notably man's "inherent" 
craving for power, the apathy of rank-and-file members, and 
the natural desire of the leadership to strengthen and 
buttress its position of authority. Thus, the very prin­
ciple of organization itself contains elitist trends. A 
number of contemporary sociologists and political scientists, 
therefore, contend that organizations are not truly capable 
either of bringing about change or of defending the status 
quo. Rather, they assert that organizations which persist 
and wield political clout are mostly conservative in their 
orientation to the status quo (Schattschneider, 1960;
Edelman, 1964; Parenti, 1970). According to Dye and Zeigler 
(1972: 234-235):
Organizations perform a conservative, stabilizing 
function for the society. . . .  Of course, the goals 
of organizations vary, some being more radical than 
others. But in general, organizations that survive, 
even if they began as radical, become more moderate 
as organizational perpetuation and maintenance of 
bureaucracy displace the original goals. . .
Pressure for substantial social change [thus] comes 
from forces outside the associational structure.
Finally, elitists are in basic agreement with the 
pluralist contention that participation may instill feelings 
of political efficacy among organizational members even when
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personal and political returns are substantially negligible 
or purely symbolic (Edelman, 1964). However, given their 
perspective of organizational life, it is not surprising 
that many elitists state additionally that such intangible 
rewards constitute a delusionary enterprise, diverting 
attention of rank-and-file members and nonparticipants 
alike from the basic issue: the perpetuation of the status
quo by vested interests.
In summarizing the conflicting contentions reflected 
in these two viewpoints, the following observations seem 
most appropriate. First, it does not appear that the 
mediating potential of organizations is a matter in ques­
tion. A wide range of literature, theoretical speculation, 
and empirical evidence are in basic agreement about this 
point. Secondly, it seems fair to say that while relative­
ly large numbers of individuals participate in organizations, 
this number is not proportionately representative of 
several important groups within the population. For exam­
ple, it is clear that the organizational variable is 
positively correlated with social class, thereby raising 
the question of whether organizations tend to represent 
specialized interests, in this case those of the higher 
classes. Finally, the matter of whether organizations re­
inforce the status quo or provide an effective medium for 
social change appears largely a matter of perspective and 
thus a contention to be verified. The tendency here will 
be to lean toward the elitist position and seek substantia­
ting and refutory evidence accordingly.
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Organizations and Politics 
Strategies in the Analysis of Organizations. It 
has almost been an unstated assumption in the history of 
organizational analyses that organizations should be 
conceptualized and evaluated in terms of their respective 
goals. As indicated in the introductory chapter, this 
procedure is embedded in the organizational perspectives 
advanced by Weber (1957) and Michels (1962) earlier this 
century and, subsequently, a goodly number of efforts have 
been patterned after their lead. There are sound reasons 
for employing this approach. Organizations may be char­
acterized as formal groups in which the' relationships are 
rationally defined' in terms of positions and concommitant 
linkages. This rationalization of relationships serves as 
a means of legitimizing social relationships in the absence 
of traditional or personal bonds and, as emphasized by this 
perspective, provides a regimen for the efficient pursuance 
of desired goals.
However, several problems seem to persistently 
accompany this approach. For instance, there has often been 
confusion concerning exactly "who" defines the goals of an 
organization. Cartwright and Zander (Mohr, 1973: 470-471) 
have noted that one may conceivably distinguish at a minimum 
(1) the goals an organizational member may hold for his own 
ends, (2) the goals an organizational member may hope the 
organization will pursue or achieve, (3) the goals of or­
ganizational members as a group, and finally (4) the formally
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stated organizational goals. The first two of these 
distinctions comprise goals which are held individually 
while the latter two identify collective orientations. 
Further, only the second two distinctions refer to goals 
which may be collectively attained. Validly enumerating 
organizational goals is of particular importance when such . 
specification is meant to provide the rationale and cri­
teria for the ensuing analysis.
The difficulties encountered in this matter of 
specifying goals raise the more general problem of adequate­
ly and formally accounting for the distinction between 
"intent" or "motive" and "function." It is clear that the 
structure of social arrangements may indeed engender a 
series of consequences beyond those intended, serve some 
purposes yet also constitute disruptions for others, or in 
other ways vary from its subjectively perceived or desig­
nated design.^
Etzioni (1960; 1975) and others (Gouldner, 1959; 
Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967) have articulated further crit­
icisms from this base of dissatisfaction with the goal model 
of organizations. By now it almost goes without saying 
in organizational research that organizations will most 
often be judged as inefficient; that is, they will be found 
to fall short of stated goals and to be pursuing objectives 
other than formalized goals. An alternative strategy is found 
in the writings of Etzioni (1960) and Gouldner (1959) who 
assert that organizations may be more meaningfully viewed
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as miniature social systems in which goal attainment is 
but one of a number of important functions. Perhaps the 
most obvious yet most frequently overlooked of these im­
portant functions is that organizations "seek" to survive; 
that is, the behavior of individuals occupying key organi­
zational roles is principally, though not exclusively, 
guided by considerations pertaining to organizational 
maintenance and enhancement (Wilson, 1973: 13).
Of course, the systems model is not without its 
critics either. If the goal model has been tagged as con­
taining an inherent rationalist bias, the system model is 
most often accused of harboring a functionalist bias.
This latter accusation stems from the maxim "what exists, 
is functional," which is often erroneously identified as 
summarizing the core of the functionalist position. More 
accurately, "what exists, exists." Existant social arrange­
ments which persist over time presumably meet some basic 
minimum of survival requirements, for instance, attracting 
and holding members. Obviously, no members, no organization. 
However, such arrangements may be functional, dysfunctional, 
or even afunctional in any number of ways, including perpet­
uating deleterious consequences upon those who gladly 
embrace them.
The conceptualization of organizations within the 
context of the systems model is not meant to exclude the 
Weberian notion that organizations are rationally formed 
for the stated purpose of attaining certain goals. Rather,
35
it is presented here to attune the inquiry to other functions 
or consequences which the organizational structure of the 
community might entail. For example, political organizations 
as a rule represent calculated attempts to gain access to the 
formal machinery of government, most often in this country 
through influencing the outcome of elections. Thus, any 
analysis of political organizations would do well to at 
least tangentally consider such stated purpose. However, a 
political organization may wittingly or unwittingly be "do­
ing" other things as well, one of which might well be the 
pacification of its members through providing only a guise 
of meaningful access to the presumed positions of power. Or, 
in keeping with the considerations presented earlier in this 
chapter, political organizations may purposely or inadver­
tently solidify potential lines of social differentiation, 
thereby functioning to support endogamus subsystems of in­
teraction within the community setting.
Organizations as Reference Groups. In an earlier 
section of this chapter, the mediating capacity of organi­
zations was presented and analyzed from a structural per­
spective. Briefly, it was argued that organizations 
constitute interactional subsystems which stand between the 
"isolated" individual and the larger socio-political struc­
ture, thereby providing a medium through which individuals 
may be integrated into a cultural stream, gain access to 
the decision-making apparatus, and so forth. The substance 
of these claims, as well as the nature of the influence
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exerted by organizations, can receive further explication 
by momentarily viewing the problem from another perspective.
One of the more central themes in sociology is that
individuals gain standards or perspectives with which to
view and evaluate the world from groups of which they are
members. Merton (1968: 339-340) has posited the following
conditions as prerequisites for group membership:
First of all. . . the concept of a group refers to 
a number of people who interact with one another in 
accord with established patterns. . . .  A second 
criterion of a group. . . is that interacting persons 
define themselves as members, i.e., that they have 
patterned expectations of forms of interaction which 
are morally binding on them and on other members. . . . 
The correlative and third criterion is that the per­
sons in interaction be defined by others as "belong­
ing to the group". . . .
The problem is only slightly modified if the concern 
is focused upon organizations. As formally constituted 
groups, the (varying) criteria for memberships are ostensi­
bly a matter of technical qualifications, for example, 
paying dues, attending meetings, and so forth. From an 
analytical standpoint, however, the basic criteria for 
membership is the same as that specified for groups in 
general, that is, members can be recognized by the fact 
that their association with the organization has affected 
their behavior. This being the case, the influence of or­
ganizations upon the activities of members is well grounded 
in theoretical expectations.
The applicability of the influence exercised by 
groups and organizations, however, is not necessarily
limited to their immediate memberships. The concept of 
reference g r o u p s h a s  been developed to account for this 
apparent tie often found between groups, their members, and 
some nonmembers as well. The basic assumption underlying 
the reference group concept is that individuals may inter­
nalize group perspectives through psychological identifi­
cation even in the absence of formal group membership and 
participation. In these instances, the affinity which 
exists between nonmember and group may establish the group 
as an occasional or even consistent focal point for gaining 
information about the world in which one lives. This fac­
tor is of particular importance to the discussion of organi­
zations, for it permits the handling of organizational 
influence far beyond formal organizational boundaries.
Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955: 31-34) have documented 
and attempted to account for one aspect of this phenomenon 
in a "two-step flow of influence" paradigm. Lazarsfeld 
and his associates had earlier studied the effects of mass 
media advertising upon the purchasing patterns of consumers 
and of mass media campaigning upon candidate preferences of 
voters. In each case, a rational model of choice was 
posited, that is, individuals were assumed to glean infor­
mation from media sources in a diligent manner and to make 
prudent decisions about products and candidates after care­
fully weighing the evidence. However, the data gathered in 
these studies suggested quite a different process. Indi­
viduals were found to derive information about the world in
38
a systematic but nonrational manner, typically by relying 
upon and accepting uncritically the interpretations of media 
messages. "Opinion leaders," usually respected members of 
groups in which individuals participated, were found to 
supply these interpretations by attaching meanings and conno­
tations to "objective" information. It has been shown in 
previous discussion, however, that the role of opinion 
leader is not restricted to group co-members. Rather, this 
function may be also fulfilled by groups in which the in­
dividual is not a formal member (reference groups) and by 
individuals not personally known to the individual (refer­
ence persons).
The Structure of Political Organizations. Up to 
this point, organizations have been simply characterized as 
structures in which interaction is highly formalized and is 
formally goal oriented. Though adequate for many purposes, 
this preliminary definition does not completely depict the 
referent usually intended by the use of the term organiza­
tion. By way of clarification, the term social group, is 
commonly used to denote structures in which recurrent, direct 
relationships exist among all members. Social groups, there­
fore, are theoretically limited in size by the requirement of 
direct relationships. By contrast, organizations are multi­
group structures (Bertrand, 1972: 132-135; Bates and Harvey, 
1975: 142-144). Thus, individuals in an organization are 
critically linked to one another by sets of indirect as well 
as direct relationships.
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This distinction points to further key characteris­
tics of organizations. Organizations typically reflect a 
well-developed division of labor, with the various sections 
devoted to the performance of specific tasks. Direct re­
lationships among section leaders and other "staff" personnel 
provide co-ordination and indirect links to individual sec­
tion members. Direct links join individuals within sections. 
The formalization of proceedings also translates the norma- 
tively specified interaction within the organization into 
relationships between positions and ranks rather than be­
tween individuals. For example, the relationship between a 
supervisor and a foreman or between a foreman and a worker 
in a given plant should be identical, irrespective of the 
individual supervisors, foremen, or workmen there encounter­
ed. Thus, as is the case with social systems in general, it 
is exactly because the behavior of these individuals is 
predictable by virtue of the positions they occupy that 
social organization can be said to exist (Bertrand, 1972: 3).
Applied to the problem at hand, political organiza­
tions are expected.to be multi-group structures oriented 
most generally to the acquisition of power or the formal 
positions of power (Etzioni, 1975: 107). As indicated 
earlier, these organizations most often consist of politi­
cal professionals, activists, and occasional workers in the 
various leadership, staff, and line (general membership) 
positions, and larger numbers of formally inert psycholog­
ical identifiers. Central to this dissertation is the
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notion that organizational participation and identification 
leads to types of political action, that is, there is some­
thing about the nature of the organizational variable which 
prompts certain kinds of political activity.
Burstein (1972) has argued that social networks in 
general may be ranked on a "voluntariness" continuum. This 
characteristic implies that membership in certain kinds of 
social networks tends to reflect varying degrees of volun­
tary action by those involved. Some networks, for example, 
are purely ascribed and are, therefore, completely involun­
tary. Thus, associations based upon one's age, sex, race, 
ethnicity, and so forth, involve statuses which are a matter 
of birth. Other networks are quasi-voluntary. These refer 
to the interplay between ascribed and achieved statuses, 
such as the type of education one obtains or the sets of 
relations one encounters. A third set refers more nearly 
to voluntary attributes, or the formal roles one plays, such 
as one's occupation, marital status, or participation in 
organizations. Finally, voluntary behaviors constitute the 
fourth category of choosing, to the extent possible, the 
circumstances of interaction.
According to this scheme, organizational participa­
tion is viewed as a voluntary type of action. There is at 
least one other consideration as well, namely, that some 
types of networks are more closely tied into— are more 
central to— the concentration of societal resources. Thus, 
from a structural point of view, one's degree of political
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access is expected to be affected by two factors: (1) one's
participation (or nonparticipation) in political organiza­
tional networks, and (2) assuming participation, the cen­
trality of the political organization in which one is a 
member to key societal resources (Burstein, 1972: 1092- 
1095; Bierstedt, 1975: 237-240) . As has been shown in this 
chapter, participation is likely to be correlated with social 
class and race. To the extent that the line of reasoning 
presented here is correct, the organizational factor stands 
as a critical variable in the emergence of kinds of politi­
cal action.
Types of Political Organizations. Another useful 
strategy in explicating the structure of political organi­
zations involves identifying political organizations within 
a spectrum, or typology, of organizations. The major pur­
pose here is to focus upon the way in which political organi­
zations may be viewed vis-a-vis other organizations and the 
way in which different varieties of political organizations 
themselves may be distinguished. A number of influential 
organizational theorists have advanced typologies potential­
ly useful for these purposes.
Blau and Scott (1962: 43-57), for example, have 
suggested classifying organizations in terms of their primary 
beneficiaries. They have distinguished mutual benefit 
organizations (members are prime beneficiaries), business 
organizations (owners or directors are prime beneficiaries), 
service organizations (definite clientele is major beneficiary),
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and commonwealth organizations (public at large is primary 
beneficiary). While interesting and useful in dealing with 
a wide range of organizations, this typology does not seem 
especially sensitive in distinguishing political organiza­
tions in which the interest here is focused.
A more useful conceptualization— the compliance 
thesis— has been advanced by Etzioni (1975). This typology 
begins with the notion that compliance with organizational 
directives is reducible to the relation in which one actor 
acquiesces to expectations of a superordinate actor. This 
relation is composed of: (1) the ability of the superordi­
nate actor to elicit conformity to directives (power), and
(2) the orientation of the subordinate actor to the power 
of the organization (involvement). This being the case, the 
nature of compliance may be plotted along these two dimen­
sions.
Etzioni (1975: 3-19) argues that there are three 
basic kinds of power which might be employed in the organi­
zational context. These power options reflect the types of 
sanctions which might be utilized in exercising social con­
trol over organizational participants. Coercive power rests 
in the application, or the threat of application, of physical 
sanctions— food, creature comforts, beatings, or even death. 
Remunerative power is based upon control of material re­
sources. Salaries, fringe benefits, fines, or termination 
of employment are appropriate illustrations of material sanc­
tions. Finally, normative power refers to the manipulation
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of symbolic resources, especially those of acceptance, 
prestige, and rejection. An organization may, and typical­
ly does, employ more than one type of power option. However, 
the organization usually relies most heavily upon one type 
of option at the expense of the other two. As Etzioni 
(1975: 6-8) has pointed out, it is difficult to simultan­
eously and effectively emphasize more than one power option 
since this tends to neutralize their respective effects.
Just as there are three modes of power, so also 
there are three main types of involvement, that is, the in­
tensity and direction of the orientation of the subordinate 
actor to the organization. Alienative involvement refers 
to an intense, negative orientation, calculative involvement 
to a mild positive or negative orientation, and moral in­
volvement to a highly positive orientation to the organiza­
tion. Taken together— the power applied by the organization 
and the orientation of the actors to the organization— there 
are three major types of compliance modes. Generally, or­
ganizations with coercive power tend to have actors with 
alienative involvement (coercive compliance). Remunerative 
power is most often combined with calculative involvement 
(utilitarian compliance). Finally, normative power is most 
often found with moral involvement (normative compliance.)
Locating political organizations within this typology 
proves to be a worthwhile endeavor. To begin with, political 
organizations potentially may fall within any one of the 
three major compliance modes outlined above, depending upon
their style of organization and their goals. Etzioni 
(1975: 107-108) argues that the goals of the organization 
often give some clear indications of the compliance struc­
ture. Thus, a political organization which seeks to con­
trol or reallocate the means of coercion can be viewed as 
focusing upon problems of order. Revolutionary groups 
often stand as empirical examples. Here the compliance 
mode is most frequently coercive. On the other hand, eco­
nomic goals, as sought by unions, local political "machines, 
and other political organizations, deal with the realloca­
tion of goods and services and are most compatible with the 
utilitarian compliance structure. Finally, normative organi 
zations usually pursue cultural goals. Examples include 
political organizations touting "good government" themes 
or advancing the cause of any one of a number of "-isms" as 
a central concern.
In this dissertation, the utilitarian and normative 
compliance modes are expected to be most useful in the 
analysis of political organizations in New Orleans. This 
distinction between the normative and utilitarian compli­
ance structures is closely related to the "public- vs. 
private-regardingness" dichotomy of Wilson and Banfield 
(1964: 876-877). They use the term public-regardingness to 
refer to a value complex based in some conception of the 
"public interest" or the "common good," whereas the term 
private-regardingness taps the value complex centered in 
self-interest. Wilson and Banfield have found that certain
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categories of individuals, as reflected in voting patterns 
by class and ethnicity, seem more predisposed toward one 
value complex over the other. Of critical importance here 
is their conclusion that the observed relationship holds 
only for those in a subculture clearly definable in ethnic 
or income terms (Wilson and Banfield, 1964: 884-885). The 
central argument in this chapter has focused upon the role 
of organizations in just such a circumstance.
A Proposed Model of Political Action
Political participation is the type of political 
action which is of greatest interest in this study. One may 
object that this category of political action implicates 
activity taking place solely within the normative confines 
of the existant socio-political system. More precisely, 
the concentration upon political participation appears to 
preclude consideration of revolutionary actions, resort to 
terrorist tactics, and the like. However, it is for this 
exact reason that the emphasis upon political participation 
is preferred. Simply stated, participation in the system 
is argued to be the modal category of political activity.
Specification of Theoretical Perspective. Previous 
discussion of the objective conditions of social differen­
tiation and their subsequent conversion into categories of 
political action may suggest to some an interactional thesis 
focusing upon individuals' cognitive assessments of socio­
political situations. In point of fact, a complete expla­
nation of this conversion process may not be possible without
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considerable attention directed towards this interactional 
dimension. For purposes of this study, however, the focus 
of the analysis is placed squarely upon distributions of 
characteristics and patterns of behavior without regard for 
the subjective definitions and perceptions of the individuals 
involved. This precondition is not meant to denigrate the 
importance of subjective dynamics intrinsic to all human 
behavior. However, such dynamics are neither here defined 
nor treated— they are simply accepted as "given" and are 
assumed to be operating.
The ecological approach is consistent with this 
strategy. This approach is based upon the premise that 
certain distinctive facets of areal units may provide major 
clues in accounting for particular patterns of observable 
behavior. This type of analysis permits the researcher to 
establish the likelihood that certain types of behavior 
will take place under a specified set of contextual circum­
stances. One might even argue that the range of viable 
behavioral and structural options available within any areal 
unit is distinctively interrelated with and delimited by its 
salient ecological (contextual) characteristics.
Heberle (1951: 210) has elaborated the logic of this 
approach in applying the perspective to the study of polit­
ical behavior:
The sociologist. . . merely reverses the process of 
thinking which.every politician uses in calculating 
his chances of winning an election. The political 
candidate knows approximately which social groups 
are his best potential supporters. . . in (each) area
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of his election district; knowing this, (he) will 
attempt to predict in which of these areas he is 
likely to have a safe majority. . . .  On the other 
hand, the social scientist knows the returns in an 
election precinct by precinct. . . .  By taking 
the percentage of the total vote case in each area 
for each candidate and comparing it with the rela­
tive size of certain significant groups in each 
area, the sociologist can infer which groups gave 
the main support for the candidate or party.
An error often associated with this approach has 
been the designation of individual motives and individual 
behaviors on the basis of the observed aggregate character­
istics (Robinson, 1950). As is clear from the debate 
stirred by Robinson's article, this point poses a problem 
mainly to the extent that one erroneously insists upon 
generalizing beyond the group data to individual activities. 
Proper use of the ecological approach on the other hand can 
provide a valuable perspective for investigating the prob­
lem under study, namely, determining the sets of objective 
class and racial characteristics and the organizational 
conditions in which certain types of political participa­
tion are likely to occur.
Specification of the Theoretical Model. The model 
developed in this discussion states that certain sources 
of social differentiation, in this case those of class and 
race, are said to receive salience and direction through 
an organizational factor, leading in turn to forms of po­
litical action. In any population, there are obviously a 
wide range of objective features which could conceivably be 
used to identify socially meaningful categories of
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individuals. One could, for example, distinguish between 
individuals on the basis of parentage, shoe size, region of 
residence, height, occupation, or any other discernible 
factor. It is being argued here that the specification of 
which differences are worth noting occurs in the organiza­
tional structure of the community.
This model is depicted in figure 2. At the most 
general level (Level 1), it stipulates that the potential 
features of social differentiation within a community pro­
vide aggregates of individuals to which emergent or exist- 
ant organizations may orient themselves. These aggregates 
represent potential members and organizational identifiers 
who may be attracted through a collective appeal couched 
in terminology and issues relevant to the conditions of 
differentiation. Attempts by organizations to generate 
support through defining and publicizing such issues sub­
sequently lead to the emergence of distinctive patterns of 
action by the various categories of differentiated indi­
viduals.
Translating these assertions into the more specific 
analytical categories of class and race (Level II), it is 
claimed that class and racial characteristics form the 
prime objective features of social differentiation. These 
class and racial characteristics, therefore, are expected 
to provide the themes and substance of the organizational 
structure found in the modern community. Insofar as the 
organizations are active and are guided by the special
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interests of their respective population bases, distinctive 
forms of political action by class and race will be found 
to exist.
The model is not meant to imply that the objective 
distributions of class and race "cause" or in some other 
way induce the emergence of the organizational structure.
No specific statements have been made in this chapter de­
fining the etiology of such structures.^ The model simply 
assumes that, however an organization emerges or is struc­
tured, an important aspect of organizational maintenance is 
that of extending influence to appropriate categories of 
sympathetic nonmembers and of retaining the interest of 
current members. The proposal suggests, at this point, 
that aggregates of those sharing objective class or racial 
characteristics provide an especially convenient and po­
tentially responsive target population for these tasks.
It should also be noted that the class or racial 
appeal of an organization may occur independently of any 
formally stated goals. It is by now well known that any 
social arrangement may engender a series of consequences 
beyond those intended, or in other ways vary from its sub­
jectively perceived or designated design (Merton, 1968: 
115). In other words, organizations may be wittingly and 
unwittingly doing a number of things, including purposely 
or inadvertently solidifying potential lines of social 
differentiation. Whatever the intention, an organizational 
factor is deemed necessary for the emergence of distinctive
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patterns of political action.
This latter observation stands at the core of the 
model, namely, that objective categories of social differ­
entiation here class and racial characteristics, do not in 
and of themselves lead to distinctive patterns of activity. 
From a social psychological point of view, such action is 
contingent upon the attachment of meaning to otherwise 
inert characteristics. From a structural perspective, 
forms of action emerge only in the presence of the organi­
zational factor as an intervening variable in the transi­
tion from aggregates to conscious groups. Either by 
accident or by design, organizations stand between isolated, 
undifferentiated individuals and the larger socio-political 
context and, thereby, function as reference groups for both 
active members and psychological identifiers alike. In 
this process, the organizational structure of the community 
contains the appropriate mediating capacity to convert 
aggregates of individuals into politically active categories 
of individuals.
Footnotes
^It should be noted that this passage employs 
"income" and "occupation" as empirical indicators of social 
class. This usage is worth noting because it represents a 
widely accepted procedure both in terms of how class is 
commonly perceived by American sociologists and in terms of 
how they have often attempted to measure it. The convention 
stems originally from the efforts of Lynd and Lynd (1929) to 
analyze "Middletown" within the framework of a two-class 
system composed of a business class and a working class.
The attempted linkage with Marx's concept of class is 
obvious.
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2
Dahrendorf's (1959) Class and Class Conflict in 
Industrial Society represents the most definitive reformu­
lation-©!' Marx's theory of social class developed within 
the context of the dialectic.
3
Nisbet (1966: 180), for example, states, "The 
major controversy in the study of stratification. . . (is) 
the subtler and theoretically more fundamental one of 
social class versus social status: of a view of the new
society resting upon the assumption of the erosion of 
class and its replacement by fluctuant, mobile, status 
groups and by status-seeking individuals.
4
Kahl (1953: 9) is among those sociologists who are 
not plagued by such doubts. For example, he states, "The 
degree to which people at a given stratification level. . . 
are explicitly aware of themselves as a distinctive social 
grouping is called their degree of class consciousness 
(Sartori, 1969: 98).
5
Although the patterns described in these early 
works have clearly undergone change, the extent and signif­
icance of that change are too many a matter of debate. 
Handlin, for example, summarizes the progress of blacks in 
the 1960's towards equality with the words " . . .  Negroes 
have advanced far more in these ten years than any other 
comparable group in the past," while Clark counters with 
the following assessment (Davidson, 1972: 4):
The homicide rate and delinquency rate in Negro 
ghettos. . . have not decreased. . . . Negroes 
are still restricted to ghettos by income and 
white resistence. . . . Unemployment and under­
employment are high. . . . The welfare system con­
tinues to reinforce family instability. . . . The 
educational system of the ghetto has decayed even 
further. . . .
g
The two terms— mass society and urban society— are 
not, however, completely interchangeable. Kornhauser (1959: 
13-17), for example, has advanced the thesis that the state 
of mass society, an anomic conducive to numerous horrors, is 
not necessarily identical with nor limited to urban indus­
trial society.
7
These assertions call into question the often 
espoused notion of the American "melting pot." This popular 
bit of folklore suggests that the American way represents a 
single, uniformly accepted culture comprising the blended 
contributions of any number of its constituent groups. In 
this spirit, former president Woodrow Wilson once observed: 
"America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of
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himself as belonging to a particular national group in 
America has not yet become an American" (Handlin, 1963: 121).
o
Durkheim (1964: 28) argues, "A nation can be main­
tained only if, between the state and the individual, there 
is interrelated a whole series of secondary groups near 
enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their 
sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general 
torrent of social life."
g
Merton (1968: 115) has admonishmgly observed:
. . . scrutiny of current vocabularies of functional 
analysis (shows) how easily, and how unfortunately, 
the sociologist may identify motives with functions.
It (is) further indicated that the motive and the 
function vary independently and that failure to 
register this fact in an established terminology has 
contributed to the unwitting tendency among socio­
logists to confuse the subjective categories of 
motivation and the objective categories of function.
■^The term was introduced by Hyman (1942) in analyz­
ing the influence of certain groups upon a sample of students 
and their perceptions of their own status.
11Dahrendorf (1959) provides an excellent analysis 
of the conditions conducive to the emergence of such 
structures.
CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
Introduction
It has been theorized in the previous chapter that 
certain objective features of social differentiation are 
converted into modes of political action through an in­
tervening organizational variable. In this chapter, the 
intent is to specify the considerations and procedures 
relevant to the testing of this basic proposition. As with 
much sociological research, the problem under investigation 
here does not lend itself to direct manipulation. For 
example, one cannot select subjects and randomly assign 
them to treatment groups to be exposed, in turn, to vary­
ing levels of class conditions or to increments of racial 
characteristics. This situation is hardly unique. Inde­
pendent variables in which sociologists are typically 
interested are rarely amenable to true experimental manip­
ulation, usually because it is either physically impossible 
or morally objectionable to do so.
This might not necessarily be regarded as a prob­
lem. However, there is a rather persistent theme in the 
methodological literature which suggests that true experi­
mentation is the most desirable of research strategies.
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The implication is that other modes of analysis are to be 
only grudgingly employed. The main advantage attributed 
to the experimental method is the degree of control intro­
duced in isolating the anticipated effects of independent 
variables upon the dependent variable. The randomization 
procedure itself serves to nullify the presence of some 
extraneous variables and the experimental manipulation of 
variables lends credence to the inference that observed 
effects are indeed attributable to specified variables.
These assertions are accepted here as essentially 
correct. It is also clear, however, that some procedure 
other than the experimental method must be used. The pro­
position under consideration may be subjected to an 
appropriate form of empirical testing through a strategy 
of comparative analysis. This strategy involves the com­
parison of the independent and dependent variables in a 
series of naturally occurring situations in order to assess 
the presence, consistency, and strength of the hypothe­
sized relationships. An advantage of this strategy is that 
it provides a framework having some control features for 
pitting expectations against empirical evidence given the 
limitations of nonexperimental variables.'*' It does, how­
ever, lack the precise control capabilities of the experi­
mental method, chiefly because the effects of the independent 
variables take place prior to the study and, hence, are 
outside the realm of the direct control of the researcher. 
Thus, one can never really be certain that observed "effects"
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are in fact the result of independent variables specified 
in the study. However, lack of complete confidence that 
a relationship is real should not preclude attempts at 
control and empirical testing. As Rosenberg (1965: 38) 
has correctly pointed out, science is built upon "degrees 
of confidence rather than certainty."
As specified in the previous chapter, the ecologi­
cal perspective shall be used to direct the course of the 
proposed comparative analysis. Census publications con­
stitute the most comprehensive and systematic compilations 
of data covering a variety of areal units from census 
tracts to entire states. Likewise, a good deal of aggre­
gate information is available which taps the political 
activity patterns of areal units. These data have been 
recorded from the precinct to the state level in special 
reports of election returns and in the rolls of voter 
registration offices. These sources, especially when 
supplemented with survey data, contain a wealth of infor­
mation appropriate for the comparisons of areal units 
intended in this study.
Operationalization of Terms
Objective Class and Racial Characteristics. The 
distributions of objective class and racial characteristics 
within selected areal units comprise the initial indepen­
dent variables of interest. Objective class characteris­
tics are measured in an index consisting of the following 
four indicators (Murray and Vedlitz, 1975: 4): (1)
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percentage of adults in an areal unit who are high school
graduates, (2) median family income per areal unit, (3)
percentage of adults in the labor force who are employed
2
in nonmanual occupations per areal unit, and (4) per­
centage of families in an areal unit who are classified
3as being above the poverty level. Possible score values 
for this index range in size from 0 to 100, with each in­
dicator contributing a maximum of twenty-five points to 
the overall score (see section 1 of figure 3) . The per­
centage measures are awarded one point for every four 
percentage units and one point is assigned for each one 
thousand dollars of family income up to a maximum of 
twenty-five points. The racial characteristics of an areal 
are operationally defined as the percentage of residents 
who are nonwhite (see section 2 of figure 3).
These two main indicators— the class index and the 
percentage of residents who are nonwhite— may also be com­
bined to form a single three dimensional measure of social 
differentiation. Howard, Long, and Zdrazil (1971: 45-47) 
have noted that in recent urban elections in the South, 
the black vote has been relatively consistent across class 
lines while the direction and variation of the white vote 
has fluctuated by class. On the basis of this observation, 
Howard and his associates suggest the use of a race/class 
variable consisting of black, lower white, and upper white 
dimensions. This can be accomplished by considering as 
black all areal units whose population exceeds fifty percent
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SUMMARY OF VARIABLES
Variable
(1) Objective class
characteristics
(2) Objective racial
characteristics
(3) Race/class
(4) Organizational 
composition
(5) Organizational 
effectiveness
FIGURE 3
UNDER STUDY AND THEIR RESPECTIVE INDICATORS
Empirical Indicator
Objective class index, 100 possible points, 
with maximum of 25 points for each of 
the following:
(a) percentage of adults in areals 
unit who are high school graduates
(b) median family income for areal unit
(c) percentage of adults in areal unit 
who are employed in nonmanual occupations
(d) percentage of families in areal 
unit above poverty level
Percentage of residents in areal unit who 
are nonwhite.
Race/class index, 3 point scale:
(a) black: areas in which more than 50% 
of residents are nonwhite
(b) lower white: areas in which less 
than 50% of residents are nonwhite 
and in which objective class index 
score is less than 59
(c) upper white: areas in which less 
than 50% of residents are nonwhite 
and in which objective class index 
is more than 59
Race/class designation, three classifi­
cations :
(a) black: majority of reported mem­
bership are blacks
(b) Lower white: majority of reported 
membership are whites and working 
class constituency is claimed
(c) upper white: majority of reported 
membership are white and middle or 
upper class constituency is claimed
. Organizational Effectiveness Indices 
based upon:
(a) ranking of organizations by organ­
izational leaders
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FIGURE 3 - Continued
(b) ranking of organizations by 
candidates for office
(c) composite ranking derived from 
(a) and (b)
(6) Political Measured as three separate dimensions:
participation
(a) registration: percentage of 
eligibles who are registered to 
vote
(b) turn out: percentage of those 
registered who vote
(c) candidate choice: percentage who 
vote for each candidate
nonwhite, and by classifying the remaining units as upper white 
if falling in the top one-third of the class index distribution, 
lower white if in the bottom two-thirds of this distribution 
(see section 3 of figure 3) .
A main advantage of this typology is that it is sensi­
tive to important shifts and trends in the composition of a 
community's political coalitions. For example, one can easily 
identify and trace four logical coalition outcomes: (1) blacks
and lower whites versus upper whites (populist coalition), (2) 
blacks and upper whites versus lower whites (moderation- 
paternalism coalition), (3) upper and lower whites versus blacks 
(segregation-white supremacy coalition), and (4) no pattern, 
instances in which the three groups split their support for 
three different candidates or issues (Howard, Long and Zdrazil, 
1971: 52). All three indicators, namely, the class index, the
60
percentage of residents who are nonwhite, and the three- 
dimensional race/class index, will be employed in subsequent 
analysis.
Political Organizational Structure of the Community. 
The initial question to be confronted here is that of spec­
ifying how a community's political organizations can be 
adequately identified. The hierarchy of organizations for 
the purposes of this study is defined as comprising those 
which can be shown to have been active in the elections un­
der consideration. Activity is said to have taken place 
if (1) it can be shown that the political organization so­
licited electoral support either for itself or a political 
candidate by contacting potential voters, by producing cam­
paign propaganda, or by financing or otherwise backing such
4
efforts, or (2) it is known to a reference person, candi­
date for office, or leader of a "rival" organization that 
electoral involvement took place. Two basic dimensions of 
a community's political organizational structure are argued 
to be of special significance, namely, organizational com­
position and organizational effectiveness. The first deals 
with the composition of organizational membership and non­
member constituencies, and the second with perceived organ­
izational effectiveness.
Organizational composition is indicated by the 
proportions of members by race and class as claimed by or­
ganizational leaders. The nonmember constituencies are 
assessed by noting the target populations claimed by
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organizational leaders (see section 4 of figure 3) . It 
is admitted that such claims are no guarantee that actual 
ties exist between organization and nonmember. However, 
the claim would seem at least to indicate categories of 
nonmembers to which the organization consciously directs 
its appeals. Finally, the organizational leaders are 
asked to specify the areal units of residence from which 
these members and nonmembers are drawn. At first glance, 
this may seem to constitute an unrealistic request. How­
ever, it is assumed at this point that organizational 
leaders are able to specify quite readily within which 
precincts or areas organizational strengths lie.
The effectiveness of political organizations is 
ascertained from ratings supplied by two independent sources. 
First, the leaders of the organizations themselves are asked 
to rank the community's political organizations in terms 
of their perceived ability to exert an influence upon the 
outcome of elections. Secondly, candidates for office in 
selected elections are asked to perform the same task.
Both are requested to indicate the areal units in which the 
organizations are thought to be effective. The two rank­
ings are then used to compile a composite rating or organ­
izational effectiveness (see section 5 of figure 3).
Political Participation. Participation in the 
established political system may include a variety of acts 
reflecting degrees of involvement in or commitment to the 
system. Milbrath (1965: 18-22), for example, has
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distinguished four major categories of activity ranging 
from gladitorial activities (being an active party member, 
soliciting campaign funds, being a candidate for office, 
etc.), to transitional activities (making monetary contri­
butions, attending political events, etc.), to spectator 
activities (exposing oneself to political stimuli, voting, 
engaging in political discussions, etc.). Apathetics com­
prise the fourth category. From this perspective, voting 
represents a minimal amount of engagement in the political 
process. However, from another point of view, voting 
stands as the modal type of participation in which the bulk 
of the populace has actually partaken. The percentage of 
those who turn out to vote in this country is small when 
contrasted with the pool of those eligible to vote, but not 
when compared with the proportions involved in the higher 
levels of political participation specified by Milbrath.
The operationalization of political participation 
is centered around aspects of voting. Three empirical in­
dicators are employed: (1) the percentage of eligible
individuals within a given areal unit who are registered 
to vote, (2) the percentage of those registered per areal 
unit who voted in specific elections, and (3) the percen­
tages of votes cast per areal unit for various candidates 
(see section 6 of figure 3). What is being argued in this 
case is that voting as a form of political participation 
begins with formally qualifying oneself by complying with 
registration requirements and procedures. Areas where
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larger proportions of individuals take this step are regarded 
as exhibiting higher degrees of political participation than 
those with lower levels of registration. The relative size 
of the voter turn out is the second level of this partici­
pation process for areal units, with actual candidate choice 
constituting an indication of the apparent purpose intended 
by given categories of individuals.
Statement of Hypotheses
5The basic propositions to be tested in this disser­
tation may be stated in question form as follows:
(1) do levels of voter registration, voter turn out, and 
candidate choice increase in areal units with higher 
objective class indices and larger proportions of white 
residents?
(2) are the varieties of organizational composition related 
to areal class index and racial composition?
(3) does organizational effectiveness vary by areal class 
index and racial composition?
(4) are levels of political participation consistent across 
varieties of organizational composition and degrees of 
organizational effectiveness in these areal units?
The anticipated answer to the first three of these questions 
is "yes." The fourth is expected to be answered negatively.
Turning to the first question, a wide range of re­
search has established the relationship of class and racial 
characteristics with levels of political participation. The 
average voter has been shown to be "unyoung, unblack, middle 
income, middle educated, and middle class" (Scammon and 
Wattenberg, 1972: 45-58). Cast in terms of rates of partic­
ipation, those with higher incomes, higher educational
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levels, and employment in managerial, professional or 
other white collar occupations have been found to be more 
involved politically than those ranking lower on these 
scales. Further, it has been shown that whites have been 
much more likely to participate politically than have 
blacks (Lipset, 1963: 185-189). The hypotheses suggested 
by these data and previous discussion are:
(1) Areal units with higher objective class indices will 
have higher percentages of individuals registered to 
vote, turn out to vote, and unanimity in candidate 
choice than areal units with lower class index 
scores.
(2) Areal units with larger proportions of nonwhite 
residents will have lower percentages of individuals 
registered to vote, turn out to vote, and unanimity 
in candidate choice than areal units with smaller 
proportions of nonwhites.
Previous research likewise illustrates the close 
relationship of class and race with organizational partici­
pation. The national surveys of Wright and Hyman (1958) 
as well as the cross-national studies summarized by Almond 
and Verba (1965) indicate the persistent tendency among 
those of higher objective class rank to become more ac­
tively engaged in the organizational structure. In a 
similar vein, whites have been found to participate more 
actively in organizational life than have blacks (Wright 
and Hyman, 1958; Lipset, 1963: 185), although there is some 
evidence that the relative level of organizational partic­
ipation of blacks vis-a-vis whites has been slightly 
underestimated (Babchuck and Thompson, 1962: 647-649). 
Therefore, it is expected that organizational composition
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shall be primarily a reflection of the distribution of 
class and racial characteristics in various areas. Formally 
stated:
(3) Areas with higher proportions of whites and higher 
class index scores will have greater representation 
in the political organizational structure than areas 
with lower proportions and scores respectively.
Participation in organizations is only one aspect 
of the interest here in the organizational dimension. Of 
great concern also is the effectiveness of the various 
organizations in exerting influence upon the course of po­
litical events in the community. As stated earlier, the 
pluralistic conception of the organizational structure has 
been that organizations represent a wide range of special 
interests and that each works to advance its own interests 
within the constraints of a spirit of democratic competi­
tion (Rose, 1967: 55-58; Truman, 1968: 134). Elitists, 
however, emphasize that the influence of organizations is 
closely allied with power bases, an important one of which 
is the class structure itself (Schattschneider, 1960: 35- 
42; Parenti, 1970: 259-263). They suggest that the re­
sources which organizations might bring to bear in conducting 
day-to-day affairs vary considerably. Although there are a 
number of ways in which organizational resources might be 
enhanced, organizations of higher class composition are 
argued to have greater access to structural controls natural­
ly appropriate to such increases. The theoretical bias in 
the dissertation for the elitist position has already been 
expressed.
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One of the ways in which a political organization 
might be considered as influential is in terms of the 
electoral support it is able to marshall. This could 
ostensibly cover a wide range of activities including 
raising funds, establishing ready pools of volunteer work­
ers, staging political rallies, formulating campaign pro­
paganda and strategy, supplying poll watchers, and so forth. 
In this study, organizational effectiveness as alleged by 
rival organizational leaders and candidates for office will 
be assessed by the levels of political participation found 
within the areal limits of organizational activity. Inso­
far as an organization is able to perform effectively as a 
mediator and reference group for its corresponding target 
population of members and identifying nonmembers, it is 
expected to increase political participation within rec­
ognizable areal units.
These relationships involving organizational effec­
tiveness are stated as follows:
(4) Areal units with higher objective class indices and 
larger proportions of white residents will have higher 
organizational effectiveness ratings than areal units 
with lower class indices and smaller proportions of 
whites.
(5) Areal units with higher organizational effectiveness 
ratings will have higher percentages of individuals 
registered to vote, turn out to vote, and unanimity
in candidate choice than areal units with lower organ­
izational effectiveness ratings.
Figure 4 contains a summarization of the basic re­
lationships contained within the five formalized hypotheses. 
Areal units which are classified as upper white are expected
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FIGURE 4
SUMMARY OF EXPECTED RELATIONSHIPS AS EXPRESSED 
IN THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
I. Race/Class Index
Black Lower White Upper White
Organizational
Effectiveness Aa B C
Expectation: C > B > A
II. Race/Class Index
Organizational 
Effectiveness -
Organiza­
tional
Effec­
tiveness
High/3 A° B C A B C
Low D E F D E F
Race/Class
Index-Column
Effects
AD BE CF
Expectations: (1) CF > BE > AD
(2) ABC > DEF
(3) A > D, B > E, and C > F
All cell entries represent anticipated level of organi­
zational effectiveness.
Organizational effectiveness variable dichotomized into 
"High" and "Low" for this presentation.
c
All cell entries represent anticipated levels of po­
litical participation.
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to have the highest levels of organizational effectiveness, 
while lower rates are expected in lower white and in black 
areas. Further, it is anticipated that observed levels of 
political participation will increase as one moves across 
the race/class index as applied to areal units. Specifical­
ly, the highest rates of political participation are expected 
in areal units predominated by upper whites, while succes­
sively lower rates of participation are anticipated among 
lower white and black areas respectively. Should the dis­
tribution of race/class characteristics fail to be a factor 
in affecting levels of organizational effectiveness or po­
litical participation, there will be no differences among 
the column effects indicated in section I and II of the 
table.
However, the anticipated effect of race/class upon 
political participation is not thought to be consistent 
across levels of organizational effectiveness. Areas where 
organizational effectiveness is said to be high are expected 
to exhibit higher levels of political participation than 
areal units where organizational effectiveness is low, re­
gardless of whether the area be black, lower white, or 
upper white. What is being argued is that organizational 
effectiveness stands as an intervening variable between 
distributions of objective race/class features and categories 
of political action by race and class. Should organizational 
effectiveness exert no significant influence upon political 
participation levels across race/class categories, there will
69
be no difference between the row effects indicated in 
section II of the table.
Sources of Data 
The Setting. Partly by design and partly by cir­
cumstance, the study involves an analysis of recent local 
elections in Orleans Parish. There are, first of all, good 
theoretical reasons for dealing with local politics using 
Orleans Parish as a case study. As stipulated in the intro­
ductory chapter, the American political system is highly 
decentralized (Dye and Zeigler, 1972: 199-200). Consequent­
ly, attempts to define its structure and analyze its pro­
cesses require full and thorough treatment at the local 
level (Riker, 1959: 11-12). Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that political decisions most immediately affec­
ting everyday life take place locally. Hence, local issues 
are often hotly contested in a manner which gives flesh to 
potential cleavages otherwise dormant in state and national 
elections. On the other hand, Orleans Parish, comprising 
essentially the city of New Orleans, happens to be a readily 
accessible area containing features suitable for examining 
the problem under study. The city's cultural and histori­
cal heritage marks the confluence of French and Spanish 
traditions with those of the Old and New South producing, it 
is argued, a basic politics of class and race.
The most current and comprehensive sources of data 
relevant to the present study may be found in the following 
items:
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(1) selected 1970 publications released by the United
States Bureau of the Census (1972),
(2) the registration rolls of the Orleans Parish Registrar 
of Voters,
(3) voting returns compiled by the Orleans Parish Demo­
cratic Executive Committee (1973) and the Office of
the Secretary of State for the State of Louisiana 
(1972, 1974).
These materials contain detailed information concerning the 
city's social, racial, economic, and political character­
istics commensurate with the purposes of this study. Of 
equal importance, these data are presented in forms amenable 
to the analysis of New Orleans by specific areal units.
The census data, for example, are available by 
census tracts. Such tracts constitute the units into which 
metropolitan areas have been divided for statistical pur­
poses by the Bureau of the Census in co-operation with local 
committees. As a rule of thumb, tracts generally contain 
an average of approximately 4,000 residents and are drawn 
in such a way to comprise relatively homogeneous units.
Data enumerated by tracts which are of particular relevance 
here include population size by age and race, income char­
acteristics for individuals and families, schooling and 
educational attainment levels for adults, and detailed 
occupation and employment classifications.
The political divisions within New Orleans are de­
fined in terms of the city's seventeen wards and their 
respective subdivisions, the precincts. Vital political 
information available for these political units include
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voter registration figures, voter turn out levels, and the 
compilations of the vote for each candidate in selected 
elections. Fortunately, comparison of wards, precincts, 
and census tracts is possible in the case of New Orleans 
since the boundaries of each of these divisions, while not 
perfectly coterminous, do nonetheless permit matching 
without gross distortions. Therefore, although wards are 
much larger in size than any given census tract, a number 
of tracts may be combined to indicate significant ward 
characteristics indirectly through census materials. Like­
wise, precincts are generally smaller than census tracts 
but can be combined in order to supply the political data 
for any given tract. The rationale behind the matching of 
census tracts with political divisions, therefore, is the 
hope of producing areal units which are well-defined in 
terms of both ecological and political characteristics.
A map containing the matching of census tract and politi­
cal ward boundaries is presented in appendix 1.
However, the matching of tracts and precincts seems 
to be the more desirable of the two strategies. Such a 
grouping will yield fairly small and relatively homogeneous 
units. This would not be the case with the larger, more 
compositionally diverse wards. With this purpose in mind 
then, one hundred and sixty-three census tracts and four 
hundred twenty-three precincts were subjected to initial 
examination. Several highly irregular tracts comprising 
warehouse districts and industrial zones were eliminated
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from consideration. Further, several emergent tracts with 
extremely small populations were combined with appropriate 
adjacent tracts of the more usual size. Finally, in a 
small number of instances, two or three tracts were com­
bined into single areal units in order to achieve a more 
harmonious fit of precinct and tract boundaries. A final 
tally of four hundred nineteen precincts were combined with 
one hundred thirty-one census tract units. A listing of 
these matched tracts and precincts is presented in appendix 
2. It is these matched tracts and precincts which consti­
tute the areal units of New Orleans for the purposes of 
this study.
The Elections. Earlier in this chapter, political 
participation was said to comprise voter registration, 
voter turn out, and candidate choice in specified areal 
units. These indicators may be concretely measured only 
within the framework of specific elections. Two basic 
considerations are invoked in choosing these elections, 
namely, the time frame of the election and, two, the 
visibility of the election. Concerning the issue of when 
selected elections took place, "recent" elections are pre­
ferred since interviews with organizational leaders and 
candidates for office are planned as a supplement to census 
materials and precinct returns. Asking respondents to re­
call details concerning organizational activity and effec­
tiveness from elections too distant in the past runs greater
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risk of inaccurate or incomplete responses due to under­
standable lapses of memory.
On the other hand, the time element must be balanced 
with considerations for the number and qualities of local 
elections available for such analysis over recent time spans. 
Elections included in the study should involve races for a 
variety of vital local offices and comprise broad based 
interests found engaging by organizations from a cross- 
section of the community. This strategy is not meant as a 
systematic sample of available elections but rather concen­
trates upon selecting out types of elections which relevant 
forms of organizational activity are expected, and, hope­
fully, cleavages among organizations are exposed. In this 
vein, special attention is directed towards those elections 
which forced run-offs and, hence, organizational realign­
ments for the second election. Further, contests featuring 
black and white candidates for office or candidates having 
clearly defined class ties are given greater consideration.
Following these guidelines, eleven elections have 
been selected for consideration in this study. A summary 
of these elections is presented in figure 5. The first 
two elections are the First (August 19, 1972) and Second 
(September 30, 1972) Democratic Primaries for the position 
of Supreme Court Justice, First District, State of 
Louisiana. This election was somewhat unusual since it 
featured races for two associate justice positions which 
had become available simultaneously through retirements
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FIGURE 5
SUMMARY OF ELEVEN RECENT NEW ORLEANS 
ELECTIONS SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS
Year Position Contested Candidates
1972 (1) Supreme Court Justice, First 
District, a State of Louisiana, 
First Democratic Primary
Pascal F. Calogero, 
Revius 0. Ortique, 
William V. Redmann 
Leon Sarpy
Jr.
Jr.
(2) Supreme Court Justice, Second 
Democratic Primary
Pascal F. Calogero, 
Leon Sarpy
Jr.
1973 (3) District Attorney, Orleans 
Parish, First Democratic Primary
Harry Connick 
Jim Garrison 
George W. Reese 
Ross T. Scaccia
(4) District Attorney, Second 
Democratic Primary
Harry Connick 
Jim Garrison
(5) Civil Sheriff, Orleans Parish, 
First Democratic Primary
Johnny Jackson, Sr. 
Alvin J. Sargent 
Milton A. Stire
(6) Clerk of Criminal Court, Orleans 
Parish, First Democratic Primary
Herman J. Bustemente 
Daniel B. Haggerty 
Edwin A. Lombard
(7) Clerk of Criminal Court, Second 
Democratic Primary
Daniel B. Haggerty 
Edwin A. Lombard
1974 (8) Supreme Court Justice, First 
District, State of Louisiana, 
First Democratic Primary
Pascal F. Calogero, 
Alwynn J. Cronvich 
Jim Garrison
Jr.
(9) Supreme Court Justice, Second 
Democratic Primary
Pascal F. Calogero, 
Alwynn J. Cronvich
Jr.
(10) Judge, Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, First Democratic 
Primary
Peter H. Beer 
Joseph R. Bossetta 
Dcminic C. Grieshaber 
George W. Reese
(11) Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Second Democratic Primary
Peter H. Beer 
Joseph H. Bossetta
^irst District is comprised of Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, 
and St. Bernard Parishes.
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prior to their scheduled expiration dates. One seat 
carried a term expiring December 31, 19 80, and the second 
seat was due to expire on December 31, 1974. The race for 
the latter position is included in the study for three 
reasons. One, the 1974 expiration date allows for a com­
parison two years hence of an election involving an ex­
tremely important judgeship position. Two, the candidates 
for that position, Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Revius O. 
Ortique, Jr., William V. Redmann, and Leon Sarpy, are in­
dividuals whose origins and categories of potential support 
cover the range of class distinctions in New Orleans. 
Calogero and Redmann, for example, both claim ties with 
the working class and organized labor while Sarpy's member- 
sips in the Krewe of Rex and the Boston Club attest to his 
upper class status. The racial issue is also a factor in 
this election. Ortique is one of the city's better known 
black lawyers. Two, the failure of any of the four can­
didates to carry a majority of the votes in the first 
primary forced a run-off election between Calogero and 
Sarpy, thereby presenting an interesting situation for 
analyzing votes in these two elections by class and race.
A total of five elections are selected for analysis 
from the 1973 First and Second Democratic Primaries held on 
the tenth of November and the fifteenth of December respec­
tively. The race for Orleans Parish District Attorney 
pitted challengers Harry Connick, George W. Reese, and Ross 
T. Scaccia against controversial incumbent Jim Garrison.
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The highly visible campaign marked Connick's second attempt 
to unseat Garrison and the race was further intensified by 
the complex of "law and order" issues with its attached 
racial overtones. The second primary featured a run-off 
between Connick and Garrison.
The Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff race was also 
drawn from the 1973 Democratic primaries. This contest 
found long-time incumbent and old-style politician Milton 
A. Stire faced by two black candidates, Rev. Johnny Jackson, 
Sr., a well known pastor and community leader, and the 
lesser known Alvin J. Sargent. Stire won the election with­
out a run-off. The election is of interest here in terms 
of the distribution of both Stire's support and those of 
the respective black candidates. The final two elections 
from 1973 involve the race for the position of Clerk of 
Criminal Court (Orleans Parish). Daniel B. Haggerty, like 
Stire an incumbent of long standing and a politician of 
the old school, was challenged by Edwin A. Lombard and 
Herman J. Bustemente. It was generally felt within the 
city's political circles that Lombard, a respected and 
articulate lawyer, had a good chance of becoming the first 
black to win a city-wide elective office since Reconstruc­
tion. Bustemente was not regarded as a serious candidate. 
This speculation proved to be essentially correct.
Bustemente polled less than six percent of the vote in the 
first primary and a second primary was necessary to settle 
the issue between Haggerty and Lombard.
The 1974 Democratic primaries were held on August 
seventeenth and September twenty-eighth. The first two 
elections of interest involved the second run in two years 
for the Supreme Court Justice seated vacated by retirement. 
Pascal Calogero, who had successfully sought the position 
in 1972, now faced challenges from Jim Garrison, recover­
ing from his defeat by Connick in the 1973 District 
Attorney's race, and Alwynn J. Cronvich, Criminal Sheriff 
of Jefferson Parish and self-styled "law and order" can­
didate. This race obviously invites comparisons with the 
same election of 1972. It also proved to be one of the 
more heated and less dignified campaigns in recent years.
A second primary was necessary to decide this election as 
well.
The final two elections are drawn from the race 
for Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, a posi­
tion also made available by retirement and carrying an 
expiration date of December 31, 1983. The four contest­
ants were City Councilman Peter H. Beer, Municipal Judge 
Joseph R. Bossetta, Civil Court Judge Dominic C. Grieshaber, 
and lawyer George W. Reese, also a candidate in the 1973 
District Attorney race. Beer, who was viewed as repre­
senting "uptown New Orleans" on the City Council, promised 
an open campaign in which no money would be paid by him 
for organizational endorsements and support. On the other 
hand, Bossetta, a George Wallace elector in 1968 who re­
portedly "softened" since that time, actively sought the
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involvement and support of political organizations. The 
appropriate role of the city's political organizations 
thus became somewhat of an open campaign issue through 
both the first and second primaries of this race.
With the selection of these elections, it is now 
possible to apply the operationalization instructions to 
the indicators of political participation. Turning first 
to the problem of voter registration levels, it is noted 
that the Orleans Parish Registrar of Voters Office com­
piles the numbers of those registered to vote by precinct 
and by ward on a monthly basis. State regulations con­
cerning voter eligibility require that an individual be 
registered at least thirty days prior to an election before 
being allowed to participate. Conversations with personnel 
at the Registrar of Voters Office reveal that the number of 
persons registering between first and second primaries in 
any given year is negligible. Therefore, the decision was 
made to determine registration levels on the basis of the 
rolls as established one month prior to the first primary 
of each of the elections involved, that is, July of 1972, 
October of 1973, and July of 1974, respectively.
The registration rolls for these months provide 
the absolute numbers of those registered to vote. In raw 
form, these numbers are not useful due to variations in the 
sizes of the base populations by area and year of all those 
eligible to register. Further, no estimates of the per­
centages registered from the pool of all those eligible to
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register are attempted by the Registrar of Voters Office. 
These percentages, however, may be crudely estimated from 
census data associated with the previously defined areal 
units. As the minimum age for registration is eighteen 
years and the most recent census data available are for 
the year 1970, the pool of those eligible to vote per areal 
unit is defined as the absolute number of individuals six­
teen years of age and older per areal unit for the 1972 
estimate, fifteen years of age and older for the 1973 
estimate, and fourteen years of age and older for the 1974
g
estimate. The level of voter registration for each areal 
unit then is computed by dividing the actual number regis­
tered in an area by the estimate of the total number 
eligible to register. A summary of these procedures is 
presented in figure 6.
The registration information also provides some 
basis for standardizing the measurement of voter turn out 
in the various elections. The compilation of the ballots 
cast in each precinct and ward are available through the 
Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee for all 
elections except those dealing with the Supreme Court 
Justice seat. Data for the 1972 and 1974 versions of this 
race are, however, obtainable through the Louisiana Sec­
retary of State's office. The basic procedure involves 
combining these voting returns by precinct to match the 
appropriate tracts. Voter turn out per areal unit is com­
puted by dividing the total number of votes cast in an area
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FIGURE 6
MEASURES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Dimension Indicator of Participation Operational Definition
Percent registered per 
areal unit, 1972
(1) Registra- Percent registered per 
tion areal unit, 1973
Percent registered per 
areal unit, 1974
Total number of persons 
per areal unit registered 
in July 1972 divided by 
total number of persons 
16 years of age and older 
enumerated in census per 
areal unit
Total number of persons 
per areal unit registered 
in October 1973 divided 
by total nurrfoer of persons 
15 years of age and older 
per areal unit
Total number of persons 
per areal unit registered 
in July 1974 divided by 
total number of persons 
14 years of age and 
older per areal unit
(2) Turn out Percent turn out (computed Total number of votes cast
for each election) per areal unit divided by
the total number of persons 
registered per areal unit.
(3) Candidate 
Choice
Percentage of votes cast 
for candidate (computed 
for each candidate)
Total number of votes cast 
for a candidate per areal 
unit divided by the total 
number of votes cast for 
all candidates per areal 
unit
81
by the corresponding number of individuals registered to 
vote. Measures of candidate support are assessed by di­
viding the number of votes cast for each candidate per 
areal unit by the total number of votes for that area.
These latter procedures are likewise specified in figure 6.
The Organizations. The identification of relevant 
political organizations and the subsequent collection of 
pertinent data are more problematic here than was the 
gathering of information for areal units discussed in the 
previous section. Preestablished lists of such organi­
zations and compilations of their characteristics relevant 
to the purposes of this study do not exist. Therefore, 
some systematic procedure must be instituted: (1) to
identify the population of political organizations operating 
in New Orleans during specified elections, and (2) to form­
ulate an appropriate questionnaire and schedule of inter­
views by which their activities and influences can be 
assessed.
A preliminary review of New Orlean's major newspapers 
was conducted as a means of generating a list of the city's 
active political organizations. The newspapers consulted 
include the New Orleans Times-Picayune, the daily morning 
newspaper and the paper with the city's largest circulation, 
the New Orleans States-Item, the daily evening newspaper,
The Louisiana Weekly, a weekly newspaper expressly oriented 
toward the black community, and finally two weekly news­
papers of popular local readership, Courier and Figaro.
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This effort yielded a list of organizations indicated as 
active in news articles or shown to be active by the publi­
cation of advertisements or endorsements in these news­
papers. The basic list was expanded and further annotated
7
through initial interviews with several reference persons. 
These two steps produced a list of fifty-two organizations 
(see appendix 3).
The initial interviews pointed to the operation of 
a rather interesting phenomenon. It was indicated that 
literally hundreds of political organizations tend to emerge 
during (recent) elections in New Orleans. Some of these 
organizations appear to be formed to represent special issue 
or neighborhood interests, either by attracting candidate 
attention or by actively supporting a favored candidate. 
Many, however, seem to be simply instituted by individuals 
offering to "work" selected areas in behalf of given can­
didates if supplied with sufficient funds to cover campaign 
expenses. This suggests that elections constitute a highly 
competitive and serious "game," that is, they comprise in­
stances of organizational struggles for various social, 
political, and/or economic rewards. Many of these political 
organizations defined as active "close shop" and cease to 
exist between elections. A further number do not survive 
more than one or so elections. The basic point is that 
the population of active political organizations varies de­
pending upon how one wishes to specify limitations in terms 
of size, purpose, and duration.
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The decision was made at this point to stay with the 
original guideline in constructing the population of organ­
izations, that is, a list of those political organizations 
known to be active during the time frame under study are 
included regardless of size, purpose, and so forth. Realis­
tically, however, resource limitations preclude the study 
of all known active political organizations in New Orleans. 
The more salient question, therefore, involves how these 
organizations to be studied shall be selected. The prefer­
ence here is to single out for analysis the "major" organi­
zations rather than drawing a probability sample of 
organizations for study. The justification is perhaps too 
simple: if organizations are indeed mediators as predic­
ted, then the capacity is expected present at the very 
least among the major political organizations. Given this 
purpose, the list is thought certainly to contain the major 
political organizations operating in New Orleans during 
the elections being considered.
The basic list of political organizations with which 
interviews are attempted is presented in figure 7. These 
political organizations are those judged most active and/or 
influential on the basis of newspaper reviews and initial 
reference interviews. They represent a wide range of in­
terests in the community, including, hopefully, those of 
class and race. By and large, they are organizations which 
seem to maintain at least a modicum of formal operations 
between elections and are those which have survived the 
elections under study.
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FIGURE 7
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS T.N NEW ORLEANS 
SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS
1 - Alliance for Good Government (AGG)
2 - Association of Independent Democrats (AID)
3 - Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD)
4 - Community Organization for Urban Politics (COUP)
5 - Cresent City Democratic Association (CCDA)
6 - Cresent City Independent Voters League (CCIVL)
7 - Criminal Courts Bar Association
8 - Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods
(DAWN)
9 - Greater New Orleans AFL-CIO
10 - Independent Women's Organization (IWO)
11 - League of Women Voters
12 - Mid-City Democrats (MCD)
13 - New Orleans Bar Association
14 - New Orleans Coalition (NOC)
15 - New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA)
16 - New Orleans Young Democrats (NOYD)
17 - Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League (NWCVL)
18 - Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee
19 - Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL)
20 - Regular Democratic Organization (RDO)
21 - Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL)
22 - Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal (TILT)
23 - Treme Independent Political Society (TIPS)
24 - University of New Orleans Young Democrats (UNO-YD)
25 - Uptown Democratic Association (UDA)
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A second set of problems involves the procedure for 
obtaining the desired organizational data. The interview­
ing of a designated leader from each of the organizations 
was selected as the most feasible strategy for obtaining 
this information. This strategy is not without its short­
comings, principally that the revelation of each organiza­
tion's characteristcis by an actual member is entrusted to 
a single interview. The problem here is not so much that 
one suspects the falsification of information but it is 
the potential variability among organizational members' 
perceptions of what an organization actually does and/or 
seeks to do which is worrisome. On the other hand, a rank­
ing leader within an organization may be more readily aware 
of a wide range of organizational characteristics and be 
more directly involved in the sorts of considerations and 
happenings which guide organizational activity. Further, 
this strategy restricts the number of resultant interviews 
to a limit within the logistics of a single interviewer.
The candidates seeking office in the speicified 
elections constitute another important source of informa­
tion concerning organizations. Unlike the data derived 
from interviews with organizational leaders, this informa­
tion is more likely to be "reputational" in nature. How­
ever, if the hypotheses guiding the research are correct, 
these candidates for office are in a position to divulge 
unique observations about local organizational activity.
Not only are such individuals expected to be intimately
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acquainted with the New Orleans political scene, but also 
many of them will have been directly affected by such 
activity. By interviewing both successful and defeated 
candidates alike, it may be possible to construct some 
balanced assessments of the organizations and their ac­
tivities from this perspective. The views of the candi­
dates may likewise serve to counter some excesses reported 
by organizational leaders. The intention here, therefore, 
is to interview at least the major candidates in all eleven 
elections.
The questionnaire designed for interviewing organi­
zational leaders is presented in appendix 4. An earlier 
version of the questionnaire was pretested in interviews 
with three organizationally affiliated individuals. Al­
terations and improvements suggested by the pretest are 
incorporated into the present questionnaire. As it now 
stands, the questionnaire takes from forty to forty-five 
minutes to administer, although it can easily run to an 
hour if the respondent is encouraged to give more extensive 
elaborations. Specified.clusters of items within the 
questionnaire are intended to ascertain the following in­
formation:
(1) the basic structure of the organization (items 1 - 7 ,
18 - 21)
(2) the organizational affiliations and occupational ties 
of organizational leaders (items 23 - 32)
(3) the composition of organizational membership (items 
5 - 15)
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(4) specification of organizational membership by areal 
units (items 8 - 1 0 )
(5) target groups of non-members to which organization 
orients itself (items 16, 52, 53)
(6) specification of target groups by areal units 
(items 17, 56)
(7) the process by which candidates were endorsed in 
elections under consideration (items 33 - 51, 54)
(8) types of campaign activities performed (items 55, 58)
(9) sources of organizational revenue (items 59, 60)
(10) ratings of the city's political organizations 
(items 61 - 64)
(11) specification of organizational influence by areal 
units (item 61a)
A second questionnaire was prepared for the inter­
viewing of candidates who sought office in the elections 
under consideration. The solicitation of information from 
the candidates is necessarily oriented toward the types 
of observations and evaluations made a£ candidates. This 
questionnaire addresses the following issues:
(1) motivation for seeking office (item 1)
(2) conception of the "average" voter in New Orleans 
(items 2, 3)
(3) assessment of the role of political organizations in 
the election(s) in which the candidate participated 
(items 4, 5)
(4) specification of organizational influence in candidate's
election(s) by areal unit, (item 6)
(5) ratings of the city's political organizations (items
6 - 9 )
(6) specification of organizational influence by areal
unit (item 6a)
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The brevity of this questionnaire results from a conscious 
effort to limit its length. Simply, it was felt that ob­
taining appointments with the candidates might be facili­
tated if the amount of time requested for an interview 
were reduced in this case to twenty to twenty-five minutes.
Footnotes
"^The rationale for the comparative approach is well 
expressed by Durkheim (1966: 125): "We have only one way
to demonstrate that a given phenomenon is the cause of 
another, viz., to compare the cases in which they are 
simultaneously present or absent, to see if the variations 
they present in these different combinations indicate that 
one depends on the other. When they can be artifically 
produced at the will of the observer, the method is that 
of [the] experiment. . . When, on the contrary, the pro­
duction of facts is not within our control and we can only 
bring them together in the way that they have been spon­
taneously produced, the method employed is that of indirect 
experiment, or the comparative method."
2
Nonmanual is here defined as including those em­
ployed in the following occupational categories: (a)
professional, technical, and kindred workers, (b) managers 
and administrators (except farm), and (c) nonretail sales 
workers (retail sales workers specifically excluded).
3Families classified as falling below the poverty 
level are those earning less than $4,000 per year.
4
A reference person is defined as an individual con­
sidered by the researcher to possess particular knowledge 
about the New Orleans political scene. Where utilized, 
such persons will be identified in footnotes.
5
The comparison of areal units in this study involves 
an entire population as derived from census and precinct 
data. Descriptive techniques, including those of correla­
tion and regression, shall be used in evaluating these data. 
Analysis of variance, an inferential statistic, shall also 
be used. In this case, the statistic indicates more cor­
rectly the probability that differences of the observed 
magnitude would occur by chance alone given a hypothetical 
set of like circumstances. Technically, the parameters are 
observed rather than estimated.
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This procedure admittedly involves undetermined 
amounts of error. For example, the procedure tacitly 
assumes that death and migration rates by areal unit are 
relatively constant— an improbable assumption. However, 
in the absence of further alternatives, this strategy is 
argued acceptable for generating at least crude estimates 
needed for the comparisons indicated.
7
Mr. James Chubbuck, Institute of Politics, Loyola 
University, New Orleans; Mr. Joe Walker, Walker Associates 
(a local polling research firm); and Mr. Freddie Warren, 
prominent black lawyer and former assistant district 
attorney.
CHAPTER IV
THE ORGANIZATIONS 
Introduction
Chapters four and five contain a presentation and 
analysis of ecological/survey data collected in accordance 
with the design of the study. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, an assessment of the organizational factor is 
complicated by a variety of problems, including the ex 
post facto character of the study, the indirect nature of 
the "influence" variable, resource limitations, and so 
forth. Nonetheless, it is felt that a considerable amount 
of interesting and usable evidence has been generated 
which allows for an appropriate testing of the research 
problem.
According to the plan specified in the previous 
chapter, interviews were attempted with the leaders of 
twenty-five local political organizations. Organizational 
leaders were questioned about both their own and other 
political organizations. Additionally, candidates for 
office in selected elections were interviewed about the 
operation of political organizations for the elections in 
which they participated.
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Four organizations— the League of Women Voters, the 
Criminal Courts Bar Association, the New Orleans Bar Associ­
ation, and the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive 
Committee— were found to depart somewhat from the criteria 
established for inclusion in the study. For example, by­
laws of the League prohibit that organization from endorsing 
candidates or dispensing partisan campaign information.
The two bar associations were found to be "politically 
active" only in the sense that the preferences of the mem­
bership, as indicated by a straw vote, are made public in 
judicial races. Their charters likewise forbid further 
action or formal dissemination of information during cam­
paigns. Finally, the Orleans Parish Executive Committee 
was found to be solely an administrative body instituted 
primarily to referee electoral proceedings and to oversee 
the proper and accurate recording, tallying, and publica­
tion of voting returns.
A brief synopsis of the remaining twenty-one organ­
izations , and the outcome of a contact with each is 
summarized below. There are two purposes in presenting 
these initial summaries. First, they provide a working, 
descriptive account of the political organizational struc­
ture of New Orleans. Such information is plainly of his­
torical interest and can be appreciated solely at the 
descriptive level. It further stands as a basis for com­
parison with other works dealing with the New Orleans 
political scene. Secondly, the summaries allow for a brief
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but systematic format to acquaint the reader with the 
empirical evidence upon which latar generalizations and 
characterizations of the organizations are based. In keep­
ing with the promise of confidentiality, information is 
reported in grouped or anonymous form.^ Appendix 5 con­
tains a list of those persons with whom interviews were 
conducted.
Descriptive Summaries
Alliance for Good Government (AGG). The Alliance
was founded in 1967 as an organization officially devoted
to "the principles of good government" and "the elimina-
2
tion of corruption." It was expressly meant to be a 
politically-oriented organization which would openly en­
dorse and support candidates "committed to reform." In 
addition, it intended "to encourage high ethical standards 
of conduct" among politicians by instituting an annual 
award for the legislator from the New Orleans area who best 
exemplified such standards. Literature published by the 
Alliance stresses the independence of the organization 
from vested political ties and emphasizes the personal 
qualities of their preferred candidates, especially those 
of "honesty and integrity."
The membership of the Alliance is reported to be 
composed primarily of white, well-educated, young profes­
sionals and businessmen. The handful of blacks who have 
joined the group are likewise described as well-heeled.
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Membership strengths and organizational influence are said 
to be concentrated in the "middle and upper-middle class" 
sections of Uptown, Gentilly, and New Orleans East. This 
particular composition is most likely attributable to the 
organization's preoccupation with the "good government" 
theme, rather than the result of any restrictions delimit­
ing membership. This view is expressed in the words of a 
leader from a rival organization: "Political reform is a
middle class luxury."
The endorsements made by the Alliance reflect its 
reformist concerns. The group has on occasion supported 
black candidates over white opponents, the most recent 
example being their choice of Edwin Lombard over Daniel 
Haggerty in their 1973 race (considered in this study.) A 
nonpartisan orientation towards reform is claimed by virtue 
of their endorsement of Republican David Treen over 
Democrat Charles Grisbaum in the 1974 Congresssional elec­
tion.
The Alliance does accept money from candidates to 
help pay the costs of advertising endorsements. Their
3
efforts to keep these transactions open and above suspicion 
may be further evidence of the reformist impulse. Several 
candidates, for example, revealed that the Alliance pro­
vided them with itemized tabs indicating how campaign 
money was spent and, in at least one instance, they re­
turned money left over from the campaign to the candidate. 
Apparently, such bookkeeping and scruples are rare, accord-
4
ing to the reimbursed candidate.
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The Alliance is generally well-regarded by other 
organizational leaders and candidates alike. It is typi­
cally described by them as "honest" and "forthright." 
However, the matter of the organization's influence is 
another question. The consensus is that its endorsements 
and support are "nice to have," but that their actual im­
pact in any given election is slight. The candidates as 
a group do rate the organization more highly than do the 
other organizational leaders.
Association of Independent Democrats (AID). AID 
is also a "good government" group, but is known to a far 
lesser extent among the candidates and organizational 
leaders than is the Alliance. The organization was char­
tered in 1970 under the leadership of now-City Councilman 
Joseph DiRosa with the expressed purpose of instituting 
"real change in government." The basic promotion made by 
the group encourages the citizen to "be independent, vote 
the person, not the party 1"
AID claims a biracial, multi-class membership con­
centrated primarily in the fifth and ninth wards. The 
headquarters for the group is located on Bourbon Street 
in the French Quarter, and their political rallies are 
said to draw "quite well" among Quarterites. The appeal 
of the group in their designated area among blacks is 
probably slight. As shall be shown, several black organ­
izations of high regard operate in these two wards.
Further, the group did not endorse any of the four black
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candidates (Ortique in the 1972 Supreme Court race, Lombard 
in the Clerk of Court race, and Jackson or Sargent in the 
Civil Sheriff election) entered in the recent elections 
under consideration here.
Like many organizations, AID does invite candidates 
to speak to their rallies. This format is generally re­
garded by the candidates as a "useful tactic" for making 
personal contact with potential supporters. However, the 
impact of AID, that is, the group's ability to reach, con­
vince, and activate potential voters, is thought to be 
minimal in any particular election. Neither the candidates 
nor the organizational leaders considered AID to be an in­
fluential organization, although several expressed their 
personal and professional respect for its current chair­
person.
Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD). 
BOLD came into being following the 1969 mayor's race, an
g
election in which the racial issue was a central question. 
For the founders of BOLD, the issue boiled down to a single 
question: "will blacks have a voice in local politics?"
The organization is thus viewed by its leaders as a mode of 
political expression for the black neighborhoods of the 
Uptown area. It is also conceived as having a wider "ser­
vice function." In addition to on-going registration 
drives, and political education classes, it sponsors a job- 
placement program, a Christmas toys program for neglected 
and needy Uptown children, and a counselling program.
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The high educational attainment and the professional 
occupational status of several BOLD leaders stand in con­
trast to that of the bulk of their target group. BOLD con­
siders its area of operation to be the black neighborhoods 
of the first, second, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and seven­
teenth wards. The area contains both medium and low income 
black neighborhoods, including several housing projects. 
Historically, Uptown black neighborhoods have been polit­
ically fragmented. White political candidates have for 
years approached ministers and a myriad of other neighbor­
hood leaders and influentials on an individual basis in an 
attempt to sway a black precinct here and there. The or­
ganization hopes to consolidate the Uptown black communities 
into a solid bloc.
BOLD has admittedly been modeled somewhat after 
other successful black organizations, namely, the Community 
Organization for Urban Politics (COUP) of the seventh ward 
and the Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL) 
of the ninth ward. It has, however, experienced much less 
success than these latter two organizations. It is rated 
by both the candidates and other organizational leaders 
alike as being influential only on occasion, and then at a 
relatively low level. Candidates endorsed and supported 
by the organization have often shown poorly in Uptown black 
precincts, including the one in which BOLD is headquartered. 
Critics of the group state that its leaders are often side­
tracked by ideological issues irrelevant to the immediate
concerns of the blacks who make up their constituency. In 
BOLD's defense, it has been argued that decision-making 
should be guided by certain issues as a matter of princi­
ple rather than by baldly pragmatic concerns.
An illustration of this apparent controversy may 
be drawn from the 1972 Supreme Court race. BOLD endorsed 
Ortique because (a) he was regarded as a qualified black, 
and (b) it was thought that a black should fill that slot. 
However, Calogero, a white liberal, was endorsed by several 
other black organizations under the argument, at least in 
part, that (a) Ortique could not possibly win, and (b) a 
solid black vote for Ortique, while gratifying, might in­
sure the election of a white conservative. Of course, 
however real this issue, BOLD's problem of ineffectiveness 
may or may not be reducible to this question of strategy.
Community Organization for Urban Politics (COUP).
As in the case of BOLD, the emergence of COUP (pronounced 
"coo") upon the New Orleans political scene is closely tied 
to the 1969 mayor's race. The middle 1960's marked a 
period of growing black voter registration and eventually
g
candidacy for office. It seems natural then that a po­
litical organization should emerge in the seventh ward 
where, in addition to the poorer black neighborhoods found 
throughout the city, the black well-to-do and middle status 
residential areas are located. Following the 1968 defeat 
of black candidate Charles Elloye for the seventh ward's 
state legislative post, COUP was formed to organize the
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black voters of the Ward into a "politically effective" 
group. Although the organization is primarily political 
in orientation, it does attempt to attend to the wider 
social and economic needs of the area. Indeed, its leaders 
regard the political arena as the locus for dealing with 
these larger problems. One COUP member put it this way:
"If you're not there when the pie is sliced, you don't 
get any!"
In 1969, the organization backed Maurice "Moon"
9
Landrieu, the eventual victor m  the mayor's race, on his 
promise of bringing a black voice into city government 
with his administration. Since this election, COUP has 
come to be regarded by the candidates and organizational 
leaders as one of the most influential and successful po­
litical organizations in New Orleans. There is, for 
example, general agreement among them that COUP endorse­
ments have had a strong impact in recent election upon the 
strength and direction of the seventh ward's black vote. 
Among several of those interviewed, COUP has the reputa­
tion of being able to "deliver the vote," a phrase his­
torically assigned to the prototype urban machine.
COUP sources do not disclaim the solid image of 
the group. They do, however, describe the relationship be­
tween the organization and the black voter as one of 
"trust." As one leader elaborates this point:
The voters will rely upon the endorsements of 
organizations whom they trust for guidance. . . .
In this matter of trust, actions speak louder
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than words. Good organizational leaders don't have 
unlisted (telephone) numbers. They're there when 
you need them. They're there at two in the morning
when you need bail or whatever. They live in the
community, they're visible. . . (An organizational 
leader) can't drive in from New Orleans East into 
the neighborhood and say, "I'm here, I've come to 
save you from all this!"
COUP expects endorsed candidates to provide money for
campaign expenses. It also conducts fund-raising drives, 
particularly to help black candidates. Unlike a number of 
other organizations examined here, COUP does not "merely 
advertize" its endorsement. Its success in persuading the 
black voter is attributed to extensive door-to-door cam­
paigning— "the personal touch"— as well as telephone 
canvassing. Both types of activity, particularly when 
carried out on a large scale, involve mounting expenses 
for sample ballots, telephone banks, paid workers, and so 
forth.^
COUP's reputation may be measured in other ways as 
well. Local (and state) governmental positions are now 
dotted with COUP members and affiliates. Examples include 
Criminal Magistrate Robert Collins, Mayor's Aide Robert 
Tucker, city Finance Committee member Henry Simon, Aviation 
Board member Nolan Marshall, Sewage and Water Board-member 
James Beverly, Policy Planning Committee member Emmon 
Mouton, Magistrate Clerk Emilo Dupre, and State Senator 
Sidney Barthelemy. Concerning the group's relative success, 
one COUP member stated: "When (Victor) Schiro was mayor
(1962-1969), the only blacks to be seen in City Hall were 
standing behind brooms. We've helped change all that."
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The sheer number of educated and professional status blacks 
associated with COUP and its area of operation appears to 
have extended the organization's sphere of influence inde­
pendent of its actual clout. Several black organizations 
have been able to exert some political pressure upon can­
didates through the ballot box. However, none have had the 
supply of members with the education and experience to take 
advantage of the opening positions as has COUP.
COUP'S reputed rise has not been without difficulty
or dissension. For example, their endorsement of Calogero
over Ortique in the 1972 Supreme Court race raised the
issue of a sell out in the minds of some blacks. It is
likely that a number of factors were considered by the COUP
leadership, not the least of which being the fact that
Calogero and Mayor Landrieu are close friends and former
law partners. One leader summed the "practical politics"
issue this way:
Sometimes you have to bite the bullet. You can't 
only wear black, red, and green, and run around 
with a clinched fist. You can accomplish much 
more with a little give-and-take, with establish­
ing yourself as a principled known quantity.
Crescent City Democratic Association (CCDA). CCDA 
was founded in 1946 by deLesseps S. "Chep" Morrison follow­
ing his stunning upset victory in the mayor's race over 
incumbent Robert Maestri. Prior to the election, Maestri 
was considered unbeatable. He had not been an unpopular 
mayor. Further, he was the undisputed leader of the Regular 
Democratic Organization (RDO, discussed later), a reputedly
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well-oiled and powerful city-wide organization which had 
dominated local politics almost uninterrupted since 1896.^  
On the other hand, Morrison had been urged into the race 
at the last minute by a desperate and disorganized com­
mittee of business and professional men opposed to Maestri. 
So reluctant was anyone to run against Maestri that the 
committee actually rummaged through the telephone directory 
at one point in search of potential challengers (Parker, 
1974: 64). Committee member Jacob Morrison eventually 
suggested that his younger brother, a colonel about to be 
discharged from the Army and a returning war-hero, might 
be interested.
Morrison ran on a platform of political reform.
He assailed the incumbent's organization as an entrenched, 
corrupt, and unresponsive political machine. Though a 
slow in city services was probably attributable to the 
war years and war effort as much as anything else, Morrison 
placed the blame squarely upon the complacent "machine."
His charges apparently struck a responsive chord. House­
wives took to the streets armed with brooms, symbolic of 
their desire to "clean up" New Orleans (Parker, 1974: 67- 
69). Maestri's campaign effort also fueled the charge of 
complacency. His organization worked without apparent 
urgency, and he himself delivered only one radio broadcast 
during the campaign. Morrison won by over 4,000 votes.
Though elected as a reform candidate, Morrison 
moved quickly after his election to build an effective
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organization of his own. CCDA was a city-wide organization 
comprising a number of seemingly incompatible groups, rang­
ing from professional politicians (including some RDO 
defectors), middle class housewives (enrolled in the Inde­
pendent Women's Organization, IWO, discussed later),
11 12 businessmen (the Cold Water Committee), and blacks
(Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League, OPPVL, discuss­
ed later). Like RDO, however, the main structure of the 
organization consisted of representatives and their staffs 
from each of the city's seventeen wards (Parker, 1974:63).
Morrison was elected mayor of New Orleans for four 
consecutive terms. In 1955 and again in 1959, he unsuc­
cessfully ran for governor of the State of Louisiana. The
second defeat, experienced at the hands of segregationist 
13Jimmie Davis, ended all gubernatorial aspirations.
Further, the rejection of a referendum by New Orleans voters 
which would have allowed Morrison to run for a fifth term 
as mayor terminated further local options. Nine months 
before his fourth term as mayor expired, Morrison accepted 
an appointment to the Organization of American States from 
the Kennedy administration. According to the city charter, 
an interim successor could be chosen only from two city 
councilmen elected at-large. Victor Schiro of the CCDA was 
selected by a close margin as interim mayor.
Mortison's departure and the ensuring organizational 
chaos, which intensified with the 1961 mayor's race, was 
viewed by many as evidence that (a) CCDA had been slipping
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14badly during Morrison's fourth term, and (b) Morrison 
15was CCDA. In his absence, the diverse factions which 
made up the organization polarized over issues, procedures, 
and, of course, Morrison's successor. Unable to unite be­
hind a single candidate for the mayoralty election, CCDA 
eventually fielded two candidates (Schiro and Adrian 
Duplantier) in the primary against RDO representative James 
A. Comiskey. In a bizarre turn of events, it was reported 
that Morrison briefly advocated Comiskey's candidacy be­
fore the Cold Water Committee. Comiskey was, however, 
eliminated in the first primary, and Schiro defeated 
Duplantier in the run-off, chiefly by capitalizing upon 
segregationist sentiment stirred by court-ordered school 
desegregation in New Orleans.
The current structure of CCDA only vaguely resem­
bles that of the organization at its peak under Morrison.
IWO and OPPVL are now completely separated from CCDA.
Although the caucus still retains representatives from 
each of the seventeen wards, present leadership claims 
some strength among whites in only the tenth, eleventh, 
twelfth, and fifteenth wards. The decline of the organi­
zation may be further evidenced by the observation that 
CCDA has "not held regular meetings in over a year." The 
group is, however, planning to meet and work in up-coming 
city council and gubernatorial elections.
Several factors are cited for the decline of CCDA 
and other "old-line organizations in general." The prime
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reason given for the drop in organizational importance is
the changing role of the news media in campaigning over the
years. Says one CCDA leader:
The role of the news media, especially television, 
is much stronger now than before. People are more 
personally oriented toward the candidate. They 
want to see him on TV and hear his pitch. They 
want to see for themselves.
Perhaps related to this is the overall decline in organi­
zational importance, as distinguished from the decline of 
the organization. One leader observed: "Civil service
took away a lot of our patronage." Implied here is a loss 
in the organization’s unique ability to provide opportunity 
and service to those loyal to it. Whereas the organization 
was previously capable of providing the link between the 
individual and the larger political structure, bureaucra­
tization of the relationship is said to relegate the 
organization to secondary importance.
A final factor thought to have affected the status 
of CCDA is the rise in the registration of black voters, 
coupled with the movement of large numbers of white ones 
to the suburbs. The combined effect is that "all neighbor­
hoods in the city now have large percentages of black 
voters, and, of course, in some they hold a majority." 
Successful organizations are said to be closely attuned to 
the neighborhoods making up the wards. CCDA has not been 
able to tie into these networks in black areas, largely be­
cause of their reluctance to alter long-standing traditions 
dividing blacks and whites in the city. The strategy
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utilized by Morrison during the 1950's of incorporating 
blacks, albeit in a secondary status, within the organiza­
tion has been totally ineffective since that time. Indeed, 
what was once progressive is now regarded by blacks as 
part of the problem.
Candidates and other organizational leaders gen­
erally agree that CCDA is in a serious state of decline.
One candidate remarked: "They still distribute sample
ballots, but it's an organization on paper only. They 
just don't have the horses any more." The organization is 
not regarded by the candidates and organizational leaders 
as having had a significant impact in any of the elections 
under consideration. Organizational leaders, however, do 
hold a more favorable opinion of CCDA than do the candi­
dates for office.
Crescent City Independent Voters League (CCIVL).
One of the city's oldest black organizations, CCIVL is 
the political arm of General Longshore Workers Local #1419. 
According to AFL-CIO by-laws, a union may formally support 
only those candidates selected by a representative council 
of all local unions. Since whites have dominated the 
council, the black longshore local was prevented political 
expression as an organization, at least to the extent that 
it sought changes in the interest of the black community.
Black longshore leaders, originally working in the Orleans 
Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL), formed CCIVL in 
1951 to enable the utilization of union resources in behalf
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of candidates favorable "both to labor and the betterment 
of the black community."
The most pressing task facing CCIVL at the time of
its inception was that of increasing voter registration
among black voters. Both the "grandfather clause" and the
16"understanding clause" had been effectively employed over 
the years to delimit black registration. A further re­
striction used occasionally permitted blacks to register 
only as Republicans, thus precluding their meaningful 
participation in local and state elections. Two CCIVL 
leaders, the late Clarence "Chink" Henry and current presi­
dent Waifred Daliet, were reportedly among the first blacks 
to register as Democrats in the ninth ward. The organiza­
tion stressed registration among union and nonunion blacks 
alike, and participated in state-wide registration drives 
as well. One dollar from the annual dues of each CCIVL 
member was funnelled to the NAACP to further the registra­
tion cause.
Although CCIVL attempted a city-wide organization 
in the past, it presently claims active membership in only 
the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and seventeenth wards. The 
organization holds regular political meetings only during 
elections. However, since the leadership of CCIVL and the 
Longshore Local are identical, it would be misleading to 
assert that the organization is totally inactive in the 
black community between campaigns. In addition to spon­
soring political rallies, CCIVL makes its endorsements
107
known through advertisements in the Louisiana Weekly and 
the publication of sample ballots.
The candidates and organizational leaders do not 
rate CCIVL as having been influential in recent local elec­
tions. This is not to say that they hold no respect for 
the organization. On the contrary, several expressed ad­
miration of CCIVL leadership, particularly for its efforts 
over the years. It was also suggested that the impact of 
the organization is difficult to assess. Although it is 
quite a sizable group (more than 1500 paid members), its 
members reside in black neighborhoods throughout the city. 
However, the ratings may not be totally incorrect either. 
Like CCDA, CCIVL may be starting to show its age. Many 
older blacks doubtlessly remember the organization and its 
history. However, the young black, whether he be poor or 
upwardly mobile, seems more likely to associate the group 
and its tactics with past wars.
Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods 
(DAWN). DAWN was founded in 1971 by two well-known and 
respected black leaders, the Rev. Johnny Jackson, Sr. and 
his son, State Representative Johnny Jackson, Jr. The 
younger Jackson had previously been associated with the 
Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL), but 
left to form his own organization in his bid for the state 
legislature after a dispute over SOUL endorsements. For­
mally, DAWN is a civic rather than a political organization, 
and hence qualifies for funds under a number of neighborhood
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improvement projects. The organization is centered in the 
one hundred and first legislative district, comprising 
eighteen precincts from the eighth and ninth wards, includ­
ing the notorious Desire Housing Project. Organizational 
activities revolve around those of the Jacksons, who are 
involved in a number of efforts to deal with the problems 
of Desire and the surrounding area.
Statistically, portions of the one hundred and . 
first district are among the poorest in the city. Median 
family income for 1969 in Desire was $2315 as compared with 
a median of $9536 for the city (United States Bureau of 
the Census, 1972: 58,66). It is estimated that approxi­
mately twenty-five percent of able adults are unemployed. 
Problems of crime and drug abuse are said to be acute, 
making it a highly patrolled area with frequent confronta­
tions with police and concommitant racial animosities. By 
virtue of his positions held with the Desire Community 
Housing Corporation (funded under Model Cities), Desire 
Area Council, Osei (which operates three day-care centers), 
and the Urban Squad Advisorty Board, rather than DAWN per 
se, Rev. Jackson is often viewed by many residents and by 
officials as a link between the area and the authority 
structure.
Ratings of DAWN as an organization tend to reflect 
this situation. While the Jacksons are generally well- 
known to the candidates and organizational leaders, DAWN 
itself is not well-known among them. Several who have
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dealt with the organization consider it to be "fairly 
effective" in its own area. An overall impression is that 
the organization itself is minimally developed, and that 
its impact resides mainly with the personal qualities of 
its leaders.
Greater New Orleans AFL-CIO. In terms of sheer 
numbers alone, the AFL-CIO constitutes a strong potential
force in any election. The city's central employers are
17the port and the tourist trade. Most occupational fields 
are organized, including service workers, and the council 
claims over 85,000 union members in Greater New Orleans, 
an area comprising Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard 
Parishes. In New Orleans, approximately fifty-five per­
cent of union members are black. However, overall member­
ship for the Greater New Orleans area is predominately 
white.
AFL-CIO endorsements for city elections are made by 
a vote of a council representing all union locals. By-laws 
prohibit any local from making counter-endorsements. Gen­
erally, the AFL-CIO itself does not actively endorse or 
support candidates. Rather, such activities are left to 
the union locals. Occasionally, the council will make 
financial contributions to candidates for office, the can­
didates often promote AFL-CIO endorsements themselves.
The council and its recent log of decisions and endorsements 
are generally regarded by black leaders as "unresponsive" 
to the black community, despite the growing black membership
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among the union rank-and-file. The council claims to 
preoccupy itself with "labor" issues.
The impact of the AFL-CIO in recent elections is 
difficult to access. Although a given candidate is en­
dorsed by the council, the endorsement typically receives 
varying degrees of support from the locals. Further, 
blacks apparently often participate in campaigns in their 
own political organizations rather than through unions. 
Finally, the membership is residentially diverse. Although 
one might be able to locate "working class" neighborhoods, 
membership in and exposure to the organization is likely 
to be uneven. This problem is commonly shared in the 
ecological data collected here for many of the organiza­
tions, but is particularly acute for those organizations 
not oriented to specific neighborhoods.
Candidates for office and organizational leaders 
consider the AFL-CIO to have been influential in recent 
elections. A negative endorsement, that is, the claim by 
the organization that a candidate is "anti-labor," is seen 
as having particular consequences. In the words of on© 
candidate:
An AFL-CIO endorsement is certainly helpful. It 
establishes your acceptability for a lot of
people. If they like what else they see and hear,
or even if all other things are equal, they'll 
vote for you over the other guy. . . . But (the
AFL-CIO) is most effective when they are out to
defeat a particular candidate.
Independent Women's Organization (IWO). IWO emerged 
in 1946 as a formal organization from the "broom brigades,"
Ill
groups of women who signified their desire to "clean up 
city hall" by parading on Canal Street armed with brooms 
in support of Morrison. Following his election, the group 
formed a close alliance with CCDA. IWO itself was not 
structured along ward lines, but rather was concentrated 
in "white middle and upper middle class" residential areas. 
At times, it numbered upwards of one thousand members and 
constituted a highly motivated and available volunteer 
force.
IWO proved to be a fairly effective political force.
In 1952, Mrs. Logan Brown of the organization was elected
*
to the state House of Representatives. Morrison himself 
may have underestimated their strength on occasion. In 
1956, he ignored their suggestions in a school board race. 
IWO worked vigorously against his choices and defeated 
them at the polls. The organization is presently much 
smaller than in past years, but retains its higher status 
membership composition. It has actively sought to recruit 
black members and the small number of black women who have 
joined come basically from "old-line, wealthy black fam­
ilies." The area of operation is restricted to the tenth, 
eleventh, twelfth, fourteenth, and sixteenth wards.
The organization has, however, undergone some recent 
changes. While the older members tend to be "leisured 
women of the upper middle class," newer members tend to be 
employed, often in career-oriented rather than terminal 
positions. IWO has also become more "issue conscious"
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beyond the rather diffuse "improve government" goal of 
years past. It has actively worked for "basic women's 
rights," including for the passage of ERA, and campaigned 
for a wide range of specific social and environmental items 
as well.
IWO's campaign strategy consists of providing 
volunteer workers for endorsed candidates, concentrating 
upon staffing campaign offices and canvassing neighborhoods, 
rather than advertising endorsements. On balance, IWO nets 
a "moderately effective" rating from the candidates and 
organizational leaders. Several of those interviewed, how­
ever, appeared to be somewhat hostile to the organization. 
Rationales involved basically the "liberal" ideology of
the group and the close "association of the group with the 
18mayor." Others seemed to imply that a women's group 
could not really be a political organization.
Mid-City Democrats (MCD). MCD is truly an organ­
ization from the old school of politics. Each Wednesday 
evening, MCD chairman (and municipal tax assessor) Lawrence 
Comiskey, Jr., holds an open session at the organization's 
headquarters on South Jeff Davis Drive. People, mostly 
from the first municipal district (wards one, two, and 
three), come one-by-one to relate their problem to Comiskey—  
a traffic ticket, a cancelled building permit, needed bail 
for a relative, or whatever. Comiskey listens intently, 
asks some questions to verify the situation, and then 
reaches a course of action— a telephone call here, a
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promised check by his lawyer in the morning there. Mostly, 
his patrons go away grateful and smiling. All Comiskey 
asks in return is that they vote the MCD ticket in the next 
election.
MCD was founded in 1962 by the late James A. Comiskey 
(Lawrence's uncle) following his unsuccessful bid for mayor 
as the Regular Democratic Organization (RDO) candidate. In 
the course of that election, RDO and CCDA tried to form a 
coalition, designated the Crescent Regular Democrats (CRD) .
The effort sought to unite the best of the two once power­
ful, but now floundering, organizations. The coalition, 
however, reportedly reached an impasse on the question of 
whom to endorse for governor that year— Gillis Long or 
John McKeithen— and it dissolved while still in the forma­
tive stage. The elder Comiskey then left both CRD and 
RDO to institute his own organization.
Originally, MCD was situated in wards one through 
six. Now, however, it is confined to the first three wards. 
The organization is predominately white, although it does 
now have "a couple" of black precinct captains from the 
district's black neighborhoods. Composition of the dis­
trict is said to be "basically working class." The stated 
purpose of the organization is simply put: "to help the
people in the area, and to promote the Democratic Party."
The organization holds campaign rallies and distributes
19sample ballots exhorting the voter to "stamp the rooster," 
"support MCD endorsements," and "be a loyal Democrat."
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MCD is the only of the city's old-line organizations to
support McGovern in the 1972 presidential election.
Comiskey explains that unpopular decision as follows:
He was the Democratic nominee, and we follow 
the party line. That's old-style politics. It's 
a matter of party loyalty— it's as simple as that.
MCD is rated by the candidates and organizational 
leaders as being "moderately effective." Generally, the 
vote of the district is said to follow MCD recommenda­
tions, especially in the white precincts. Referring to 
his weekly "help sessions," Comiskey says: "The voters
here have fifty-two reasons to back our endorsements."
The lowered rating of the organization is most often 
attributed to the small number of votes at stake in the 
first district, especially in comparison with the numbers 
of votes involved in other of the city's wards. In 1974, 
for example, wards one, two, and three combined had only 
12,648 registered voters. By comparison, ward seven alone 
had 28,703 and city's largest ward, ward nine, had 47,224.
New Orleans Coalition (NOC). The Coalition began 
at Loyola and Tulane Universities quite informally in 1968 
as a "club" devoted to the discussion of political issues. 
Interest sparked by the 19 69 mayor's race led to the cry­
stallization and formalization of proceedings. Originally, 
the organization served as a clearing house for various 
liberal groups in the city. It published a newsletter 
synthesizing the activities of local liberal groups, and 
most of NOC participants were also frequenters of these 
groups as well.
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The basic purpose of the organization was "to 
raise the level of political awareness and participation."
It is described as having been very idealistic and greatly 
concerned about issues such as education, integration, and 
the "Great Society" programs. The spirit of those days 
is captured in incidents such as Coalition members taking 
"great delight" in integrating Uptown bars. The political 
tone of the group is more sobered these days. The organ­
ization continues its political discussion format/ more 
formalized now by the presence of guest speakers at vir­
tually every meeting. Also, money has been allocated to 
conduct "Nader-type" research. Finally, NOC seems to deal 
in electoral activity more seriously and one or two of its 
leaders are contemplating future bids for office.
NOC is still peopled predominately by "white, 
college educated, upper middle class" individuals. Black 
members are reportedly "academic types" who commonly are 
also active in black organizations as well. NOC claims to 
represent the "academic, preservationist, ecological, 
liberal bag"— an impulse which in New Orleans delimits its 
appeal to a rather small constituency. The organization 
does endorse candidates and supports these selections pri­
marily by advertisements in Figaro and The Courier, news­
papers with a young adult readership. It also does some 
canvassing, particularly in Uptown precincts near the 
universities. NOC is generally rated by candidates and- 
organizational leaders as having been minimally effective 
in recent elections.
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New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA). NOVA was 
established in 1967 under the tutelege of now State Senator 
Nat Kiefer. The organization is centered in Kiefer's home 
district comprising portions of the eighth and ninth wards, 
including the rapidly expanding and developing New Orleans 
East. It is formally dedicated to electing officials to 
local and state government who are "responsive to the peo­
ple." NOVA claims to draw its membership primarily from 
the older, more established white areas of the two wards and 
the newer, more suburban (and primarily white) neighborhoods 
of New Orleans East. This constituency may be characterized 
as containing both "working and middle class" voters.
NOVA appears basically to be the personal organi­
zation of Senator Kiefer. The group endorses candidates in 
all elections, however, and supports its endorsements pri­
marily through canvassing neighborhoods and shopping centers. 
The name recognition of the group is fairly low among can­
didates and organizational leaders, perhaps accounting for 
its rather low rating. Several of those interviewed, upon 
being informed of the organization's identity, offered 
stronger evaluations on the basis of their acquaintance with 
the group as "Kiefer's organization."
New Orleans Young Democrats (NOYD). Several attempts 
were made to set up an interview with the leader of this 
organization. The president had no office or home telephone 
and had to be dealt with through an intermediary. Apparent­
ly the leader declined the interview, either directly or
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unintentionally by failure to respond. Organizational 
leaders and:candidates for office rate this organization as 
having had no significant impact in recent elections.
Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League (NWCVL). The 
NWCVL was originally organized in 1958 as the "political 
section" of the Ninth Ward Civic League, a group which 
sought to confront and improve conditions in black neighbor­
hoods of the ninth ward. However, it quickly became 
apparent that "a true political organization was needed if 
anything was to be accomplished." The political section 
thus expanded and NWCVL became a separate entity in 1960.
The stated purpose of the organization is "to promote po­
litical involvement" among ninth ward residents through 
political education. NWCVL regularly conducts registra­
tion drives and classes. Further, much of each monthly 
meeting is devoted to speakers, projects, and seminars 
dealing with neighborhood problems.
The group claims an interest in all black neighbor­
hoods of the ninth ward, but is concentrated in "Lower 
Nine," the residential areas south of the Industrial Canal. 
Neighborhoods there range from "poor to working and lower 
middle class." Membership of the organization reflects 
this composition, with the "lower middle class" predominant 
among regular attenders. Leadership of the group is com­
posed primarily of those in nonprofessional middle class 
occupations, and there appears to be a pervading sense in 
the group of working hard and biding one's time. In this
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respect, the group seems to combine much more idealism 
with its political pragmatism than do most of the other 
black organizations under study here. This may reflect 
the political mood of the seemingly large proportion of 
older individuals and retirees in the group. For them, 
enough change may have taken place in recent years for the 
system to appear accessible. Such does not seem to be the 
perception of many younger blacks in the area.
NWCVL is rated by the candidates and organizational 
leaders as being at least moderately effective in recent 
elections, particularly in Lower Nine. On occasion, it is 
said to have had an impact in other areas of the ward, even 
when opposed by such reputedly powerful organizations as 
Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL).
Examples of such organizational confrontations, and subse­
quent good showings by NWCVL endorsed candidates, include 
Harry Connick's 1970 run for District Attorney (against 
Jim Garrison), Bennett Johnston's 1972 gubernatorial bid 
(against Edwin Edwards), and Peter Beer's 1974 Fourth Cir­
cuit Court race (against Joseph Bossetta). One candidate 
stated of the organization:
You can't help but be impressed with NWCVL. They 
have a straightforward, earnest demeanor. . . .
In my opinion, too, their (organizational) effec­
tiveness is often overshadowed by the brassy image 
of other organizations such as ,SOUL.
At least part of NWCVL's reputed level of success may lie
in its low-key presentation of self, which apparently many
white candidates and organizational leaders find assuring.
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Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL).
OPPVL was founded in 1948 by now-city Councilman Rev.
Abraham Lincoln Davis. At that time, only about thirteen
percent of black adults in the city were registered to vote,
as compared with sixty-six percent of white New Orleanians.
The organization was formed to mobilize black registration
and introduce blacks ("Negroes in those days") into the
mainstream of the political process. Like CCDA with which
it became affiliated for some time, OPPVL was structured
along ward lines and sought to mobilize black registration
efforts and voter turn out for the entire city. The
association which developed between Mayor Morrison and
Rev. Davis led then Governor Earl Long to grump, "Morrison's
got himself a Baptist preacher who don't preach nothin'
20but Morrison!"
The most common strategy in those days among white 
politicians was to deal solely with black leaders rather 
than ever confronting the black electorate directly, a 
practice which has often carried over to the present day. 
While Morrison privately encouraged Davis to develop the 
organization and strive for continued black involvement, 
it became clear to many black leaders that white sponsor­
ship itself was capable and willing of only the most modest 
of advances. Thus, despite some initial improvements, a 
general move emerged to more directly challenge the segre­
gationist stance of traditional social and political 
relations.
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Paramount among these was the formation of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in 1957 at 
a meeting in Rev. Davis' New Zion Baptist Church and the 
election of Rev. Martin Luther King as its first president 
(Davis was elected second vice-president). Rev. Davis him­
self was a regular spokesman for the black community as the 
drive toward integration got underway in New Orleans and 
he was on one occasion jailed for such activities. However, 
Davis' assimilationist goals and his willingness to work 
with existing powers have led some more impatients blacks 
over the years to brand him an "Uncle Tom." Counters Davis: 
"If sponsoring radical ideas of eliminating racial segrega­
tion and saving a city is Uncle Tom-ing, then so be it."
OPPVL served as Davis' organizational base through­
out these years. Rev. Davis' own notoriety and the many 
historic changes which were taking place in those years 
coupled to make the organization a fairly unified politi­
cal force. However, it is acknowledged that OPPVL is not 
as strong in all parts of the city as it once was, and 
that other black organizations now challenge its leadership 
role in several wards. Nonetheless, the black voter enter­
ing the polling place with a Rev. Davis sample ballot in 
hand is said to still be a fairly common occurence.
Candidates and organizational leaders rate OPPVL 
as having been a moderately effective organization in recent 
elections. They are skeptical of any claim of current city- 
wide influence, but concede particular organizational
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strength in portions of the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and
seventeenth wards. They do suspect at least some latent
appeal remaining among many older black voters. Davis'
21recent appointment to the city council may further en­
kindle some of those feelings. On the other hand, there 
is some evidence that time may have eclipsed OPPVL. Many 
of the newer black organizations seem to regard OPPVL en­
dorsements and modus operandi with some disdain. In the 
words of one leader, "We're all indebted to Davis for his 
long service to the community, but the organization is a 
little too conservative. . . the style smacks too much of 
the old days."
Regular Democratic Organization (RDO). RDO claims
to be the second oldest of the big city political "machines"
22which emerged in the U.S. during the nineteenth century.
The organization evolved in 1876 from the Crescent City 
White League, a white supremacist group formed two years 
earlier to combat Reconstructionist rule. In 1879, RDO 
was able to gain control of the city following the election 
of several of its members to key governmental positions. 
However, a number of RDO candidates were defeated by reform 
candidates in ensuring elections amid charges of corruption 
and, by 1896, the Regulars had been dislodged from power.
A year later, RDO began a serious rebuilding program for 
establishing its return to power with the founding of the 
Choctaw Club, an extensive grassroots political organiza­
tion instituted expressly "to recapture city hall and to
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disenfranchise the Negro" (Reynolds, 1936: 32). It is 
difficult to exaggerate the success of RDO in achieving 
these goals. RDO thoroughly dominated city politics at 
every level almost without interruption from the turn of 
the century until Morrison's upset victory in 1946. Fur­
ther, they invoked a dramatic ninety-five percent reduction 
in the number of blacks registered to vote in New Orleans 
between the years 1896 and 1900 (Howard, 1971: 190).
RDO's organization during these years of rule may 
be described as the prototype urban political machine. The 
caucus consisted of leaders from each of the city's wards. 
Precinct captains generally were carried on the city pay­
roll, thus allowing them to devote full-time to political 
chores. Principal among these chores was the task of cul­
tivating voter loyalty to the organization by providing 
services for precinct residents. Affiliation with the 
organization afforded jobs, preferential treatment in city 
services, and the necessary connections to cut red-tape in 
what could otherwise be an impersonal, bureaucratized city 
government.
In 1927, RDO made the mistake of opposing the can­
didacy of Huey Long in his successful governatorial bid.
Long brought the organization to its knees by cutting off 
access to state patronage and state funds. However, Long 
had no desire to eradicate the machine— he merely wished 
to make it responsive to himself. He therefore elevated to
123
the highest ranks those individuals who expressed their 
loyalty to him, among them Robert Maestri. Maestri's 
eventual term as mayor marked almost a half-century of RDO 
rule. While the arrangement has been described as "bene­
ficial and effective" for both organization and loyal 
23voter alike, it also remembered as often being greedy, 
complacent, and ineffective.
RDO appears to have never fully recovered from its 
1946 setback at the hands of Morrison. However, the group 
still does claim a city-wide organization. More realis­
tically, its strengths are said to be concentrated in the 
"white working class" areas of the third, fourth, seventh, 
eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh wards. The organization
has no black members, although it claims to have supported
24black candidates on occasion. Unlike CCDA, it conducts 
regular monthly meetings of both the full membership (the 
Choctaw Club) and the executive committee. RDO typically 
distributes sample ballots and holds rallies in support of 
its endorsed candidates.
RDO is rated by organizational leaders and candi­
dates as having been moderately effective in recent elections. 
This assessment is in keeping with the self-evaluation of 
one RDO leader: "Quite frankly, we're not what we used to
be, but we still win more than we lose." The evaluation is 
by no means unanimous. One candidate stressed the decline 
of the oldline organizations in general by stating empha­
tically, "RDO and CCDA endorsements are worth about thirty-
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five votes apiece." On balance, the overall assessment 
by the leaders and candidates seems more nearly the correct 
description. A surprising number of RDO members and 
affiliates may be found in state and local governmental 
positions. Further, RDO retains some measure of its appeal 
in certain areas of the city, as the solid attendance at 
many of its rallies attests.
Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL). 
SOUL is commonly regarded by the organizational leaders and 
candidates for office as the "longest and strongest" po­
litical organization in New Orleans. It is also known 
among them as being "extremely pragmatic." Such pragmatism 
apparently prompted SOUL leader Nils Douglas to refuse
participation in this study with the words, "There's
25nothing m  it for SOUL." Therefore, information con­
cerning the organization was gathered from other written 
sources and reference persons.^
SOUL, like COUP, emerged in the mid-1960's from 
an unsuccessful bid for the state legislature, in this 
case, by Douglas. Following his defeat, Douglas established 
the organization in the populous ninth ward. According to 
one interviewee:
The older black organizations were in a real stall 
in those days. Progress with them depended too 
heavily upon white co-operation. . . (which) ceased 
administratively when Schiro became mayor. SOUL 
hit at a time when blacks were frustrated and black 
consciousness was rising. The timing was right.
The 1969 mayor's rate proved to be critical in establishing
SOUL's reputation. Jimmy Fitzmorris entered the race with
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the solid endorsement of the old-line white organizations. 
Landrieu, however, won by drawing overwhelming support from 
black and upper white precincts. SOUL precincts showed 
impressive support for Landrieu, some reporting ninety per­
cent of the votes cast in his favor.
SOUL's reputation for pragmatic politics is long 
established as well. Several candidates and organization­
al leaders have suggested that, for several years, the 
organization's support has gone "to the highest bidder."
The label stems mainly from two factors. One, as SOUL's 
reputation has grown, so apparently has the price of its 
support. Gov. Edwin Edwards reported spending $60,000 for 
their support in the 1972 gubernatorial election (James, 
1975). Figures quoted more often are $30,000 in elections 
dealing with major local offices, and $10,000 to $15,000 
for lesser offices. One candidate remarked somewhat 
sourly, "Thirty thousand is a lot of money to turn over to 
an organization for just one stinking ward." Secondly,
SOUL has occasionally supported candidates whose ideologies 
and stands on the issues seemingly would have precluded 
their support in the black community. A prominent example, 
from several which might be mentioned, is SOUL's endorse­
ment in 1971 of Jamar Adcock, a wealthy north Louisiana 
segregationist, for lieutenant governor (Murray and Vedlitz, 
1974: 34).
Several observations have been offered in explana­
tion of SOUL's strategy. It should be noted, for example,
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that SOUL did not invent this brand of politics. The 
habit of paying black leaders rather than dealing with the 
black electorate directly originated with white politi­
cians, most notably, Morrison. More to the point, however, 
is the observation that the strategy is only a slight mod­
ification of the politics employed for years by white 
organizations. At the simplest level, the leaders of SOUL 
wish to back candidates from whom they can extract tangi­
ble rewards, presumably both for themselves and for their 
constituency. The argument is well taken that money is a 
medium of exchange not likely to net direct benefit for 
the constituency. Unlike the situation where policy and 
patronage considerations are delivered after the election, 
the commitment of the candidate tends to end with the 
monetary exchange. However, one interviewee observed:
. . . building an effective organization requires 
revenue. SOUL has gotten a rather bad reputation 
from the press as a money-grabbing operation. But 
if a candidate wants the full stroke— canvassing, 
mail-out, ads and posters, transportation of voters 
to the polls, etc.— let's face it, that costs some 
money. So to begin with, SOUL has built a real 
organization, not a paper one like so many others 
around. . . for what? Let's be cynical for a moment.. 
For most [white] candidates, the political reality 
is that the interests of the black community are 
intrinsically opposed to those of the white commun­
ity. In that case, what's a campaign promise worth?
This line of thought thus places the emphasis upon 
building an organizational weapon. In this respect, SOUL 
differs little from successful organizations of the past. 
Control of the organization is thought to reside in the 
hands of three individuals, Douglas, Sherman Copelin, and
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Don Hubbard. Much of the revenue generated by the organi­
zation is clearly devoted to election activities. SOUL, 
for example, is said to possess the most extensive telephone 
banks of any organization in the city. Further, SOUL is 
known to have financed the campaigns of several black can­
didates for office. However, the recent indictments for 
gross misuse of funds handed down against Copelin and 
Hubbard in connection with their respective jobs with Model 
Cities and the Family Health Foundation— both federal 
poverty programs— have done little to quell the image of 
"money grabbing" at the ultimate expense of the black 
community.
SOUL has extended its area of operation in recent 
elections, most notably into the fifteenth ward. It's 
actual level of effectiveness, as opposed to its reputation, 
is a matter of some debate. Analyses conducted by the 
Institute of Politics at Loyola University show that can­
didates endorsed by SOUL between 1969 and 1973 received a 
mean of 72.6 percent of the votes cast in black neighbor­
hoods of the ninth ward (Murray and Vedlich, 1974: 35). 
Although this figure is extremely impressive, its glitter 
falls off somewhat when one realizes that several of these 
candidates carried all black neighborhoods of the city by 
wide margins. One candidate for office summarized it this 
way:
It depends. Given a candidate who is basically 
acceptable to the black community anyway, a SOUL 
endorsement might produce 80-90 percent support.
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On the other hand, given an unknown or a candidate 
with a bad racial stance, getting 40-50 percent 
with their support might be a real accomplishment.
Of course, who knows that you couldn't achieve 
similar results if you just spent $40,000.in that 
ward on your own.
Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal (TILT). 
TILT endorsements appeared in Figaro in 1973 and gained 
some notoriety due mainly to the strange composition of 
their preferred ticket. The slate of endorsed candidates 
comprised a mixed bag of blacks, ultra-conservative whites, 
and little known candidates, all topped off by an endorse­
ment of local eccentric and perennial candidate, Rodney 
Fertel, for mayor. Attempts to locate the group revealed 
TILT to be a good-natured hoax perpetrated by a local news­
paper editor. Alert readers no doubt suspected as much
following claims of organizational strength in "the area
2 6of the Canal Street and Metarie cemetaries." TILT's 
name was left on the list of organizations presented for 
evaluation to organizational leaders and candidates as a 
validity check. They rated the organization as ineffective 
in recent elections.
Treme Improvement Political Society (TIPS). TIPS 
was founded in 1971 to support the candidacy of Louis 
Charbonnet, the son of a black, well-to-do funeral parlor 
operator, for the state legislature from the ninety-sixth 
district. The district comprises higher status whites 
living in the French Quarter and lower Esplanade area, 
"working class blacks" located in Treme and adjacent
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neighborhoods, and "working class whites" in the Faubourg- 
Marigny and City Park areas. The stated purpose of this 
organization is to "improve the conditions of the districts 
unique neighborhoods." The needs of the neighborhoods vary 
and while Charbonnet himself deals with the wider concerns 
of the district, TIPS is devoted to the black neighbor­
hoods. One critical problem facing the city is revenue 
and, of course, ways of generating more of it. In a recent 
session of the legislature, Charbonnet introduced a contro­
versial bill to convert the old U.S. Mint located at Decatur 
and Esplanade into a gambling casino for revenue purposes.
TIPS does not hold regularly scheduled meetings be­
tween elections, although it does on occasion sponsor 
activities and the board of directors is "on call" for any 
problem. As with DAWN, the organization and its activities 
seem closely tied to a dominant, publically known person, 
in this case, Charbonnet. Organizational leaders and can­
didates rate TIPS as having been only minimally effective 
in recent elections. It appears that Charbonnet himself 
was elected with the support of blacks and upper whites.
The latter group, however, does not figure in the organiza­
tion nor is responsive to it. Thus, the strength of the 
vote which elected Charbonnet coalesces again only occasion­
ally, and then outside the control and influence of TIPS 
itself.
University of New Orleans Young Democrats (UNO-YD). 
The current chapter of UNO-YD was re-established in 1970
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following the demise of the original group at the University 
of New Orleans campus during the middle-1960s. The group 
is affiliated with the national Democratic party, but 
carries no formal ties with either state or local Democratic 
organizations. Membership is not restricted solely to UNO 
students, but is limited to those less than 35 years of age. 
The organization claims to represent what has been generally 
termed "the youth vote." Active campaign work is conducted 
on campus and in surrounding areas where students are like­
ly to live.
The size of the organization varies greatly, depend­
ing mainly upon the interest generated by any particular 
election. Between elections, active membership may drop 
off to as low as a dozen or so. The organization operates 
upon a rather severe budget, thus delimiting options which 
it can exercise in behalf of endorsed candidates. Its main 
asset in this regard may be that it is able to sponsor 
speeches and debates on campus as an organization officially 
registered with the university. Such activities typically 
draw quite well, particularly in the more heated of elec­
tions. The organization also contributes money to candi­
dates, albeit on a small scale. The group, for example, 
contributed ten dollars in support of Baton Rouge newscaster 
Jeff LaCaze's bid to unseat Congressman John Rarick. Or­
ganization leaders and candidates for office rate the YD's 
as having had no impact in recent elections in New Orleans.
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Uptown Democratic Association (UDA). UDA is 
located in the tenth and eleventh wards and operates from a 
locally popular seafood restaurant and bar. Its area of 
concentration appears to be the white, working class neigh­
borhoods of the Irish Channel in and around lower Magazine 
Street. The group advertizes its endorsements in a store­
front on Magazine Street and, of course, in the bar. An 
interview with the leader of the organization was precluded 
by illness in his family. Organizational leaders and can­
didates for office rated the organization as ineffective in 
recent elections. Due to this and the lack of other infor­
mation, the organization was dropped from the study. The 
elimination of UDA and NOYD from the modified list of twenty- 
one organizations left nineteen organizations for further 
analysis.
Composite Organizational Ratings
As indicated in previous sections, organizational 
leaders and candidates for office were asked to rate each 
political organization in terms of its impact upon selected 
elections. As the questionnaire had been originally pre­
pared, each respondent was to indicate which organizations 
were most effective. However, once interviewing began, each 
respondent was instead asked to comment upon the effective­
ness of each organization on the list rather than only the 
most effective ones. From these individual evaluations of 
each organization, three overall rating scales were generated—  
one for the organizational leaders, one for the candidates,
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and, finally, a composite ranking based upon these first 
two ratings.
A summary of these ratings is presented in Table 1.
The rankings for each scale have been divided into four basic 
categories on the basis of the individual evaluations: very
effective, moderately effective, minimally effective, and not 
effective. The order in which the organizations are listed 
within the first three of these categories indicates further 
ranking of the organizations. Thus, the first organization 
in the moderately effective category was ranked higher than 
the organization entered in the second slot of that category. 
However, within the fourth category, that is, those rated not 
effective, the organizations are merely listed in alphabetical 
order. Further differentiation within this category on the 
basis of the evaluations rendered would have been extremely 
arbitrary.
The first column of the table contains the ratings 
of the organizational leaders. SOUL and COUP, the well- 
organized black groups of the ninth and seventh wards respec­
tively, were said by them to be the most effective in,recent 
elections. Rated as moderately effective are the old-line 
organizations of New Orleans— in order, AFL-CIO, OPPVL, MCD, 
RDO, IWO, and CCDA. The only other organizations founded 
prior to 1960, NWCVL and CCIVL, were classified as minimally 
effective and ineffective respectively. Other organizations 
reputed by the leaders to be minimally effective are BOLD,
NOC, NOVA, and TIPS, all groups of fairly recent origins.
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TABLE 1
RATINGS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NEW ORLEANS 
BY ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERS AND CANDIDATES 
FOR OFFICE, 1972-1974
Ratings by Ratings by Composite
Rating Organizational Leaders Candidates for Office Ratings
very SOUL SOUL SOUL
effective COUP COUP COUP
. AFL-CIO NWCVL OPPVL
OPPVL AGG AFL-CIO
moderately MCD OPPVL RDO
effective RDO RDO IWO
IWO IWO NWCVL
CCDA AFL-CIO MCD
BOLD BOLD AGG
minimally NWCVL DAWN BOLD
effective NOC MCD CCDA
NOVA NOVA NOVA
TIPS NOC
AGG AID AID
AID CCDA CCIVL
not CCIVL CCIVL DAWN
effective DAWN NOC TILT
TILT TILT TIPS
UNO-YD TIPS UNO-Y1
UNO-YD
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AGGf AID, DAWN, TILT, and UNO-YD were said by the organiza­
tional leaders to have been ineffective in recent elections.
Ratings by the candidates for office are similar to 
those of the organizational leaders, with a few important 
exceptions. Most dramatically, the candidates pronounced 
AGG as a moderately effective organization as. opposed to an 
ineffective classification by organizational leaders, and 
CCDA as an ineffective rather than a moderately effective 
organization. Likewise, the candidates advanced a higher 
rating of NWCVL and assigned slightly lower ratings to AFL- 
CIO, MCD, and NOC than did the organizational leaders. A 
fairly strong correlation of .66 (Spearman rho) was found 
between the ratings of the organizational leaders and those 
of the candidates.
A composite ranking derived from the previous ratings 
further reflects their basic similarities. In the composite 
ranking, most organizations are listed in the same effective­
ness category as earlier specified by the two sets of respond­
ents. As indicated earlier, serious disagreement between the 
organizational leaders and the candidates exists only in their 
evaluations of AGG and CCDA. The overall effect is that these 
two organizations are both classified in the composite scale 
as minimally effective organizations by default rather than 
by consensus.
The disagreement over these two organizations is per­
haps purely coincidental. However, the discrepancy may be 
symptomatic of the differing vantage points of the two sets
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of respondents. AGG is not structured in the same manner as
other typical organizations regarded by organizational leaders
as effective. Rather, it is seen more as a businessmen's
club. By contrast, CCDA, at least in previous years, has had
the expected organizational form. The candidates, on the
other hand, are attuned to the consequences of an endorsement
by a group such as AGG, particularly among higher status
voters. This factor is illustrated by the memberships held
27in AGG by several candidates prior to seeking elections.
Simply, the "good government" image of the group is consider­
ed a desirable social and political asset in grooming one's 
credentials for office. It also certifies one's politics as 
acceptably mainstream. In comparison, CCDA lacks such tran­
sitivity now that it is viewed as lacking the organizational 
muscle to literally turn out the vote, a major source of its 
strength in the past.
Organizational Composition and Organizational
Effectiveness"
These latter comments raise the question of the vary­
ing composition of organizational memberships and its relevance 
to the problem at hand. One strategy in arriving at some 
answer to this situation is to classify the organizations on 
the basis of their own identity claims. Given the current 
array of organizations, the most obvious criteria of differen­
tiation is that of race. While none of the organizations 
interviewed openly forbid membership to persons on the basis 
of skin color, most memberships are, nonetheless, racially
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restricted. Several organizations further proclaim to present 
or advance the interests of a racially defined group. RDO, 
for example, was originally a white supremacist organization. 
BOLD's very name, Black Organization for Leadership Develop­
ment, indicates a black target population, and so forth. 
However, all of this seems a bit cautious. The city has a 
long history of racial segregation and, unsurprisingly, inter­
action to the present day continues to be confined to racially 
homogeneous groups, as the previous organizational descriptions 
illustrate.
Class distinctions are likewise evident in the organi­
zational descriptions advanced by the organizational leaders 
themselves. Target populations are commonly defined as "the 
working class" of a given ward or an "upper middle class" 
neighborhood. On the basis of these observations, it is argued 
that the organizations may be categorized as "black," "lower 
white," and "upper white" in keeping with organizational 
claims. Table 2 contains a summary of New Orleans' major po­
litical organizations categorized along race/class and organi­
zational effectiveness dimensions. Each listed organization 
readily fits the assigned race/class designation, with the 
exception of NOVA whose area of operation reportedly includes 
both "lower" and "upper" white neighborhoods of the eighth 
and ninth wards.
Two basic hypotheses were advanced in the previous 
chapter concerning the expected composition of this table.
It was anticipated that: (a) levels of the race/class
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TABLE 2
RATINGS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NEW ORLEANS, 
BY RACE/CLASS AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS3
Composite
Rating Black
Race/Class Designation
Lower White Upper White
very
effective
SOUL
COUP
moderately
effective
OPPVL
NWCVL
AFL-CIO IWO
RDO
MCD
minimally
effective BOLD CCDA AGG
NOC
-NOVA-
not
effective
CCIVL
DAWN
TIPS
AID
Excluded from this listing are TILT, the fictional 
organization, and UNO-YD, whose campus orientation makes it 
technically unclassifiable according to this scheme.
dimension would reflect varying degrees of political 
organization, and (b) levels of the race/class dimension 
would exhibit varying degrees of political effectiveness. 
Specifically, upper white areas were expected to show the 
greatest evidence of organization and effectiveness, while 
decreasingly lower levels of these characteristics were an­
ticipated in lower white and black areas respectively. Initial
inspection of the table indicates that neither of these hy­
pothesized relationships is substantiated by the data. Rather, 
the data show that upper white organizations are conspicuously 
few in number and sport rather tame reputations. Lower white 
organizations, while more numerous and more highly regarded,
are considered as a group to be in a general state of decline.
Finally, black organizations have been appearing recently in 
greater numbers and, in many cases, are regarded as having 
organized quite effectively.
These trends indicated in the table are not thought 
to be distorted by the nonrandom nature of the sample under 
study. Each organizational leader and candidate was asked 
during the interview to identify further political and non­
political organizations considered influential in recent 
elections. All agreed that the major political organizations 
of the city were included in the list under study. While 
several additional organizations were mentioned, the name of 
only one was volunteered more than once (two times, actually)—  
the Black Youth for Progress (BYP), a small, black, quasi­
radical group centered in the St. Bernard Housing Project. It
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is doubtful that any of these suggested organizations, 
including BYP, would have received high effectiveness ratings. 
Nor is it likely the proportions of upper white, lower white, 
and black organizations are grossly distorted. The inter­
viewees expressed basic agreement with the ratio of organiza­
tions contained in the race/class categories. Thus, despite 
the lack of a random sample, the enumeration of further or­
ganizations known to exist would most likely only increase 
in rough proportion the number of organizations listed in the 
minimally effective and ineffective categories.
The scarcity of upper white organizations, of whatever 
effectiveness status, deserves further mention. As indicated 
in chapter two7~a substantial amount of research has detailed 
a positive correlation between socio-economic status and 
organizational participation. The data show here that, in 
New Orleans during the early 1970's at least, participation 
in formal political organizations does not follow this pat­
tern. However, the positive correlation between status and 
participation may indeed hold within the broader organiza­
tional structure of the community, that is, when the scope 
of inquiry is extended beyond the range of purely political 
organizations. There is some evidence suggesting this trend. 
Parker (1974: 68), for example, notes that the higher status 
groups of New Orleans have traditionally left the operation 
of the city's politics to the political organizations and 
their lower status constituents. Chai (1971: 2-11) has 
further exemplified this theme by claiming widespread, rapid
140
participation of higher status Orleanians in the city's 
social organizations, most notably Mardi Gras krewes, at the 
expense of political participation.
Organizational Effectiveness as an Attribute of
Areal Units
In order to facilitate further analysis of the or­
ganizational variable, a procedure was derived for measuring 
organizational effectiveness as a characteristic of the areal 
units under study. Attempts were made to identify as clearly 
as possible the areas of operation claimed by each of the 
organizations to be analyzed. Areal units which fell within 
territories claimed by organizations with high or moderate 
composite effectiveness ratings were classifed as areas of 
high organizational efficiency. A medium organizational 
effectiveness classification was assigned to areas claimed 
by minimally effective organizations and, finally, areas 
occupied by ineffective organizations or otherwise devoid of 
claimed organizational activity were categorized as low organ­
izational effectiveness areas. In cases where an areal unit 
was claimed by more than one organization, the efficiency 
rating of the stronger organization was used in determining 
the areal rating.
A number of problems were encountered in applying the 
organizational variable to areal units. To begin with, the 
orientation of some organizations was not easily translatable 
into geographic terms. UNO-YD, for example, claimed to seek 
the "youth vote"— a characteristic almost impossible to
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isolate with any degree of accuracy utilizing census 
materials. A similar situation results when the area of 
operation is only vaguely defined by the organizational 
leader, either because he himself does not know or wishes to 
keep the information secret. In essence, the problem of de­
fining the organizational characteristics of areal units is 
simple and straightforward only when the organizational claims 
specific precincts and these precincts match a set of defined 
areal units reasonably well.
Secondly, individual exposure to organizational activ­
ity is surely highly variable from area to area. One might 
argue that this variability is primarily a function of differ­
ences in organizational effectiveness. However, the researcher 
has no firsthand evidence of (a) individual exposure to organ­
izational activity, leading to (b) individual behavior 
commensurate with organizational exhortations, leading to (c) 
the organization's reputation for effectiveness. Thus, the 
study deals primarily with the reputation for organizational 
effectiveness since the areal units are being ranked on the 
basis of claims by organizational leaders and candidates for 
office.
These problems, no doubt, introduce some systematic 
error into the procedure. The overall effect of the first 
problem is most likely that of inducing underestimations of 
the organizational factor. The second problem can be kept 
within control by restricting generalizations to the repu­
tation for effectiveness as opposed to actual effectiveness.
With these restrictions in mind, the nature of the organi­
zational effectiveness variable as an ecological attribute 
in relation to the race/class dimension of areal units is 
shown in table 3. Previous discussion has made clear the 
expectation that varying levels of race/class characteristics 
were anticipated to lead to varying levels of organizational 
effectiveness. The data in table 3 confirm the observations 
made in the previous section, to wit, the race/class and 
organizational effectiveness variables are indeed related, 
but not in the previously hypothesized direction.
Black areas are claimed to have political organiza­
tions which are, on the average, considered more effective 
than those found in either lower white or upper white areas. 
On a scale of one to three (low, medium, and high effective­
ness ratings respectively), black areas show an average 
organizational effectiveness score of 2.15 as compared to 
mean values of 1.70 and 1.52 for lower white and upper white 
areas respectively. Asterisks next to the race/class mean 
square indicate that its corresponding F-value, derived by 
dividing the race/class mean square by the mean square for 
error, is statistically significant. Thus, there is a true 
overall difference among the organizational effectiveness 
means across categories of the race/class variable. Further, 
contrasts between treatment means show that the difference 
between the organizational effectiveness average for black 
areas and the weighted average for all white areas is sta­
tistically significant as well (t = 4.02, p<.01). However,
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TABLE 3
DATA SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVE­
NESS RATINGS OF 131 AREAL UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS
DESIGNATION
Data Summary: Race/Class
Black Lower White Upper White Total
Mean Organizational 
Effectiveness Score 2.15 1.70 1.52 1.85
Number of Areal Units 54 50 27 131
.!
Analysis of Variance:
Source of Variation: df3 dfk Mean Square Contrast
Total 130
Race/Class 2 4.45**C
Black vs. White 
Lower White vs. 
Upper White
128
128
4.02**
1.03
Error 128 .55
Column entries associated with these degrees of freedom 
are mean squares. Mean squares are interpreted in terms of 
the corresponding F-value resulting from the ratio of mean 
square for treatments with mean square for error.
^Column entries associated with these degrees of freedom 
are t-statistics. The t-test is composed of the difference 
between weighted contrast means divided by the standard error 
of the difference between means.
£
Level of significance is indicated by asterisks: no
asterick, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
144
the size of the difference in organizational effectiveness 
means between lower white and upper white areas was not 
significant (t = 1.03, p > .05).
The race/class and organizational effectiveness dimen­
sions of areal units can be further explicated by examining a 
correlation matrix of pertinent ecological characteristics. 
This matrix includes the additional ecological variables of 
percent residents who are nonwhite, median school years com­
pleted, percent adults who are high school graduates, median 
family income, and percent adults employed in nonmanual 
occupations. The matrix of variables is presented in table 4.
As expected, the race/class dimension shows a strong 
inverse relation (-.87) with the nonwhite variable. The re­
maining variables indicate that upper white areas contain 
higher schooling, income and occupational advantages, while 
decreasing levels of these attributes are found as one moves 
to lower white and then to black areas. Organizational effec­
tiveness, on the other hand, is positively related to the 
nonwhite variable (.35), that is, black areas tend to show a 
higher reputation for organizational effectiveness. Corres­
pondingly, then, areas of high organizational effectiveness 
tend to be characterized by lower educational, income, and 
occupational levels. The relationship between race/class 
and organizational effectiveness is moderate and inverse 
(-.33). These issues shall receive further amplification 
with the analysis of elections in the next chapter.
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TABLE 4
CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE RACE/CLASS AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
EFFECTIVENESS DIMENSIONS WITH OTHER ECOLOGICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS, NEW ORLEANS
MSCHa PHSG MFIN PNML ORGEF RACLS
NONW -.63b -.57 -.59 -.67 .35 l • CO
MSCH .86 .86 .92 -.24 .71
PHSG .75
CM00• -.22 .65
MFIN
00CO• -.17 .76
PNML -.25 .81
ORGEF -.33
SiAbbreviations refer to ecological characteristics as 
follows:
NONW - percent residents of areal unit who are non­
white
MSCH - median school years completed for adults over 
25 years of age 
PHSG - percent adults of areal unit who are high 
school graduates 
MFIN - median family income for areal unit 
PNML - percent adult residents of areal unit employed 
in nonmanual occupations 
ORGEF - organizational effectiveness rating of areal 
unit
RACLS - race/class classification of areal unit
Correlations are computed for 131 areal units. All 
correlations in the table are statistically significant, that 
is, the probability that the true relationship between any 
two of the variables is really zero is less than .05.
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Utilitarian vs. Normative Compliance 
Characteristics
It was argued in chapter two that compliance with 
organizational directives comprises at least two dimensions 
(Etzioni, 1975: 3-19): (1) the type of power available to
the organization to enforce its directives, and (2) the 
orientation of the members to the authority of the organiza­
tion. Briefly, three types of power— coercive (the use of 
physical sanctions), remunerative (the use of material sanc­
tions) , and normative (the use of symbolic sanctions)— and 
three types of orientation— alienative (intensely negative), 
calculative (mild positive or negative), and moral (intense­
ly positive)— were discussed. It was noted that three major 
types of organizations are likely to be found, namely, 
coercive (coercive power, alienative involvement), utilitarian 
(remunerative power, calculative involvement), and normative 
(normative power, moral involvement) organizations. Applied 
to political organizations, it was shown that a political 
organization may potentially fall in any one of the three 
classification types. However, empirical reviews suggest that 
they most often meet the credentials of the latter two com­
pliance modes. The old-line political machine, for example, 
most closely resembles the utilitarian criteria, while the 
national or state political party structure most often exhibits 
traits of the normative type.
An attempt shall be made to tentatively apply the 
typology to the political organizations discussed here. This
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procedure shall rest largely upon a subjective evaluation 
of the primary emphasis detected in the organizations. Or­
ganizations typically reflect the characteristics of more 
than one compliance mode. Further, the organizations may 
reflect differing compliance modes in varying contexts. For 
example, it may reflect a normative compliance pattern when 
operating in the public sphere, and a utilitarian mode in 
its day-to-day operation. As has been shown, however, one 
compliance pattern tends to predominate.
With these qualifications in mind, it seems allow­
able to state impressionistically that the upper white or­
ganizations discussed here tend to resemble most closely the 
normative mode, while black and lower white organizations, 
with the possible exception of NWCVL, AID, and NOVA, appear 
to reflect the utilitarian mode. Thus, the "good government" 
and "elect candidates of integrity" themes— regardless of 
their intrinsic truthfulness in contrast to the strategies 
of other organizations— are reflections of an appeal to the 
realm of political ideals for guiding activities. By con­
trast, the recurrent references among black and lower white 
organizations to campaign funds, considerations for political 
positions, and performance of service considerations suggest 
the salience for them of the practical and material benefits 
at stake in these elections. This by no means is meant to 
imply that upper white organizations have little interest in 
such "mundane" considerations or that they do not benefit 
materially from electoral activity. On the contrary, they may
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simply be more clever in disguising their "true" intentions. 
It is also possible that the material rewards for the upper 
white category are realized in more subtle form. Or they may 
indeed be more "public-regarding," to use Wilson and Banfield's 
(1964) term. These themes shall receive further treatment 
in the next chapter.
Footnotes
^Note, however, that much information about the organ­
izations is public in nature. For example, the organizations 
themselves advertize their endorsements.
2
Unless otherwise specified or clear by context, 
quotation marks in this section entitled "Descriptive Summaries" 
refer to words used by an interviewee.
3It is not illegal, apparently, for such funds to 
exchange hands in Louisiana. For a discussion of the election 
laws in the state, see James' (1975) analysis of Gov. Edwin 
Edwards' re-election campaign.
4
This candidate remarked: "Believe me, it was the
first time I'd seen that happen in my thirty years in politics!"
5
The term influential could be possibly interpreted 
in more than one sense. For example, an organization could be 
extremely "influential" in a limited area of operation without 
having an impact upon the overall election. Respondents were 
encouraged to evaluate the organizations in terms of their 
perceived areas of operation.
g
For an analysis of the 1969 mayoralty election, see 
Chubbuck, Renwick, and Walker (1970).
7
One such neighborhood leader is well-known local 
political figure, Edna Mae Tickles. For a discussion of the 
political fragmentation of the Uptown area, see Synder (1975).
g
In 1944, for example, 63% of white adults were regis­
tered to vote, compared to approximately 1% of black adults.
By 1948, the percentage of registered blacks increased to 13%, 
to 26% by 1956, 27% in 1964, 47% in 1968, and 55% in 1974.
White registration levels for the same time frames stand at 
approximately 70%. For a discussion of registration levels by 
race in five Southern cities (including New Orleans) , see 
Murray and Vedlitz (1975: 7-12).
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q
It is apparently also quite common for money secured 
for campaign expenses to be utilized in support of more general 
organizational activities. This practice is by no means re­
stricted to COUP.
■^With the exception of one term (1920 - 1925), a mem­
ber of RDO has occupied the mayor's seat for every term from 
1896 to 1946 (Parker, 1974: 69).
■^The Cold Water Committee was composed of a group of 
wealthy businessmen who helped finance activities of CCDA.
Its name was derived from their attempt to dissuade Morrison 
from running for governor - figuratively, throwing "cold water" 
upon his plans (Parker, 1974: 81).
12For a more detailed discussion of the special rela­
tionship between CCDA and the black community see Parker 
(1974: 86-88).
13While Jimmie Davis himself did not run on an openly 
segregationist platform in the first primary, third place 
finisher, Willie Rainach, did so in the crudest of terms. In 
the second primary against Morrison, Davis made race an issue 
and successfully gathered much of Rainach's support. For a 
discussion of this election, see Havard, Heberle, and Howard 
(1963).
14Morrison is generally regarded to have handled the 
initial period of desegregation in the city quite poorly. 
Morrison's general strategy seems to have been to ignore the 
issue as much as possible— a seemingly unwise decision while 
disorder reigned in the streets. The agonizing controversy, 
perhaps accentuated by the absence of strong leadership, 
appears to have contributed to CCDA's growing reputation for 
ineffectiveness (Parker, 1974: 118).
15Iris Kelso, political reporter for the New Orleans 
States-Item, offered this analysis (Parker, 19741 126) :
The main reason for the confusion is that for almost 
sixteen years now Chep Morrison was New Orleans 
politics. It was all quite simple. Either you were 
for or against the former mayor. Members of the 
Crescent City Democratic Association were the good 
guys. Members of the Regular Democratic Organization 
were the bad guys. . . I f  you were a Regular, you. . . 
waited patiently for the day he would be gone. Now 
suddenly that day has come and nobody knows what to 
do.
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16The grandfather clause stipulated that only those 
whose grandfathers were registered voters could now themselves 
register to vote. Since the grandfathers of most blacks would 
have been slaves, and, hence, not registered to vote, the 
rule had the effect of disenfranchizing blacks. Of course, it 
technically also eliminated a number of whites from eligibility 
as well. The understanding clause required the potential regis­
trant to demonstrate knowledge of the U.S. constitution to the 
satisfaction of the registrar of voters. The level of know- 
lege required to "satisfy" the registrar typically varied, 
depending upon who was attempting to register.
17New Orleans is the second largest port in the United
States.
18The group was, in fact, a strong supporter of the 
mayor in the 1969 election. Further, Phyllis Landrieu, the 
mayor's wife, is a member of the organization.
19The "rooster" is the symbol of the Democratic Party 
in Louisiana.
20A quote of this nature is found in both Parker 
(1974) and Fredrichs (1967).
21Rev. Davis was appointed to the post by Mayor Moon 
Landrieu. Elections for positions on the city council have 
been temporarily suspended until a redistricting plan for the 
city is completed.
22Only Tammany Hall is said to be older.
23The system is obviously not beneficial to those who 
are excluded from access to the organization.
24RDO claims to have endorsed Juvenile Court Judge 
Israel Augustine in his bid for that post. They also invited 
the Rev. A.L. Davis to be one of the honored guests at the 
centennial celebration of the organization (Katz, 1975).
25Douglas' reputed pragmatism has by now reached 
legendary proportions. He reportedly told a national organ­
izer from the McGovern 1972 presidential campaign who solicited 
his support (Davis, 1973: 40): "Let's get one thing straight: 
I'm a political whore. . . what's in it for me?"
2 6Sources here include Murray and Vedlitz (1974) ,
Davis (1973), Bourg (1973), and selected reference persons.
CHAPTER V 
THE ELECTIONS
Introduction 
This chapter contains an analysis of eleven New 
Orleans elections which were held between 1972 and 1974.
The rationale for selecting the particular elections under 
study and the basic descriptions of the contestants and 
issues involved in these elections are presented in chapter 
three. As further detailed in the operationalization of 
terms section of that chapter, local elections are consider­
ed to be of particular relevance in studying a community's 
political organizational structure. Such elections typically 
involve issues which most directly confront the individual 
citizen. Consequently, they are often hotly contested and 
serve as a forum in which potential cleavages within the 
population may become actualized. Of course, a major concern 
here is to assess the role of political organizations in this 
process.
Race/Class, Organizational Effectiveness, 
and Voter Registration
Granted the assumption that political organizations
attempt to influence the way in which individuals cast their
votes, it seems clear that they likewise concern themselves
with qualifying potential supporters for action at the polls.
Indeed, the promotion of voter registration appears on the
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agenda of virtually every New Orleans political organization
described in the previous chapter. However, interest in the
registration variable stems from other motives as well.
According to evidence presented in the chapter dealing with
theoretical considerations, voter turn out in many locales
is often correlated with a number of characteristics, includ-
*
ing race, sex, class, participation in voluntary associations, 
and so forth (Lipset, 1963: 75). Not surprisingly, these 
patterns generally hold as well for those who register to 
begin with. It is reasonable to expect that organizations 
prey upon this factor, seeking either to accentuate or re­
verse these reported trends in their favor.
Table 5A contains a summary of registration figures 
in New Orleans for the years 1972 through 19 74. Cell entries 
for . each of these years'*" contain the average percent register­
ed to vote of the estimated total number of individuals eight- 
teen years and older for the 131 areal units comprising New 
Orleans. The registration means are cross-tabulated by both 
the race/class designation and the organizational effective­
ness rating of the areal units. These means represent actual 
registration levels as determined from voter registration 
rolls, that is, they are not adjusted for the effects of the 
race/class and organizational effectiveness variables.
The race/class designations of the areal units are 
identical to those used in chapters three and four. However, 
for purposes of the analysis contained in this chapter, the 
list of areal units has been dichotomized into high and low
TABLE 5A
VOTER REGISTRATION IN 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS FOR 1972 
CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
ADULTS REGISTERED, UNADJUSTED MEANSa
, 1973, AND 1974, BY RACE/ 
RATING: MEAN PERCENT
Year:
1972 Race/Class
Black Lower White Upper White Row Mean
Organizational High 53.3 59.0 74.4 59.0
Effectiveness Low 49.5 60.5 65.3 58.6
Column Mean 52.3 59.7 70.1 58.8
1973
Organizational High 46.9 51.1 61.9 52.2
Effectiveness Low 41.9 53.7 59 .7 51.8
Column Mean 44.5 52.3 60.4 51.9
1974
Organizational High 42.7 49.0 62.7 47 .1
Effectiveness Low 37.3 45.4 52.9 46.5
Column Mean 41.2 47.1 57.9 46.9
aRaw data used in generating this table were derived from the registration rolls 
of the Orleans Parish Registrar of Voters.
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organizational effectiveness categories rather than the 
three levels— high, medium, and low— of the previous chapters. 
This procedure is necessary since the cross-tabulation of 
three levels of race/class and three levels of the organiza­
tional variable would generate a table with at least one empty 
cell and several low frequency cells. High effectiveness 
areas are defined as those claimed by organizations themselves 
rated as highly or moderately effective by organizational 
leaders and candidates for office. The low effectiveness 
label is attached to areas claimed by organizations said to 
be minimally effective or ineffective, or to areas without 
organizational activity.
A two-factor analysis of variance is presented in 
table 5B for assessing the registration figures. This pro­
cedure is particularly appropriate for testing the relation­
ship between nominally scaled independent variables and a 
dependent variable which is intervally scaled. It allows 
for the determination of the isolated effect of each inde­
pendent variable upon the dependent variable and, addition­
ally, a test for an interaction effect. Since cells of the
two-way classification table used here do not have equal 
2
frequencies, a modification of the standard analysis of 
variance is contained in this procedure. Basically, each 
effect— in turn, race/class, organizational effectiveness, 
and interaction— is partitioned by adjusting for all other 
effects. Thus, the component sums of squares will not be 
orthagonal, that is, the estimates of the main effects will
TABLE 5B
VOTER REGISTRATION IN 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS FOR 1972, 1973, AND 1974, BY 
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT ADULTS REGISTERED
Year
Source of Variation dfa dfb 1972 1973 1974
Total 130
Race/Class 2 96.34**C 118.16** 97.12**
Black vs. White
Lower White vs. Upper White
12 5 
125
5.03**
3.06**
5.44**
3.68**
5.16**
3.52**
Organizational Effectiveness 1 15.64 26.93 31.51
Interaction 2 25.52 30.62 45.45
Black vs. White, High,
Low OrgEff 
Lower vs. Upper White, High 
Low OrgEff
9
125
125
Error 125 19.13 16.90 15.75
aColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are
mean squares.
Column entires for components associated with these degrees of freedom are 
t-statistics.
°Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed 
statistic, as follows: no asterisk, p >.05; *, p <.05; **, p <.01.
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not be independent of each other and the estimate of the
interaction effect will not be independent of the main effects.
This situation reflects a characteristic of the estimation
procedure for unequal cell frequencies rather than any parti-
3
cular defect m  the analysis. Estimates of the various 
effects are reported in the analysis of variance table as 
mean squares. The standard F-test is computed by dividing 
the mean square associated with any treatment effect by the 
corresponding mean square for error.
A further tool available in the analysis of variance 
repertoire is the computation of independent contrasts among 
treatment means. Such comparisons essentially involve a 
further partitioning of the variation associated with the in­
dependent variables. The number of comparisons permitted 
with any one independent variable is equal to the number of 
levels of that variable minus one. Thus, two comparisons-- 
black versus white and lower white versus upper white, for 
example— are contained in the race/class variable. Since 
only one comparison— low versus high effectiveness--is allowed 
with the organizational variable, the indicated F-value stands 
as the test of this comparison. With these two independent 
variables, two further contrasts are possible, namely, one 
for each of the two degrees of freedom associated with the 
interaction component. The t-statistic for testing the dif­
ference between means is used to determine the level of signif­
icance incurred with each contrast.
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Turning to the actual registration data entered in 
the table, it is first noted that an estimated 58.8 percent 
of eligible Orleanians were registered to vote in 1972, while 
51.9 percent and 46.9 percent were so registered in 1973 and 
1974 respectively. The eleven percent reduction in the 
proportion of those registered to vote is almost perfectly 
consistent across both race/class and organizational effec­
tiveness levels. Examination of the raw figures constituting 
the percentages indicate that the reduction is due both to 
decrease in the numerator and to increases in the denominator. 
Specifically, the absolute numbers of registered voters 
actually declined between 1972 and 1974 and the pools of 
eligibles in these years likewise increased in size. In 
1972, for example, 252,788 of the estimated 437,349 indi­
viduals 18 years of age and older in New Orleans registered 
to vote. Corresponding figures for 197 3 are 234,567 of 
451,960, and 217,278 of 465,264 for 1974.
Several possible explanations may be advanced to 
account for this pattern, although none can be clearly sub­
stantiated by the data. An employee of the Orleans Parish 
Registrar of Voters suggested that the decline is not a 
long term one. Rather, registration increases occurred in 
the late 1960's and early 1970's, probably due to growing 
black registration and heightened interest in the 1969 mayor's 
race. Periodic checks of the registration cards are conduc­
ted in order to verify continued residence in the precinct 
of registration among those who have not voted in the past
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three years. Those who have moved to addresses outside 
the city boundaries or who cannot be located are eliminated 
from the rosters. Apparently, registration levels in 1973 
and 1974 did not offset such losses.
Another possible explanation involves some basic 
error in the estimation of the total number of those elibible 
to vote. Since these estimates are based upon census mater­
ials, no adjustment is included for differences in mortality 
rates and migratory patterns among areal units. However, 
this factor would appear much more plausible if the differ­
ences from year to year, or from one level of the independent 
variables to another, were wildly divergent or reflected in­
consistently biased trends. This is decidedly not the case. 
The observed patterns of decline are relatively uniform.
Thus, the assumption that mortality and migratory differences 
among areal units will cancel each other out still seem 
acceptable.
Whatever the reasons for the decline, registration 
levels are clearly correlated with the race/class dimension 
of areal units. Upper whites are in each instance registered 
in greater proportion than are either lower whites or blacks. 
In fact, the mean difference in registration levels in upper 
white areas is approximately 12 percentage points higher than 
in lower white areas and 20 percentage points higher than in 
black areas. The statistics associated with the isolated 
effect of the race/class variable on voter registration levels 
confirm these observations. The magnitude of the race/class
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mean square shows the differences to be highly significant, 
that is, to reflect a significance level indicating that 
differences of this magnitude occur by chance alone less than 
one time out of one hundred in identical situations. The 
orthagohal contrasts indicate that differences between black 
and white areas and differences between lower white and upper 
white areas are both statistically significant aspects of the 
race/class differences.
However, the same patterns do not hold for the organ­
izational variable. Examination of row totals suggest that 
there is only a negligible difference in registration levels 
between areas designated as containing highly effective or­
ganizational ratings and those having the low effectiveness 
ratings. Consequently, the mean square associated with 
these observed differences in registration across levels of 
organizational effectiveness is even smaller than the mean 
square for error. An orthagonal comparison, therefore, is 
not warranted. Further, since the observed patterns are 
fairly consistent within treatment dimensions, the interaction 
component is also well within chance expectations.
These findings are only partially consistent with 
hypothesized expectations. Positive relationships were ex­
pected between race/class and registration and also between 
organizational effectiveness and registration. The data 
support only the former expectation. However, there is a 
further complication. The race/class and organizational 
effectiveness attributes of areal units were also originally
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expected to follow a positive relationship pattern. Instead, 
as the data of the previous chapter show, an inverse pattern 
prevails there. Thus, from the standpoint of its composi­
tion, the high organizational category is made up primarily 
of black areas, followed in number by lower white and upper 
white areal units. Specifically, the high organizational 
effectiveness category contains thirty-nine black, twenty- 
seven lower white, and fourteen upper white areal units. The 
low organizational effectiveness group consists of fifteen 
black, twenty-three lower whites, and thirteen upper white 
areas.
The central feature being tested in this dissertation 
is the mediating capacity of the organizational variable. 
Therefore, if the relationship between the race/class desig­
nation and the organizational effectiveness characteristics 
of areal units is inverse, the following two conditions must
hold for the mediation role to be substantiated:
1) an inverse relationship must exist between the race/
class characteristic and the participation variable 
(registration or voter turn out), and
2) a positive relationship must exist between the or­
ganizational effectiveness rating and the participation 
variable.
As detailed earlier in this section, neither of these 
conditions holds in comparisons of the registration figures 
across levels of the race/class and organizational attributes 
of areal units. To summarize, upper whites exhibit the 
highest levels of registration. However, the high effective­
ness category of the organizational variable contains primarily
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black, not upper white, areal units. Upper white areal units 
rated as highly effective are therefore expected to exhibit 
higher registration figures than upper white units rated as 
low effective areas, but lower registration figures than 
either lower white or black neighborhoods. Thus, the super­
ior registration proportions of the upper white areas are 
apparently obtained in the relative absence of effective 
political organization as measured here. This situation 
accounts to some extent for the poor showing of the organi­
zational factor vis-a-vis the registration data.
Race/Class, Organizational Effectiveness, and 
Voter Turn Out
One can expect that organizational activity will be 
reflected in varying degrees of voter turn out. Table 6A 
contains a summary of voter turn out levels classified by 
race/class and organizational effectiveness characteristics 
for the years 1972 through 1974. Analysis of these data 
is presented in table 6B. As stipulated in chapter three, 
the voter turn out percentages were computed by dividing 
the total number of votes cast per areal unit by the total 
number of persons registered to vote for each unit.
Looking first at the 1972 figures, average voter turn 
out in the first primary stands at 41.6% and at 45.4% for the 
secondary primary. However, levels of voter turn out are not 
uniform across levels of the race/class variable. Upper 
white areas show the highest average turn out levels, exceed­
ing in both elections those levels found in lower white areas
TABLE 6A
VOTER TURN OUT IN 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS FOR 1972, 1973, AND 1974, BY RACE/ 
CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN PERCENT
TURN OUT, UNADJUSTED MEANS3
Year:
First Primary 
Race/Class
Second Primary 
Race/Class
1972: Black
Lower
White
Upper
White
Row
Mean Black
Lower
White
Upper
White
Row
Mean
OrgEffb High 38.2 44.7 53.1 43.0 41.9 47.1 54.7 45.9
Low 38.2 43.8 43.1 42.0 40.8 46.6 44.9 44.4
Column Mean 38.2 44.3 48.4 42.6 41.6 46.8 49.9 45.4
1973:
OrgEff High 56.1 57.5 56.5 56.7 56.9 55.9 61.1 57.3
Low 55.8 56.9 52.6 55.5 58.3 56.6 54.4 56.6
Column Mean 56.0 57.2 54.6 56.2 57.3 56.2 57.9 57.0
1974:
OrgEff High 39.5 48.5 54.7 45.1 39.6 45.2 52.6 43.8
Low 41.3 47.3 47.0 45.4 42.2 46.3 46.1 45.0
Column Mean 40.0 47.8 50.7 45.2 40.3 45.7 49.5 44.3
Raw data used in generating this table were derived from the Office of the 
Secretary of State, State of Louisiana (1972, 1974a, 1974b), the Orleans Parish Demo­
cratic Executive Committee (1973a, 1973b, 1973c), and the United States Bureau of the 
Census (1972: 1-18).
The abbreviation "OrgEff" refers to the organizational effectiveness variable. 162
TABLE 6B
VOTER TURN OUT IN 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS FOR 1972, 1973, and 1974, BY RACE/ 
CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT TURN OUT
Source of First Primary Second Primary
Variation dfa dfb 1972 1973 1974 1972 1973 1974
Total 130
Race/Class 2 15.55*C 5.69 18.43** 15.14** 5.39 20.34**
Black vs. White 125 6.22** 6.73** 6.31** 6.03**
Lower White vs.
Upper White 125 2.45* 1.71 2.16* 1.98*
Organizational
Effectiveness l .10 2.33 3.48 1.24 .78 7.08
Interaction 2 24.64** 1.58 17.13** 20.93** 3.09 18.43**
Black vs. White,
High, Low OrgEff 125 2.15* 2.28* 2.16* 1.79
Lcwer vs. Upper
White, High, Low
OrgEff 125 2.86* 1.87 3.37* 2.08*
Error 125 4.51 3.31 4.63 3.24 2.57 5.78
aColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedan are mean squares.
Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedcm are t-statistics.
°Asterisks refer to the level of signifiance associated with the listed statistic,
as follows: no asterisk, p >.05; *, p<05; **, p <.01. 163
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by about four percentage points and those of black neighbor­
hoods by approximately twelve percentage points. The mean 
squares associated with the main effects of the race/class 
variable indicate statistical significance at the .05 level.
Turn out figures in 1972 are quite consistent across 
organizational effectiveness levels. The variation in mean 
voter turn out in high versus low organizational effective­
ness areas is only about one- percentage point. The extremely 
small mean squares for the organizational variable confirm 
the absence of significant differences in turn out levels. 
However, F-values associated with the interaction component 
of race/class and organizational effectiveness do indicate 
significant variation. Inspection of the turn out averages 
listed in the respective cells of the table quickly reveals 
the locus of the interaction. Turn out figures for black 
and lower white areas are almost identical, regardless of the 
level of organizational effectiveness considered. By com-. 
parison, upper white areas show voter turn out to be almost 
ten full percentage points higher in the high than in the 
low organizational effectiveness areas/ Further comments 
concerning this matter shall be presented after considering 
the voter turn out data for 1973 and 1974. A check of the 
orthagonal contrasts reveals that the observed differences 
in turn out are significant for the black versus white, 
lower versus upper white, and, with one exception, for the 
interaction comparisons.
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In 1973, voter turn out levels for New Orleans rose 
dramatically by an overall average of approximately eleven 
percent. The average turn out in the first primary stands 
at 56.2% and at 57.0% for the second election of that year. 
The major portion of this increase is contributed by the 
black and lower white neighborhoods. The mean turn out among 
upper whites is approximately seven percentage points higher 
in 1973 than in 1972. However, turn out in the lower white 
areas is about eleven percentage points higher than in 1972, 
and, in black neighborhoods, the average turn out increased 
by nearly seventeen percentage points. The overall effect 
is that turn out in the three race/class areas approaches 
parity, with the lower white and black areas actually show­
ing a higher turn out than upper whites by two or so points 
in the first primary. The F-values indicate that the sizes 
of the differences in turn out means by the race/class 
variable are not statistically significant. Likewise, the 
small differences in turn out figures across levels of organ­
izational effectiveness are below significance thresholds 
and no interaction effect is noted. Under these circumstan­
ces, no orthagonal comparisons are warranted.
Voter turn out levels in 1974 returned to magnitudes 
comparable with the 1972 data. In the first election of 
1974, 45.2% of those eligible voted in the first primary and 
44.3% participated in the second. Upper white neighborhoods 
again had the highest turn outs in both primaries, exceeding 
turn outs in lower white and black areas by about three and
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ten percentage points respectively. The F-ratios indicated 
by these overall differences are statistically significant. 
However, the orthagonal contrasts indicate that the average 
difference in turn out between lower and upper whites is 
not significant in the first primary. Turn out differences 
associated with the organizational variable are again neg­
ligible. In both elections, however, an interaction effect 
is detected among levels of the independent variables. As 
in the 1972 data, this effect is centered in the turn out of 
figures of upper whites, high organizational effectiveness 
areas which show nearly seven percentage points beyond that 
listed for low organizational effectiveness, upper white 
areas.
The turn out data thus reflect two basic trends. One, 
voter turn out figures are, in general, positively correlated 
with the race/class dimension of areal units. This finding 
is contrary to the expectations revised on the basis of the 
observed inverse relationship between race/class and organi­
zational effectiveness. If organizational effectiveness were 
the mediating variable, black areas would be expected to show 
the highest turn out percentages, followed then in participa­
tion by lower white and upper white neighborhoods. This 
pattern is approached only in the 1973 elections, a year in 
which black and lower white turn out levels significantly ex­
ceed those of the other two election years examined here.
These and other data suggest that the 1973 pattern is the ex­
ception rather than the rule.
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The second trend contained within the data concerns 
the interaction effect observed in the 1972 and 1974 figures. 
The second corollary of the mediation hypothesis is that 
voter turn out will be highest in areas rated as organization­
ally effective. Generally, this is not supported by the data, 
except in upper white areas. Turn out in lower white and 
black neighborhoods is shown to be roughly identical in both 
high and low organizationally effective units. The upper 
white pattern may be a reflection of the composition of high­
ly rated upper white areas, located primarily in Uptown New 
Orleans and the Lakefront, as opposed to that of lower rated 
upper white areas, situated mostly in the newer suburban 
neighborhoods of New Orleans East and the West Bank— in 
short, a distinction between status areas of older versus 
newer vintage.
Race/Class, Organizational Effectiveness, and Votes 
Cast in Selected Elections
Perhaps the ultimate test of organizational effective­
ness lies in the relation between the array of organizational 
endorsements and the distribution of votes cast for endorsed 
candidates. As has been shown in the organizational descrip­
tions of the previous chapter, such campaign activity forms 
the nucleus of what New Orleans' political organizations 
typically consider themselves to be all about. Further, can­
didates and organizational leaders alike considered local 
political organizations to play an important role in recent 
elections and were able to talk readily about the organizations
168
in terms of their reputed impact upon elections. Indeed, 
the concept of "organizational effectiveness" as adopted 
for the study is drawn from the definition commonly held 
among these respondents. In short, the organizations operate 
primarily within the electoral context.
The assessment of the mediating role of organizations 
follows the expectations specified earlier in this chapter, 
with one modification. This refinement is necessitated by 
the fact that organizations do not always endorse the same 
candidate. Thus, the expected direction of the relationship 
between the race/class dimension and the distribution of 
votes cast is defined in each election by the particular 
pattern of organizational endorsements. Likewise, the di­
rection of the relationship expected between organizational 
effectiveness ratings and the distribution of votes cast is 
subject to this endorsement pattern.
1972 Louisiana State Supreme Court Race. The 1972 
Louisiana Supreme Court election featured four candidates 
seeking to fill a two year unexpired, associate justice term. 
The election district for this seat actually extends beyond 
Orleans Parish to include Jefferson, Plaquemines, and St. 
Bernard Parishes. Analysis is restricted here to Orleans 
Parish to maintain continuity and comparability with other 
electoral data presented in the study.
Preliminary descriptions of the candidates— Pascal 
Calogero, Revius Ortique, William Redmann, and Leon Sarpy—  
and the conditions surrounding the election were presented
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in chapter three. The election is of particular interest 
because of its racial and class overtones. Both Calogero 
and Redmann, for example, emphasized their "working class" 
ties. Ortique reminded audiences that he would be the first 
black justice elected to the court. Sarpy, a Tulane law 
professor, Boston Club member, and former King of Rex, was 
cast as the Uptown, silk-stocking candidate.
Calogero, a close friend and former law partner of 
Mayor Landrieu, actively sought the support of the city's 
political organizations. Landrieu himself had won the 1969 
mayor's race with strong black and upper white organizational 
support, and many of the same apparently saw virtue in back­
ing a candidate of a similar mold. Calogero's own working 
class origins in the city's eighth ward., graduation at the 
top of his class at the Tulane Law School, and work as an 
attorney and Democratic office holder combined to project a 
"local boy makes good!" image attractive to many organiza­
tions. The Landrieu connection was likewise said to be very 
persuasive.
Ortique, on the other hand, encountered considerable 
difficulty marshalling the support of even black organizations. 
Several black organizations had recently experienced a measure 
of electoral success and its spoils in the 1969 election.
The wisdom of backing a winner was apparent and fresh in 
mind. Further, Ortique's upper status background and exist­
ence, seemingly removed from that of the average black, were 
mentioned as obstacles in generating enthusiasm for his
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candidacy. The issue of black solidarity, however, took 
precedence in the considerations of some organizations.
Sarpy's campaign strategy concentrated upon the 
media approach. He tended to view the judicial race and his 
own campaign as standing above the political fray incumbent 
to the typical New Orleans election. The tone of his tele­
vision commercials, filmed in the well-appointed living room—  
chandaliers, for example, hung conspicuously overhead— of his 
Uptown home, seemed particularly to impart an air of aloof­
ness. He addressed a number of rallies sponsored by political 
organizations, but seldom asked directly for organizational 
support and universally refused to provide funds for organi­
zational endorsements.
The final candidate, Redmann, sought some organiza­
tional support, but received little— most likely because he 
was given little chance of winning the election, given the 
nature of his opposition. The AFL-CIO did rate him as very 
friendly to and compatible with labor.
Endorsements of the city's political organizations 
are summarized in table 7. In the first primary, the black 
organizations split their endorsements, with the more highly 
rated organizations of this group favoring Calogero and 
those rated as less effective, excepting CCIVL, siding with 
Ortique. Calogero drew the support of all lower white and 
upper white organizations. With the elimination of Ortique 
and Redmann from the race, all organizational support was 
lined up behind the candidacy of Calogero in the second
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TABLE 7
ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 1972 LOUISIANA 
STATE SUPREME COURT RACE
Organizations
Race/Class 
Designation
First Primary
Calogero Ortique Redmann Sarpy
Second Primary
Calogero Sarpy
Black:
SOUL
COUP
OPPVL
NWCVL
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
BOLD
CCIVL
DAWN
TIPS
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Lower White:
AFL-CIO X X
RDO X X
MCD X X
CCDA X X
NOVA X X
AID X X
Upper White:
IWO X X
AGG
NOC
X
X
X
X
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primary. On the basis of these endorsements, expectations
l
consistent with the mediating hypothesis indicate that 
Calogero should carry the areas of high organizational rat­
ings over those areas rated as less effective, and that the 
distribution of votes cast for Calogero should be inversely 
related to the race/class designation of areal units. Fur­
ther, the levels of support found among the other candidates 
should be equally distributed over both race/class and or­
ganizational effectiveness categories.
Presentation and analysis of the votes cast in the 
1972 Louisiana Supreme Court race are given in tables 8A and 
8B. In the first primary, Sarpy received 33.7% of the votes, 
only a fraction more than the 33.3% collected by Calogero. 
Ortique managed to get 24.1% and Redmann finished a distant 
fourth at 9.2%. Turning to the race/class variable, Sarpy, 
without organized political support as defined here, received 
the largest share of votes within any of the race/class areas—  
55.7% of the upper white vote. With only the claimed support 
of the lower rated black organizations, Ortique gained 45.8% 
of the black vote. Thirty-two percent of the remaining vote 
in black areas was cast for Calogero and 17.6% was given to 
Sarpy. Calogero managed 39.4% of the lower white vote, only 
one tenth of one percentage point more than the 39.3% of that 
vote cast for Sarpy.
The F-ratios associated with the race/class variable 
indicate that the average number of votes c a s t  in each of 
the race/class levels are significantly different in all cases
/TABLE 8A
VOTES CAST IN 1972 LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT RACE FOR 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS, 
BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN
PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS3
Candidate: First Primary Second Primary
Race/Class Race/Class
Lcwer Upper Rcw Lower Upper Row
Calogero Black White White Mean Black White White Mean
OrgEff High 30.9 42.2 19.4 32.7 74.8 54.1 33.3 60.6
Low 34.9 36.1 30.3 34.2 70.7 52.1 43.5 55.1
Column Mean 32.0 39.4 24.7 33.3 73.5 53.3 37.7 58.4
Ortique
OrgEff High 48.5 12.3 4.2 28.6
Low 38.6 9.5 5.1 17.0
Column Mean 45.8 11.1 4.7 24.1
Redmann
OrgEff High 4.5 9.2 14.0 7.8
Low 6.1 12.1 16.0 11.3
Column Mean 5.1 10.5 15.0 9.2
Sarpy
OrgEff High 16.3 36.6 62.4 31.3 25.1 49.1 66.7 39.4
Low 20.2 42.3 48.3 37.4 30.7 45.7 57.5 45.9
Column Mean 17.6 39.3 55.7 33.7 26.7 47.3 62.3 41.9
Raw data used in generating this table were derived from the Office of the
Secretary of State, State of Louisiana (1972). 173
TABLE 8B
VOTES CAST IN 1972 LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT RACE FOR 131 NEW ORLEANS AREAL UNITS, 
BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE
Source of First Primary Second Primary
Variation dfa dfb Calogero Ortique Redmann Sarpy Calogero Sarpy
Total 130
Race/Class 2 14.09 507.42**'3 35.84** 327.74** 294.21** 273.14**
Black vs. White 125 -14.60** 10.07** 14.67** -13.27** 13.23**
Lower White vs.
Upper White 125 -2.07* 4.71* 6.58** -6.04** 5.83**
Organizational
Effectiveness 1 17.42 104.29** 2.61 15.95 18.27 33.91
Interaction 2 69.81** 27.14 .58 93.39** 40.48* 49.69*
Black vs. White
High, low OrgEff 125 0.41 2.02* 1.88 2.08*
Lower vs. Upper
White, High, Lew
OrgEff 125 6.97** 4.00** 2.23* 2.50*
Error 125 10.00 16.04 1.49 10.54 11.21 11.07
aColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedan are mean squares.
T_
Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedan are t-statistics.
Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows: 
no asterisk, p >.05; *, p< .05; **, p <.01.
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except that of Calogero. Orthagonal contrasts indicate 
that these discrepancies across race/class levels are sig­
nificant for both black-white and lower white-upper white 
differences. A strong interaction effect is also noted in 
both the Calogero and Sarpy distributions, symptomatic 
mainly of the heavy support for Sarpy in the high effective­
ness, upper white areas and the corresponding low support for 
Calogero in these same areas.
The distribution of votes cast shows a statistically 
significant difference across levels of the organizational 
effectiveness variable only in the case of Ortique. Here, 
a difference between high and low effectiveness areas stands 
at eleven percentage points in favor of Ortique. Since, 
however, he was not endorsed by one of the eight organizations 
in the high effectiveness category, and the bulk of the vote 
in his direction occurred in black neighborhoods, it is 
difficult to construe this as evidence supportive of the or­
ganizational variable.
The major issue in the second election revolved around
the question of to whom Ortique1s bloc of votes would shift.
Black organizations previously backing Ortique now endorsed
5
Calogero. The Landrieu connection was reaffirmed. Sarpy, 
meanwhile, continued his policy of working independently of 
organizational support. Political wags fully expected 
Calogero to take the bulk of the departed candidates' support.
Returns from the second primary suggest quite clearly 
to whom Ortique's share of the black vote went. Calogero
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received 58.4% of all votes cast in Orleans Parish, enough 
to offset his losses in neighboring parishes, and 73.5% of 
the black vote. This represented an increase of 41% in his 
support among blacks over the first primary. He also in­
creased his share of the lower white vote to 53.3%, and 
carried 37.7% the upper white vote. The analysis shows that 
the differences in the vote by race/class categories is sta­
tistically significant for both candidates. There also is 
an interaction effect, again centered in the ten percentage 
point gap in candidate choice in upper white neighborhoods 
between high and low organizational effectiveness areas.
Votes in black and lower white areas vary no more than five 
percentage points across organizational effectiveness levels. 
Differences in overall mean votes per candidate across the 
organizational variable are not significant.
In sum, the data for this election do not tend to 
support the mediating hypothesis. The organizational effec­
tiveness variable shows a significant difference only in the 
case of the vote for Ortique— an instance which must be dis­
counted since the high effectiveness organizations endorsed 
his opponent. One might argue, however, that the effect of 
an endorsement is relative, that is, Calogero did well by the 
organizations in the first election in drawing almost one- 
third of the black vote against a black opponent. On the 
other hand, in the absence of a black opponent in the second 
- primary, he still received 70.7% of the vote in low effec­
tiveness black neighborhoods— only four percentage points
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less than in high organization black areas. In short, 
the endorsed candidate won, but it is difficult to point to 
solid evidence of organizational mediation.
1973 Orleans Parish District Attorney Race. The 
District Attorney's race in 1973 featured a rematch of the 
1969 election in which Harry Connick challenged incumbent 
Jim Garrison. These two were joined in the 1973 election by 
attorney George Reese and former Garrison aide Ross T.
Scaccia. Connick's campaign emphasized a tough "law-and- 
order" stance which included a promise to prosecute black- 
on-black crime, a claimed weakness of the Garrison regime.
As otherwise used, law-and-order is generally a codeword 
for cracking down upon black-on-white crime. Connick sought 
to soften the hard image that law-and-order thus carries in 
the black community by personally and openly courting the 
support of the black organizations. Upper white organiza­
tions favored Connick over Garrison. Connick was well-known 
among them through his work as a successful attorney in 
criminal law and through his participation in AGG prior to 
seeking office. As indicated in table 9, Connick was success­
ful in gaining the support of the higher ranking black organ­
izations, with the exception of OPPVL, and of all the upper 
white organizations. Among the lower white organizations, 
he was able to secure the endorsement only of MCD.
Garrison was seeking his fifth term as district 
attorney and, whether he himself actually contributed to the 
problem or not, was a natural target for the frustration over
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TABLE 9
ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 197 3 ORLEANS 
PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY RACE
Organizations . 1st Primary 2nd Primary
Race/Class
Designation Connick Garrison Reese Connick Garrison
Black:
SOUL X X
COUP X X
OPPVL X X
NWCVL X X
BOLD X X
CCIVL X X
DAWN X X
TIPS X X
Lower White:
AFL-CIO X X
RDO X X
MCD X X
CCDA X X
NOVA X X
AID X X
Upper White:
IWO X X
AGG X X
NOC X X
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rising crime rates in New Orleans. Generally regarded as
a charismatic individual, Garrison maintained extensive
support in lower white areas over the years and, despite
occasional recriminations, was personally popular among
blacks as well. However, his involvement in the Kennedy
assassination case, considered by some as a wasteful and
7
foolish divergence, seemed to have cost him some measure 
of support in upper white areas. Garrison drew endorsements 
from two old-guard black organizations (OPPVL and CCIVL) and 
all the lower white organizations except MCD. The leaders 
of DAWN, somewhat leery of all the law-and-order talk being 
generated, decided to stay with Garrison.
Reese, the third candidate, was able to attract only 
the endorsement of BOLD, although several organizations ex­
pressed their basic satisfaction with his credentials. His 
efforts in aligning organizational support appeared hampered 
chiefly by the belief that Connick had the best chance of 
unseating Garrison. A handsome and charismatic sort, he 
concentrated upon personal appearances and media advertising.
The basic pattern of the endorsements varies in this 
election significantly from that of the previous one. In 
this race, upper white and black organizations are found 
leaning toward the same candidate, who is actively opposed 
by the lower white organizations. In this scheme, the high­
er organizational effectiveness category is initially some­
what diluted. In keeping with hypothesized relations, 
support for Connick is expected to be least elevated in the
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organizationally effective areas of lower white neighbor­
hoods. The reverse pattern, that is, low support in black 
and upper white areas and high support in lower white neigh­
borhoods, should hold for the distribution of the Garrison 
vote. The Reese support should be randomly distributed 
across levels of the race/class and organizational effective­
ness variables.
These expectations, therefore, anticipate quadratic 
trends within the distribution of the Connick and Garrison 
votes. Such trends may be specifically assessed by utilizing 
the two orthagonal contrasts associated with the race/class 
variable to test for linear and quadratic trends rather than 
the black-white and lower white-upper white comparisons em­
ployed in analyzing the previous election. In this instance, 
the former set of contrasts is clearly preferable.
Tables 10A and 10B_contain the distribution and 
analysis of votes cast in the district attorney's race. 
Garrison carried 40.4% of the vote in the first primary, com­
pared with Connick's 34.4%. Reese was eliminated with his 
third place finish of 23.9%. The largest single bloc of 
votes within any race/class category is the 49.2% of the 
black vote given to Garrison— despite the endorsement of 
Connick by the bulk of the strongest black organizations. 
Connick followed in black neighborhoods with thirty-six per 
cent of the votes. Lower whites favored Garrison, giving 
him 40.3% of the vote, and split their remaining votes almost 
equally between Connick and Reese (29.8% and 28.2%,
TABLE 10A
VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, 
BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN
PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS3
First Primary Second Primary
Candidate: Race/Class Race/Class
Connick Lower Upper Row Lower Upper Row
Black White White Mean Black White White Mean
OrgEffb High 37.1 29.3 41.7 35.3 44.4 45.1 68.2 50.7
Low 32.2 30.4 37.7 34.4 39.8 48.2 61.9 51.2
Column Mean 36.0 29.8 39.8 34.4 43.0 46.6 66.0 50.9
Garrison
OrgEff High 48.8 41.1 20,6 41.3 55.5 54.8 31.8 49.2
Low 49.9 39.2 25.6 39.0 60.1 51.7 38.1 48.8
Column Mean 49.2 40.3 23,1 39.0 56.8 53.3 33.9 49 .0
Reese
OrgEff Hiqh 13.3 27.9 34.3 22.2
Low 16.3 28.2 34.8 26.9
Column Mean 14.2 28.0 34.8 23.9
aRaw data used in generating this table were derived from the Orleans Parish 
Democratic Executive Committee (1973a).
The abbreviation "OrgEff" refers to the organizational effectiveness variable.
TABLE 10B
VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY 
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS OF
VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE
Source of 
Variation dfa dfb
First Primary 
Connick Garrison Reese
Second
Connick
Primary
Garrison
Total 130
Race/Class 2 21.91**C 204.22** 122.91** 171.13** 170.13**
Linear Trend 
Quadratic Trend
125
125
2.85**
5.97**
-13.54**
-3.65**
15.17**
3.24**
10.55**
4.12**
-10.46**
-4.12**
Organizational
Effectiveness
1 8.48 .11 9.65 21.79 23.06
Interaction 2 10.31 10.16 4.38 25.70* 26.21*
Linear Trend, 
High, Lew OrgEff 
Quadratic Trend, 
High, Lew OrgEff
125
125
0.41
2.56*
-0.39
-2.55*
Error 125 4.48 6.22 2.97 7.85 7.94
aColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedan are mean squares.
Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.
CAsterisks refer to the level of significance associated with listed statistic, as follows:
no asterisk, p > .05, *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
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respectively). Connick and Reese were the clear choices of 
the upper white neighborhoods, drawing 39.8% and 35.8% of 
those votes. Garrison finished a poor third there with only 
23.1%.
The F-ratios associated with the race/class designation 
indicate that the mean differences among the categories are 
indeed statistically significant. Further, a clear quadratic 
trend is present in the distribution of Connick votes. The 
expected quadratic trend in the Garrison vote is overshadowed 
by the strong linear trend induced by the unexpected high 
support for Garrison in black areas. Reese's support is like­
wise obviously linear, but in the opposite direction from 
Garrison's distribution. Differences among levels of organi­
zational effectiveness are not statistically significant.
The distribution of the vote in the first primary 
suggested that Garrison faced an uphill battle in the run-off. 
Reese's votes seemed most likely to swing in Connick's direc­
tion. Votes cast for Reese shared an important characteristic 
with those for Connick, namely, both were votes against the 
incumbent. To Connick's advantage also, Reese was the clear 
favorite over Garrison in upper white areas. Finally, several 
of the black organizations backing Connick seemed slightly 
embarrassed by the strong black support for Garrison in the 
first primary. Atonement could be made in the second election. 
A breakdown of the votes cast in the second primary generally 
confirmed these projections, with the exception of Garrison's 
black support diminishing. Garrison carried 56.8% of the
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black vote, an increase of about seven percent over the 
first primary. However, Connick managed to win the election 
by a narrow margin, 50.9% to 49.0%. He did so by carrying 
two-thirds of the votes from upper white areas— an increase 
of nearly thirty percent— and drawing 46.6% and 43.0% from 
lower white and black areas respectively.
The differences among the race/class categories are 
shown to be statistically significant in the analyses of 
variance. A strong positive relationship between the race/ 
class variable and the Connick support and the concommitant 
inverse relationship between race/class and the Garrison 
support are indicated. These linear trends overshadow the 
predicted quadratic trends. The interaction effect is noted 
again, resulting from the magnitude of the differences in 
support between high and low organizational effectiveness 
areas of the upper white category, compared with the simi­
larities found in black and lower white areas across organi­
zational effectiveness ratings.
In this election, there are some factors which conform 
with expectations. The quadratic distribution of the Connick 
vote in the first primary and the higher vote totals for 
Connick in high organization upper white areas are examples. 
However, the organizational variable again shows poorly and 
most of the expectations associated with it are, in fact, not 
substantiated by the evidence. In addition, one may note 
the 61.9% support gained by Connick in low organizational 
effectiveness upper white areas or the 55.5% for Garrison in
185
high organizational effectiveness black areas. Such 
discrepancies must be balanced against the confirmed expec­
tations .
1973 Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff Race. Political 
observers indicated prior to this 1973 election that long 
time incumbent, Milton Stire, again appeared unbeatable.
Stire was reputed among the organizational leaders and can­
didates to run and clean and tight office. Further, he had 
proved over the years to be an active and shrewd politician. 
Formally, he eshewed personal affiliation with any one po­
litical organization. He did, however, maintain open and 
public ties with a number of organizations, expecially the 
city's lower white groups. As illustrated in table 11,
Stire acquired the backing of these organizations for the 
election and also secured the endorsement of AGG. For Stire,. 
the issue of the campaign was simple: "Re-elect me, I've
done a good job."
Stire was opposed by two black candidates— Rev.
Johnny Jackson, Sr. of DAWN, and Alvin Sargent. Jackson 
voiced no specific complaints about Stire's performance in 
office other than the incumbent's rather conservative racial 
stance. Given the extent to which matters of this office 
affected the black' community, Jackson primarily claimed to 
seek greater black participation and input. The entry of 
Sargent into the race touched off some controversy in the 
black community. It was charged by some that Sargent's 
candidacy was inspired by the Stire camp to put a crack in
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TABLE 11
ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 1973 ORLEANS 
PARISH CIVIL SHERIFF RACE
Organizations
Race/Class
First Primary^
Designation Jackson Sargent Stire
Black:
SOUL X
COUP X
OPPVL X
NWCVL X
BOLD X
CCIVL X
DAWN X
TIPS X
Lower White:
AFL-CIO X
RDO X
MCD X
CCDA X
NOVA X
AID X
Upper White:
IWO X
AGG X
NOC X
Stire won re-election without a run-off (second primary).
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the solid black vote needed by Jackson to pull an upset. 
Jackson gained the unified endorsement of all the major 
black organizations, and drew the support of IWO and NOC as 
well, who agreed "it was time for a change."
The pattern of endorsements in this election closely 
resembles that of the district attorney race (which, inci­
dentally, was conducted concurrently). Quite simply, black 
and upper white organizations are found to favor the same 
candidate, Jackson, in opposition to the choice of the lower 
white organizations, Stire. According to the hypothesized 
relationships, therefore, quadratic trends are expected in 
the distributions of Stire and Jackson support across levels 
of the race/class designation. Thus, the greatest support 
for Jackson is expected in high organizational effectiveness 
portions of black and upper white areas, while comparatively 
fewer votes should be found for him in high organizational 
effectiveness areas of lower white neighborhoods. Stire's 
support should be concentrated in the lower white categories, 
especially in the high organizational effectiveness classi­
fication. These patterns are again tested directly in the 
set of orthagonal comparisons.
The results of the first primary for this office are 
presented in table 12A. The political forecasts were in this 
instance affirmed. Stire won easily without necessitating a 
run-off by cornering 56.4% of the vote. Jackson followed 
with 34.1% and Sargent claimed the remaining 9.1%. The larg­
est single bloc of votes within categories of the race/class
TABLE 12A
VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH CIVIL SHERIFF RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY 
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN
PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS3
Candidate:
Race/Class
Jackson Black Lower White Upper White Row Mean
Organizational High 63.0 18.9 10.1 40.2
Effectiveness Low 52.3 19.9 12.1 27.1
Column Mean 60.1 19.5 11.5 34.5
Sargent
Organizational High 8.7 8.6 8.4 8.6
Effectiveness Low 9.5 9.7 10.6 9.8
Column Mean 9.0 9.1 9.4 9.1
Stire
Organizational High 28.2 71.4 81.5 49.7
Effectiveness Low 38.1 71.3 77.3 63.1
Column Mean 31.0 71.4 79.4 56.4
aRaw data used in generating this table were derived from the Orleans Parish 
Democratic Executive Committee (1973b).
designation is found among the high organizational effective­
ness upper white neighborhoods where Stire gained 81.5% of 
the vote. Overall, Stire collected 79.4% of the votes cast 
in upper white neighborhoods. Jackson and Sargent split the 
remaining twenty-one percent almost evenly, 11.5% to 9.4% 
respectively. Stire likewise carried lower white neighbor­
hoods by a wide margin, 71.4%, with only one tenth of one 
percent difference showing between high and low organization­
al effectiveness areas. Jackson managed to get 60.1% of the 
black vote, carrying high organization areas of these neigh­
borhoods by about eleven more percentage points than in low 
organizational effectiveness areas. However, Stire did re­
ceive almost one-third of the black vote despite solid 
organizational opposition in black areas. The nine percent 
won by Sargent would apparently not have altered the out­
come of the election, even if it had been unanimously co­
opted by Jackson.
The analyses of variance, presented in table 12B, 
indicates that the differences in support for Stire and 
Jackson are statistically significant across race/class 
categories. The distribution of votes for Sargent by this 
variable is well within chance expectations. The expected 
quadratic trends are not pronounced due to the low support 
accorded Jackson, or conversely, the strong support for 
Stire, in upper white neighborhoods. However, linear trends 
are pure and prominent. The Jackson vote is clearly related 
inversely to the race/class dimension and the Stire support
TABLE 12B
VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH CIVIL SHERIFF RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY 
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE
Source of Variation dfa dfb Jackson Sargent Stire
Total 130
Race/Class 2 701.09**° 4.62 675.79**
Linear Trend 
Quadratic Trend
125
125
-14.97** 
-6.30**
14.40**
6.16**
Organizational
Effectiveness
1 123.96** 6.23 107.23**
Interaction 2 41.85 4.69 49.41
Linear Trend, High,
Low OrgEff 
Quadriatic Trend, High, 
Low OrgEff
125
125
Error 125 16.07 12.74 17.11
aColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares, 
k Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.
c . •Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as
follows: no asterisk, p >.05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
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subsequently shows a strong positive relation with the race/ 
class variable.
The organizational factor likewise shows significant 
variation here in the distribution of votes for both major 
candidates. The significant variation in the vote between 
high and low organizational effectiveness areas is largely 
attributable to the differences in support among black neigh­
borhoods. Differences in candidate choice among white 
neighborhoods of the low and high effectiveness rating are 
quite small by comparison. Generally, these data are quite 
supportive of the hypothesized relationships, with the not­
able exception of the potent support given Stire in upper 
white areas.
1973 Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal Court Race.
The Clerk of Court election bears much resemblance to the 
race for Civil Sheriff. A long term white incumbent, Daniel 
Haggerty, faced opposition from a promising black candidate,
g
Edwin Lombard, and a third minor candidate, Herman Bustemente. 
Haggerty was considered to be more vulnerable than Stire. 
Dissatisfaction had surfaced concerning Haggerty's perform­
ance in office, particularly during the most recent term. The 
situation posed a dilemma in the minds of some people. Dis­
posing of Haggerty was one thing. Replacing him with a black 
man was another. However, by almost any standard, Lombard 
was an attractive candidate. He was well and locally—
Loyola University School of Law— educated. He had worked 
for Mayor Landrieu in recent elections and was considered to
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be a stable, known quantity. He was an effective and 
articulate speaker, especially in comparison to Haggerty. 
Bustemente sought to gain entry and consideration into the 
race, but was largely ignored as major organizations and 
figures chose sides between Haggerty and Lombard.
Organizational endorsements for the election are pre­
sented in table 13. Lombard received unanimous support from 
the city's black and upper white organizations. His candi­
dacy was even endorsed by the conservative morning daily,
The New Orleans Times-Picayune. He was likewise endorsed by 
The New Orleans State-Item, the editorially more liberal
evening newspaper. For the black organizations, Lombard's
✓  \
candidacy became a •cause celebre. The specifics of the 
election indicated that Lombard had a good chance of becom­
ing the first black to win a city-wide elective post since 
Reconstruction. On the other hand, if he failed, it was 
difficult to envision a situation in which a black candidate 
might succeed in the near future. Haggerty drew the unified 
support of the lower white organizations. Thus, the elec­
tion, like the previous two, shows black and upper white 
organizations siding in their endorsements against those of 
the lower white organizations. The expectation, then, is 
that the distributions of support for Haggerty and Lombard 
will follow linear and quadratic trends.
Tables 14A and 14B contain the distribution and 
analysis of the votes cast in the two primaries for this 
office. In the first primary, Haggerty barely missed
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ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 1973 ORLEANS 
PARISH CLERK OF CRIMINAL COURT RACE
TABLE 13
Organizations
Race/Class
Designation Bustemente Haggerty Lombard Haggerty Lombard 
Black:
SOUL X
COUP X
OPPVL X
NWCVL X
BOLD X
CCIVL X
DAWN X
TIPS X
Lower White:
AFL-CIO X X
RDO X X
MCD X X
CCDA X X
NOVA X X
AID X X
Upper White:
IWO X
AGG X
NOC X XX
 
x 
X
X
X
X
 
x
x
x
x
TABLE 14A
VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH CLERK OF CRIMINAL COURT RACE FOR 131 AREAL 
UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
RATING: MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE,
UNADJUSTED MEANSa
First Primary Second Primary
Candidate:
Race/Class Race/Class
Lower Upper Row Lower Upper Row
Haggerty Black White White Mean Black White White Mean
OrgEff High 23.0 64.2 63.9 44.1 16.7 64.5 58.4 40.3
Low 37.0 63.3 62.7 52.6 30.5 65.3 60.5 54.0
Column Mean 27.0 62.8 63.3 48.5 20.8 65.0 59.5 45.6
Lombard
OrgEff High 73.3 30.1 27.9 50.8 83.5 35.4 41.0 5S.8
Low 59.1 30.4 29.0 38.5 69.2 34.6 39.4 46.0
Column Mean 69.3 30.2 28.5 46.0 79.5 35.0 40.5 54.4
aRaw data used in generating this table derived from Orleans Parish Democratic 
Executive Committee (1973c).
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TABLE 14B
VOTES CAST IN 1973 ORLEANS PARISH CLERK OF CRIMINAL COURT RACE FOR 131 AREAL 
UNITS, BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
RATING: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES
CAST PER CANDIDATE
First Primary Second Primary
Source of Variation dfa dfb Haggerty Lombard Haggerty Lombard
Total 130
Race/Class 2 359.43**C 450.49** 579.62** 578.59**
Linear Trend 
Quadratic Trend
125
125
10.74**
-7.21**
-11.87**
7.02
10.06**
-8.58**
-10.16**
8.55**
Organizational
Effectiveness 1 208.40** 220.48** 214.31** 221.99**
Interaction 2 76.57** 76.04** 56.73 60.75
Linear, High, Low 
OrgEff 
Quadratic, High, 
Low OrgEff
125
125
2.44*
-1.53
-2.41*
1.41
Error 125 15.88 16.82 20.94 20.93
aColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares. 
IdColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.
CAsterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows: 
no asterisk, p > .05; *, p < .05; **, p < .01.
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collecting a majority of the votes, receiving 48.5% of 
those cast. Lombard finished a scant two and one half per­
centage points behind with 46.0%. Thus, Bustemente forced 
a run-off though getting only 5.1% of the vote. The largest 
bloc of votes in any race/class category is the 73.3% 
support for Lombard found in high organizational effective­
ness black neighborhoods. Overall, Lombard received 69.3% 
of the black vote, while drawing 30.2% and 28.5% from lower 
white and upper white areas respectively. Surprisingly, 
upper white areas gave Haggerty his largest proportion of 
support. He received 63.3% of that vote and 62.8% of the 
vote in lower white areas.
Analysis of these figures shows that the average 
voting levels recorded for the two candidates vary signifi­
cantly across both levels of the race/class dimension and 
levels of the organizational effectiveness variable. Tests 
for linear trends indicate the Lombard vote to be strongly 
and inversely related to the race/class designation and 
positively related to the organizational effectiveness rat­
ing of areal units. These relationships are present in the 
Haggerty vote as well, but run in the opposite direction.
That is, Haggerty support tends to increase across levels 
of the race/class variable and decrease across organizational 
effectiveness levels. The quadratic trend is less pronounced 
due to the unexpected level of support received by Haggerty 
in upper white neighborhoods. An interaction effect is 
present in the data, attributable mainly to the large
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difference in support between high and low organizational 
effectiveness areas in black neighborhoods. The differences 
average almost fourteen percentage points in black areas, as 
compared with fluctuations of only one or two percentage 
points in white areas. 1
With both sides realistically sensing victory, the 
campaigns between the primaries intensified considerably.
Both organizational efforts and media advertising increased 
noticeably. Special efforts were made to further inform 
voters residing in upper white areas of Lombard's education­
al and political credentials. Perhaps of even greater 
significance, his name was subtlely linked with that of 
Connick (the district attorney candidate) and Charles Foti 
(the challenger in the criminal sheriff race) as the reform 
"ticket." This strategy would presumably help Lombard in 
white areas, and work to the advantage of Connick and Foti 
in black neighborhoods.
The second primary was not as close a contest as had 
been expected. Lombard won with 54.4% of the vote. He drew 
79.5% of the black vote, an increase of almost ten percentage 
points over the first primary. He also received 40.5% of 
the upper white vote, a shift of twelve percentage points 
over the first primary, and drew over one-third of the vote 
in lower white neighborhoods. Thus, Haggerty recorded 65.0% 
of the lower white vote, but fared more poorly in both black 
and upper white areas than in the first primary.
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Differences in the average votes cast per candidate 
vary significantly across both race/class and organizational 
effectiveness categories. Lombard's support is inversely 
related to race/class and positively related to organization­
al effectiveness. Haggerty's support appears as the mirror 
image. The quadriatic trends across race/class levels are 
clearly evident, with Lombard's support in black and in 
upper white areas being larger than that recorded in lower 
white neighborhoods. For Haggerty, the reverse is true. No 
interaction effect is noted. In short, the results of this 
election conform in every way to the hypothesized expecta­
tions .
1974 Louisiana State Supreme Court Race. The 1974 
race for the Louisiana State Supreme Court involved the 
same associate justice seat contested in the 1972 election 
treated earlier. This time, however, the victor could ex­
pect to serve a full ten-year term before facing re-election. 
Justice Calogero was challenged by Jefferson Parish Criminal 
Sheriff, Alwynn Cronvich, and the former Orleans Parish 
District Attorney, Jim Garrison.
Cronvich attacked Calogero's record on the court, 
claiming that Calogero served as the liberal swing vote that 
allowed rapists and murderers to run free. He vowed to 
bring a tough law-and-order stance and a lawman's point of 
view to the court. Calogero defended the legal and moral 
integrity of his court decisions. He further emphasized 
his private role of parent, implying that the concerned
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father of eight children would not turn loose murderers 
and rapists into the streets. Garrison's candidacy seemed 
doomed to failure from the start. Having just been defeated 
in the district attorney's race in the midst of law-and- 
order talk, he had no unique stand left between Calogero and 
Cronvich. Further, his major strengths during the district 
attorney years— lower whites and blacks— were major sources 
of Calogero's constituency in the 1972 race. The tough- 
talking sheriff, meanwhile, seemed to hold a decided edge 
among the suburban whites of Jefferson Parish and the rural 
whites of St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes that might 
otherwise be predisposed to Garrison.
Calogero's strategy in 1974 was similar to that used 
two years earlier— to win by a large enough margin in New 
Orleans to off-set expected losses to Cronvich in the other 
three parishes of the district. Table 15 contains a summary 
of the endorsements of New Orleans political organizations 
for this election. Calogero secured the endorsements of 
all seventeen organizations. The organizations worked the 
campaign with some sense of urgency. Few were willing to 
risk losing the campaign to Cronvich. Some were concerned 
about Cronvich's ideology. For others, it was simply a 
matter of retaining the seat for a New Orleanian rather 
than giving it up to someone in Jefferson Parish.
The pattern of endorsements in this election leads 
to the standard set of expectations used in the analysis of 
the 1972 race. The distribution of the Calogero vote is
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TABLE 15
ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 1974 LOUISIANA 
STATE SUPREME COURT RACE
Organizations
1st Primary 2nd Primary
Race/Class
Designation Calogero Cronvich Garrison Calogero Cronvich
Black:
SOUL X X
COUP X X
OPPVL X X
NWCVL X X
BOLD X X
CCIVL X X
DAWN X X
TIPS X X
Lower White:
AFL-CIO X X
RDO X X
MCD X X
' CCDA X • X
NOVA X X
AID X X
Upper White:
IWO X X
AGG X X
NOC X X
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expected to be inversely related to the race/class variable. 
Black areas are anticipated to support Calogero in a greater 
proportion than are lower white or upper white areas. Lower 
white support for Calogero should exceed that found for him 
in upper white areas. Finally, the vote should be signifi­
cantly larger in Calogero's behalf among high than low 
organizational effectiveness areas. Distributions of support 
for Cronvich and Garrison should follow a random pattern 
across levels of the race/class and organizational effective­
ness variables. These trends are specifically tested in the 
set of orthagonal comparisons.
Tables 16A and 16B contain the results and analysis 
of the two primaries. In the first primary, Calogero just 
missed a majority in Orleans Parish, carrying 49.7% of the 
vote. Garrison was second in the parish with 28.8% and 
Cronvich finished third here with 21.5% of the New Orleans 
vote. However, by virtue of his stronger showing in the 
other three parishes of the district, Cronvich outdistanced 
Garrison for the run-off slot against Calogero.
Returning to the New Orleans vote, black neighbor­
hoods gave Calogero the largest single bloc of votes (59.5%) 
of any of the race/class areas. He also carried the largest 
percentage of the votes cast in white areas, taking 43.1% 
of the lower white and 41.9% of the upper white votes. 
Garrison did almost equally well in lower white and black 
areas, polling 31.8% and 30.1% of the votes, but fared 
poorly in upper white neighborhoods. Cronvich received a
rTABLE 16A
VOTES CAST IN 1974 LOUISIANA STATE SUPREME COURT RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, 
BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
RATING: MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE,
UNADJUSTED MEANS3
First Primary Second Primary
Race/Class Race/Class
Candidate: Lower Upper Row Lower Upper Row
Calogero
Black White White Mean Black White White Mean
OrgEff High 61.4 43.3 40.6 51.9 81.2 56.4 43.7 66.2
Low 54.7 42.3 43.4 46.2 76.7 52.8 51.0 59.6
Column Mean 59.5 43.1 41.9 49.7 79.8. 54.8 47.2 63.6
Cronvich
OrgEff High 10.0 23.3 41.2 20.0 18.8 43.4 56.1 33.6
Low 11.3 26.5 33.4 23.8 23.3 47.1 48.7 40.5
Column Mean 10.5 24.8 37.5 21.5 20.0 45.1 52.5 36.3
Garrison
OrgEff High 28.6 32.5 18.2 28.1
Low 33.9 31.0 23.0 29.9
Column Mean 30.1 31.8 20.5 28.8
a
Raw data used in generating this table derived from the Office of the Secretary
of State, State of Louisiana (1974a).
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TABLE 16B
VOTES CAST IN 1974 LOUISIANA STATE SUPREME COURT RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, BY 
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE
Source of 
Variation dfa dfb
First Primary 
Calogero Cronvich Garrison
Second
Calogero
Primary
Cronvich
Total
Race/Class
130
2 76. 35**C 185.46** 44.13** 317.91** 316.00**
Black vs. White 125 -9.93** 16.18** -4.05** -15.04** 14.93**
Lower White vs.
Upper White 125 0.64 7.93** -7.20** -3.16** 3.09**
Organizational
Effectiveness 1 48.58** 1.99 30.32** 22.19 22 .18
Interaction 2 19.73* 27.65** 15.76* 33.58* 33.63*
Black vs. White,
High, Lew, OrgEff 125 2. 33* 1.44 1.43 1.73 1.70
Lower vs. Upper
White, High, Lav 
OrgEff 125 1.22 3.50** 2.03* -2.35* 2.36*
Error 125 6.48 4.28 9.22 9.27
Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedan are mean squares. 
Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedan are t-statistics.
Asterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows: 
no asterisk, p >.05; *, p <.05; **, p <.01.
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meager 10.5% of the black vote and 24.8% of the votes in 
lower white neighborhoods. Upper whites gave him 37.5% of 
their votes.
Differences in votes cast across the race/class 
designation of areal units are statistically significant in 
all cases, and the discrepancies between lower and upper 
white levels of support vary significantly in the cases of 
Cronvich and Garrison. An interaction effect is noted as 
well for the distribution of support for each candidate.
This effect is located in the difference between high and 
low organizational effectiveness levels of support in black 
versus white areas for the Calogero vote and in lower versus 
upper white areas for both the Garrison and Calogero votes. 
The organizational variable shows significant differences 
as expected only in distribution of the Calogero vote.
Projections indicated that Calogero would fare even 
better in Orleans Parish in the second primary. Calogero 
seemed sure to pick up the bulk of Garrison's substantial 
black and lower white support. Further, if trends in the 
first primary carried into the run-off, Calogero and Cronvich 
stood to split Garrison's small upper white following almost 
evenly. A look at the results for the second primary gen­
erally confirm the accuracy of these predictions. Calogero 
carried 63.6% of the votes cast in Orleans Parish, with an 
increase of twenty percentage points over the first primary 
from blacks (to 79.8%), an eleven percent increase from 
lower whites (to 54.8%), and an additional six percent in
205
upper white areas (to 47.2%). These differences, as well 
as those contained in the Cronvich vote, are statistically 
significant across race/class categories. Orthagonal con­
trasts show the differences to be significant for both black 
versus white and lower white versus upper white variations.
The interaction effect is also significant in the comparison 
of lower and upper white patterns across levels of the or­
ganizational variable. Variation in the vote by levels of 
organizational effectiveness ratings are likewise significant.
These data are only partially supportive of the hy­
pothesized trends. The Calogero vote is indeed inversely 
related to race/class and, especially in the second primary, 
the organizational variable does register a significant 
effect. However, as indicated by the persistent presence 
of the interaction effect, these trends are not entirely 
consistent across all levels of the independent variables.
In short- variations in the dependent variable, votes cast, 
occasionally carry a unique effect at certain levels of the 
independent variables. Here, the loci have generally been 
the high and low effectiveness categories of the black or 
upper white area designations. At this juncture, therefore, 
the organizational variable seems to assume the hypothesized 
mediation role only under certain circumstances. Even then, 
it deviates at times from expectations.
1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Race. The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals race is of particular interest 
for two reasons. One, the organizational endorsement procedure
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became a campaign issue in this election. City Councilman 
and Uptown resident, Peter Beer, declared that he would not 
"pay" for organizational support. Other of the candidates 
resented at least one implication of the pronouncement, 
namely, the charge that only they were buying votes.
Several organizational leaders were rankled by the remarks 
as well. If candidates were being impugned for buying votes, 
the organizations were also being accused of selling them. 
Secondly, this election shows a third pattern of organiza­
tional endorsements— that of black and lower white organiza­
tions siding against the choice of the white organizations.
The question of organizational endorsements had been 
a campaign issue on previous occasions. For example, Sarpy 
had disdained the practice during the 1972 Louisiana Supreme 
Court election. However, the issue was highlighted in the 
Fourth Circuit Court election, probably because of the en­
dorsement of Municipal Judge Joseph Bossetta by several 
black organizations, including SOUL. SOUL's pragmatism, or 
more baldly, its reputation for requiring money in exchange
for an endorsement, had received considerable media atten- 
9tion. Black endorsement of Bossetta, a Wallace elector in 
the 1968 presidential race, constituted for some substantia­
ting evidence of such practices--although Bossetta had in 
fact established a more moderate reputation among several 
black leaders since 1968 and could reasonably have been 
supported by them on these grounds.
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Table 17 contains a summary of the organizational
endorsements for this election. Of the strongest black
organizations, SOUL and OPPVL endorsed Bossetta, while COUP
and NWCVL supported George Reese. Bossetta also obtained
the endorsements of all but one of the remaining black
organizations and all of the lower white groups. One black
leader commented:
We would have been quite comfortable politically with 
Beer. He had a pretty good record while on the (city) 
council. But when we met the candidates, here he was 
standing there spouting off about money and endorse­
ments and generally being offensive to us. Bossetta 
. . . was making an effort to relate to us and, by 
contrast, seemed the more friendly candidate. . . .
Of course, his background did, nonetheless, make him 
hard to peddle in our precincts.
Beer drew the solid endorsements of the upper white organi­
zations. However, securing endorsements was a difficult 
matter for the two remaining candidates, Civil Court Judge 
Dom Grieshaber and Reese, the former district attorney can­
didate. Grieshaber won the support only of BOLD. As 
indicated earlier, at least one important consideration 
entertained by the organizations in making endorsements is 
the candidate's probability of winning. As such, much of 
the natural constituency which Grieshaber and Reese could 
expect to attract was pre-empted by the two other candidates.
The basic pattern of endorsements contained here—  
black and lower white versus upper white— generates the 
following set of expectations. Support for Bossetta is 
anticipated to be greatest in the high organizational effec­
tiveness areas of black and lower white neighborhoods.
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TABLE 17
ORGANIZATIONAL ENDORSEMENTS, 1974 FOURTH 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS RACE
Organizations;
First Primary Second Primary
Race/Class
Designation Beer Bossetta Grieshaber Reese Beer Bossetta
Black:
SOUL X
COUP
OPPVL X
NWCVL
BOLD X X
CCIVL X X
DAWN X X
TIPS X X
Lower White:
AFL-CIO X X
RDO X X
MCD X X
CCDA X X
NOVA X X
AID X X
Upper White:
IWO X X
AGG X X
NOC X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Further, there should be an inverse relationship between 
the race/class variable and support for Bossetta. Beer, on 
the other hand, is expected to carry upper white neighbor­
hoods, with special strength in the high organizational 
effectiveness areas. The series of orthagonal contrasts are 
fitted to test the particular black-lower white versus white 
dichotomy found here.
Results and analyses of the two primaries are pre­
sented in tables 18A and 18B. The returns of the first 
primary indicate a fairly close election, with the top three 
candidates finishing within eight percentage points of each 
other. Beer and Bossetta qualified for the run-off with 
31.5% and 29.7% of the votes respectively. Grieshaber was 
a close third with 23.6% and Reese finished last with the 
remaining 15.2%. The largest blocs of votes found in any 
of the cross-classifications by race/class and organizational 
effectiveness are the 52.0% and 44.6% of the votes cast in 
upper white high and low organizational effectiveness areas 
respectively. The remaining portion of the upper white vote 
slightly favored Grieshaber (20.7%), with Bossetta (17.4%) 
and Reese (13.4%) close behind. The largest percentage of 
the black vote was gained by Bossetta (37.7%), followed by 
decreasing levels of support for Grieshaber (23.3%), Beer 
(21.3%), and Reese (17.8%). Lower white preferences were 
even more closely contested among the top three candidates.
In lower white areas, Beer received 33.3% of the votes, while 
Bossetta and Grieshaber finished with 27.8% and 25.5%
TABLE 18A
VOTES CAST IN 1974 FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, 
BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING:
MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE, UNADJUSTED MEANS3
First Primary Second Primary
Candidate: 
Beer
Black
Race/Class
Lower Upper 
White White
Row
Mean Black
Race/Class
Lower Upper 
White White
Row
Mean
OrgEff
Column
High
Low
Mean
21.0
21.7
21.3
32.4
34.3
33.3
52.0
44.6
48.4
30.3 
33. 3 
31.5
43.8
41.5
43.2
47.9
49.6
48.8
65.5
58.2
62.0
48.0
53.6
50.8
Bossetta
OrgEff
Column
High
Low
Mean
39.0
34.5
37.7
29.5
25.7
27.8
13.7
21.1
17.4
31.3
27.1
29.7
56.1
58.9
56.9
52.0
50.2
51.2
34.2
41.7
37.8
49.9 
49 .0 
49.2
Grieshaber
OrgEff
Column
High
Low
Mean
21.6
28.0
23.3
23.5 
28.0
25.5
22.5
18.9
20.7
22.3
25.6
23.6
Reese
OrgEff
Column
High
Low
Mean
18.6
15.7
17.8
14.5
11.9
13.3
11.7
15.2
13.4
16.0
13.9
15.2
aRaw data used in generating this table derived from the Office of the Secretary 
of State, State of Louisiana (1974b).
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TABLE 18B
VOTES CAST IN 1974 FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS RACE FOR 131 AREAL UNITS, 
BY RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN PERCENT VOTES CAST PER CANDIDATE
Source of v*
First Primary Second Primary
Variation dfd df Beer Bossetta Grieshaber Reese Beer Bossetta
Total 130
Race/Class 2 184.18**c 66.35** 39.69** 8.15 97.11** 102.87**
Black, Lower White
vs. Upper White 125 11.63** -7.48** -2.62** 8.12** -8.28**
Black vs. Lower White 125 7.02** -4.92** 0.59 3.26** -3.44**
Organizational
Effectiveness 1 .60 21.58 16.63 9.38 5.51 8.03
Interaction 2 20.38* 32.20* 21.87* 10.49 17.86 19.52
Black, Lower vs.
Upper White, High, 
Low OrgEff 125 2.42* -2.92* 2.58**
Black vs. Lower
White, Hiqh, Low
OrgEff 125 0.34 0.18 0.59
Error 125 6.75 8.02 6.35 4.05 8.25 8.11
aColumn entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares. 
^Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.
cAsterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows: 
no asterisk, p >.05; *,p <.05; **,p <.01.
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respectively. As in the other areas, Reese was the last 
choice with only 13.3%.
Differences in the distributions of votes cast 
across categories of the race/class variable are statisti­
cally significant in the cases of Beer, Bossetta, and 
Grieshaber. Beer was clearly favored by the upper whites 
and the overall distribution of his support is positively 
correlated with race/class. Bossetta and Grieshaber were 
supported primarily by votes from black and lower white 
neighborhoods. Orthagonal contrasts reveal a consistent 
inverse relationship between the Bossetta vote and the race/ 
class variable. F-ratios for the organizational effective­
ness variable are not statistically significant. However, 
this effect is diluted somewhat by the particular pattern 
of endorsements in this election. Thus, it is important 
to note that the patterns of support found in the Bossetta 
and Beer votes match expectations associated with the or­
ganizational variable.
The second primary gave every indication of being 
an even closer election. Beer seemed likely to pick up the 
greater share of the lower white and upper white support 
previously accorded Grieshaber and Reese, and Bossetta stood 
to gain most of their black support if trends established 
in the first primary persisted. However, lower white or­
ganizations, which had shown poorly in the first primary 
with Beer actually carrying their combined area of opera­
tion, intensified efforts in Bossetta's behalf. Also, Beer
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quietly moved to smooth over the ruffled feathers of several 
black organizations in an effort to secure crucial support 
in these areas. Thus, although the endorsements and the 
voting patterns in the first primary were known, the exact 
levels of support in the second level were difficult to pre­
cisely predict.
An unusual incident further muddied the picture. A 
few days prior to the election, a letter, supposedly endorsed 
by the captains of several Mardi Gras krewes, was made public 
denouncing Beer as an "enemy of Mardi Gras." The letter 
noted that Beer, while a city councilman, had questioned the 
amount of money budgeting for sanitation and other services 
provided by the city during the Carnival season. It further 
implied that Beer was not a full participant or enthusiastic 
supporter of Mardi Gras. The letter elicited a negative 
public reaction. First, it was viewed as containing the 
hint of an unpleasant attack upon Beer as a member of the 
Jewish community. Jews have been traditionally excluded 
from most Mardi Gras krewes, and thus many of them are not 
"full participants" or "enthusiastic supporters." Secondly, 
Beer's full record on the council hardly warranted the 
attack. The letter was therefore commonly viewed as a last 
ditch effort to smear the Beer candidacy.
Bossetta campaign personnel denied any connection 
with or knowledge of the drafting of the letter. The effect 
of the letter incident upon the election is difficult to 
gauge. If it had any effect at all, it was thought to have
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been more detrimental to Bossetta than to Beer, and since 
Bossetta lost in an extremely close election, the question 
has generated much speculation.
Beer carried 50.8% of the votes cast in the second 
election, drawing his major support from upper white neigh­
borhoods where he received 62.0% support. Lower white and 
black areas offered decreasingly lower levels of support 
for him with 48.8% and 4 3.2% of the votes cast respectively. 
Bossetta's support follows the opposite pattern. Differ­
ences in the votes cast vary significantly across levels of 
the race/class variable. These differences are of signifi­
cant magnitude for both black, lower white versus white 
comparisons and black versus lower white comparisons. This 
indicates a positive relationship between the support for 
Beer and the race/class variable, and a consistent inverse 
relationship between the distribution of Bossetta votes and 
the race/class variable. Differences across organizational 
effectiveness levels are not statistically significant, nor 
is an interaction effect noted. However, the distribution 
of the votes do conform closely with the expectations 
associated with the organizational variable.
Race/Class, Organizational Effectiveness,
 ^ and the Index of Cohesion
Interpretation of the race/class and organizational 
effectiveness variables can be aided by the computation and 
analysis of an index of cohesion variable. As stated in 
chapter three, the index of cohesion is an indication of the
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extent to which the vote in any given area is unanimous 
or, conversely, fragmented. It is computed by subtracting
the proportion of votes cast in an areal unit for the less
favored candidate from the percentage of votes cast in that 
unit for the favored candidate. The greater the percentage 
of votes cast for the favored candidate, the more unanimous 
the vote, and the higher the index of cohesion score. Con­
versely, the closer the contest in an areal unit, the more
divided the vote, and the lower the index of cohesion score.
The computational procedure of the index of cohesion 
restricts its effective use to elections in which there are 
only two candidates. Thus, the analysis here is restricted 
to those five elections which featured second primaries: 
the 1972 and 1974 Louisiana State Supreme Court races, the 
1973 Clerk of Criminal Court race, the 1973 District Attorney 
race, and the 1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals race. If 
the mediating hypothesis is correct, that is, if organiza­
tional effectiveness as an attribute of areal units is a 
key intervening variable in the expression of levels of 
political action in varying race/class areas, then the 
following two expectations are warranted. One, the race/ 
class variable will be inversely related to the index of 
cohesion scores of areal units. Specifically, black neigh­
borhoods are anticiapted to have the highest levels of 
cohesiveness, with decreasing levels expected in the lower 
white and upper white areas respectively. Second, high 
organizational effectiveness areas should exhibit higher
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index of cohesion scores than areas of low organizational 
effectiveness.
Table 19A contains a presentation and analysis of 
index of cohesion scores. The 1973 Clerk of Court race 
shows the presence of the highest index of cohesion score.
In that election, votes for the favored candidate of an 
areal unit exceeded the proportion of votes given his oppon­
ent by an average of 44.0%. In order, decreasingly lower 
scores are found in the 1974 and 1972 Supreme Court races 
(32.7% and 30.5%), the District Attorney race (20.3%), and 
the Fourth Circuit Court race (18.3%). Overall, the index 
of cohesion scores are highest among black neighborhoods 
with an average score of 41.2%. Upper white areas have the 
next highest average cohesion score with 23.4,%, and lower 
white areas show the least cohesion with an average of
19.2 percentage points separating their favored from their 
less favored candidates. High organizational effectivenss 
areas show a mean cohesiveness score of 28.4%, while a mean 
score of 21.8% is found for low organizational effective­
ness neighborhoods.
Analysis of the index scores presented in table 19B 
show that the degree of cohesiveness varies significantly 
across levels of the race/class variable in all five of the 
elections. Further, differences in cohesiveness scores 
vary significantly in high and low organizational effective­
ness areas in three of the five elections— the 1972 and 1974 
Supreme Court races, and the Clerk of Court race. Interaction
TABLE 19A
INDICES OF COHESION FOR 131 AREAL UNITS IN SELECTED NEW ORLEANS ELECTIONS, BY 
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING: MEAN
INDEX SCORES, UNADJUSTED MEANS
Election:
--------  Black
1972 Louisiana Supreme Court
Organizational High 50.4
Effectiveness Low 36.9
Column Mean 46.7
1973 District Attorney
Organizational High 18.2
Effectiveness Low 20.7
Column Mean 18.9
1973 Clerk of Court
Organizational High 68.1
Effectiveness Low 43.7
Column Mean 61.4
1974 Louisiana State Supreme Court
Organizational High 62.2
Effectiveness Low 54.7
Column Mean 58.9
1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Organizational High 19
Race/Class 
Lower White
17.8
13.6
15.9
18.7
12.5
T5T9'
Effectiveness Low 
Column Mean
7
21.8
20.2
36.5
36.2
36.4
15.1
16.0
15.6
12.5
11.3
12.1
Upper White
33.3
16.0
25.1
36.8
24.8
31.1
23.1
23.0
23.1
13.0
10.7
11.9
32.9
17.9 
25.7
Row
Mean
36.4 
21.1
30.5
21.7
18.1
20.3
49.7
35.1
44.0
37.7 
24.9
32.7
19.7
16.2
18.3
TABLE 19B
INDICES OF COHESION FOR 131 AREAL UNITS IN SELECTED NEW ORLEANS ELECTIONS, BY 
RACE/CLASS DESIGNATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATING:
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN INDEX SCORES
Sources of Variation: dfa df
Supreme 
Court(72)
District
Attorney
Criminal
Court
Supreme 
Court(74)
Fourth
Court
Total
Race/Class
130
2 269.38**C 71.07* 151.78* 722.67** 51.98*
Black vs. White 125 -6.89** 1.54 -6.13** -12.57** 0.84
Laver White vs. 
Upper White 125 2.11* 5.01** -2.51* 0.87 4.41**
Organizational
Effectiveness 1 196.70** 6.80 644.97** 141.34* ' 4.54
Interaction 2 47.51 47.51 202.19* 45.25 63.65*
Black vs. White, 
High, Lew OrgEff 
Lower vs. Upper 
White, High, Low 
OrgEff
Error 125
125
125
31.10 16.14
-2.83**
0.03
48.89 30.91
2.05*
2.25*
16.15
aGolumn entries for ccmponents associated with these degrees of freedom are mean squares.
Column entries for components associated with these degrees of freedom are t-statistics.
cAsterisks refer to the level of significance associated with the listed statistic, as follows:
no asterisk, p >.05; *, p <.05; **, p <.01.
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effects are noted in the Clerk of Court and Fourth Circuit 
Court elections. The interaction effect for the 1973 race 
is located in the high organizational effectiveness black 
areas and, in the 1974 election, in the high organizational 
effectiveness upper white areas. Orthagonal contrasts 
confirm greater cohesiveness among black than white areas 
in the 1972 and 1974 Supreme Court races and the Clerk of 
Court election, and greater voter cohesiveness among upper 
white than lower white areas in all but the Clerk of Court 
race and the 1974 Supreme Court race.
These data are generally quite supportive of the 
specified hypothesis. Black areas do indeed show signifi­
cantly higher cohesion scores than white neighborhoods. In 
three of the elections, the organizational variable like­
wise is shown to exhibit- significant variation in the 
predicted direction. The major flaw in the match of 
hypotheses and the data here lies in the cohesion scores 
of upper whites, which are slightly higher than predicted.
Discussion
A number of issues have now been raised and given 
extended treatment. The most basic question' under study 
involves the mediating potential of organizations, spe­
cifically in this case, the role of political organizations 
in affecting patterns of political participation. In this 
dissertation, an attempt has been made to treat the organ­
izational variable as an attribute of areal units. Such
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strategy is consistent with the theoretical tradition of 
political ecology and has the further advantage of tapping 
a wide range of data already enumerated and available as 
characteristics of areal units.
However, as has been noted on occasion in the 
previous pages, the measurement of organizational effec­
tiveness as an ecological characteristic is not without 
certain problems. In this study, the organizational effec­
tiveness rating of an area has been obtained by (a) asking 
each organizational leader to specify the area of operation 
claimed by his organization, (b) asking organizational 
leaders and candidates for office to rate the organizations 
in terms of their judged effectiveness, and (c) applying 
the effectiveness rating attached to organizations to their 
respective areas of operation. Thus, the nature of the 
characteristic is somewhat different than other ecological 
attributes employed in the study. If census materials or 
precinct returns indicate something about the racial com­
position of a census tract or the number of votes cast for 
a given candidate, one can feel fairly certain that such 
traits do indeed reside in the geographical unit under study. 
Such certainty is much weaker in the case of the organiza­
tional variable measured here.
To begin with, while most organizations operate in 
terms of geographical areas, there are some whose geogra­
phical orientations are either quite loose or even inciden­
tal. In such cases, defining the organization geographically
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or, conversely, defining the characteristic of an area on 
the basis of that organization's activity becomes problem­
atic. Further, even if the operation of the organization 
is clearly specified in geographical terms, the actual or 
physical presence of the organization is, nonetheless, in­
determinate. Namely, it is still not known that the 
residents of the areal unit are aware of the organization 
and its activity— or even more to the point, that they con­
sult it for guidance in political matters. In large part, 
the problem resides in the measurement of organizational 
effectiveness through a reputational approach. However, 
given the logistics of the study, there was little other 
choice.
Thus, it should be kept in mind that the measurement 
of the organizational variable contains an unknown amount 
of error. It is possible, though unlikely, that the organ­
izations exert little or no influence and, consequently, 
that their effectiveness is vastly overrated by the reputa­
tional approach. Such would require a collective effort on 
the part of the organizational leaders and candidates for 
office similar to that found in the tale of the king's "in­
visible clothes." It seems more likely that, if anything, 
the actual effect and operation of the organizations will 
be somewhat underestimated— mainly because the areal units 
comprised of census tracts almost certainly overextends or 
slightly misrepresents the target areas in which organiza­
tions operate. Thus, even if one had individual level
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measurements covering the connection between organizations 
and areal residents, additional error is always present in 
assigning the organizational rating to the entire areal unit.
An important facet in the test of the organizational 
variable is the race/class dimension and its correlates.
The data show that the basic relationship between the race/ 
class and organizational attributes of areal units is in­
verse, that is, the highest organizational rankings are con­
centrated in black areas. This finding modified the set of 
hypotheses advanced earlier in the dissertation. However, 
the race/class variable is strongly and consistently related 
to the measures of political participation--voter registra­
tion, voter turn out, and votes for candidates. In virtually 
every election and comparison, the distribution of the polit­
ical participation measure is found to be distributed non- 
randomly across levels of the race/class designation. The 
essential question then involves the identification of the 
mechanism whereby these categories of political action emerge. 
Of course, the organizational variable is tested here as the 
potential mechanism.
The evidence concerning the mediation role of the 
organizational variable is decidedly mixed. No real organi­
zational effect could be noted in the registration data, 
although these data are clearly correlated with the race/ 
class dimension. Evidence of organizational activity is 
likewise scarce in reviewing the turn out data, although 
1973 constitutes a year in which turn out levels best
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indicate the organizational effect. However, no statistically 
significant differences are found for that year since the 
higher turn out among black and lower white areas simply 
brought their percentages to parity with the usually higher 
upper white turn out figures. Finally, in turning to the 
election returns, solid evidence for the organizational var­
iable is found only in the 1973 Clerk of Court and the 197.3 
Civil Sheriff races. Lower levels of support can be gleaned 
from certain aspects of the other elections, especially the 
1972 and 1974 Louisiana Supreme Court races.
With this maze of sometimes conflicting evidence, 
how can one answer the question, "what is the effect of the 
organizational variable?" The best answer seems to be that 
the organizational variable does indeed have an impact upon 
political activity, both in terms of candidate support and, 
to a lesser extent, voter turn out. However, the effect of 
the organizational variable seems to be primarily situation­
al. Given a setting in which issues can be clearly defined 
in racial or class terminology, organizations bearing and 
playing upon these identifications appear to be able to act 
persuasively.
These statements require some clarification. One, 
the actual effect of an organizational endorsement or of 
organizational activity calls for a relative judgment. In 
situations where organizations have endorsed candidates al­
ready popular and acceptable to the residents of their area, 
a high vote in support of that candidate may only appear to
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constitute an organizational effect. On the other hand, a 
comparatively lower showing in that area by a less attrac­
tive candidate endorsed by the organization may actually 
constitute a strong organizational impact.
Secondly, modern organizations do not seem to hold 
the extensive control over their patrons apparently avail­
able to the traditional machine. They can no longer expect 
to be an exclusive information source, mobility vehicle, of 
political godparent. One consequence of this is that few 
organizations can expect to generate the same sort of loyalty 
often rendered the traditional machine. One further con­
sequence is that, while the influence of the organization 
is more fragmented, it is often more diffuse as well. The 
implication of this factor is that the reference group 
attribute of the organization may be quite extensive. Fi­
nally, it appears that the organizational structure relevant 
to the generation of categories of political action extends 
beyond the narrowly defined set of political organizations 
used here. This would seem to be especially true of activity 
patterns in upper white neighborhoods, where overall levels 
of participation in political organizations are quite small 
yet particular patterns of political participation were quite 
well defined.
These basic trends within the data can be further 
illustrated as statistically defined dimensions by the factor 
analysis technique. Table 20 contains a presentation of 
these dimensions. The first dimension, entitled "The Black
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TABLE 20
FACTOR ANALYTIC DIMENSIONS OF ECOLOGICAL VARIABLES
Factor 1— The 
Black Vote
Factor 2— The Up­
per White Vote
Factor 3— Voter 
Registration
Factor 4— Voter 
Turn Out
% Lombard 1 .95 % Connick 2 .90 % Registered .86 % Turn out .79
1973 2 73
% Ortique 1 .95 Median School .86
Years Ccmpl % Registered .84 % Turn out .78
% Lombard 2 .94 1972 1 73
% Garrison 1 -.84
% Jackson 1 .93 % Registered .84 % Turn out .74
1974 2 74
% Haggerty -.93 % Nonmanual .81
1 % Turn out .72
SES Index .79 1 72
% Stire -.93
% High School .76 % Turn out .69
% Haggerty -.92
O
Graduates 1 74
% Connick 1 .68 % Turn out .67
% Calogero .88 2 72
1 74 % Beer 2 .68
% Calogero .88 Race/Class .47
2 74
% Nonwhite .88
% Sarpy 1 -.74
% Calogero .72
1 72
Race/Class -.66
Organiza­
tional
Effective­
ness . 40
1 = First Primary
2 = Second Primary
72 = 1972
73 = 1973
74 = 1974
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Vote," contains support for candidates Lombard, Jackson, 
Ortique, and Calogero, lack of support for Haggerty, Stire, 
and Cronvich, and the ecological characteristics of a high 
percentage of nonwhite residents, a "black" race/class 
designation, and high organizational effectiveness rating.
The second factor, labeled "The Upper White Vote," indicates 
a dimension detailing support for Connick and Beer, lack of 
support for Garrison, and high scores on schooling, educa­
tional, income, occupational, and race/class attributes.
No factor is noted for the lower white group. Finally, 
factors three and four represent "Voter Registration" and 
"Voter Turn out" as dimensions separate from candidate 
choice.
These findings are consistent with the theoretical 
expectations expressed in chapters two and four and drawn 
from Etzioni's (1975) typology of organizations. It was 
argued in these chapters that upper white organizations 
typically exhibit normative compliance structures. Such 
structures are characterized by the exercise of "normative" 
power, that is, the use of symbolic sanctions to enact or­
ganizational control, and by the presence of "moral" in­
volvement patterns, that is, members tend to be positively 
oriented toward organizational power and participate as 
committed believers.
By comparison, black and lower white organizations 
were argued to be structured primarily along utilitarian 
lines. This type of structure is based upon the allocation
of material sanctions— remunerative power--and upon a 
calculative orientation of its members to organizational 
power. Thus, the emphasis here is upon the practical con­
sequences and spoils at stake in elections. Simply stated, 
supporting winning candidates affords access to the formal 
positions of power, either directly through the placing of 
organizational personnel in these positions or indirectly 
through the development personal/professional ties with non 
member candidates and the accumulation of political credits 
The data suggest with a fair degree of clarity that 
black and upper white organizations are regarded as rela­
tively effective forces in the elections considered. The 
strongest black organizations are clearly ulititarian.
They enjoy reputations of being effective organizations in 
influencing the vote and of being able to command a high 
price or promise for patronage in exchange for services 
rendered. The dominant upper white organizations are known 
as being idealistic groups whose endorsements help "legiti­
mize" candidates, that is, attest to the mainstream accept­
ability of candidates' credentials. However, these organi­
zations are also regarded as relatively unimportant in 
actually delivering the vote. They likewise are not known 
to entertain openly material concerns in contemplating en­
dorsements. These several differences between black and 
upper white organizations reflect clearly the key distinc­
tions between utilitarian and normative organizations.
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Turning to the low ratings and apparently weak 
performances of the lower white organizations, it may be 
said that their utilitarian posture has been undermined by 
increasing problems in effectively allocating material 
sanctions. In prior times, lower white organizations tended 
to the politics of New Orleans while upper whites tended to 
the business affairs. Blacks, largely disenfranchised, were 
not a formal factor. However, with increasing black regis­
tration, white migration patterns, and increasing concern 
for political reform, the operational bases of lower white 
organizations appears to have become increasingly eroded.
On occasion, these organizations are still able to muster 
effective power and participation. For the most part, how­
ever, their effectiveness seems pre-empted directly by 
competing black organizations and indirectly by reform 
oriented upper white organizations.
Footnotes
^"Figures are for the month prior to the first primary 
in the years 1972, 1973, and 1974.
2
Cell frequencies are as follows:
Black Lcwer White Upper White Total
39 27 13 79
15 23 14 _52
54 50 27 131
JComputer programs employed in the analyses are drawn 
from Nie et al. (1975).
Organizational High 
Effectiveness Low
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4 . .An interaction effect indicates that the effects
assocated with one variable are not consistent across levels 
of another variable. In such instances, prime consideration 
needs to be devoted to the interaction effects rather than 
the main effects.
^Mayor Landrieu placed a personal advertisement in 
the New Orleans States-Item, entitled, "So That Mr. Sarpy 
Will Understand." The ad contained pointed references to 
Sarpy's social status, asking at one point if the ex-King 
of Rex expected to ascend to the Supreme Court by virtue of 
the "divine right of kings." It defended Calogero as the 
realization of the American dream— by contrast to Sarpy, a 
"poor boy makes good" story (Glassman and Davis, 1972).
g
Scaccia, who received less than 3% of the vote, is 
excluded from the analysis.
7
Recent revelations concerning the CIA seem to re­
deem Garrison's preoccupation somewhat. A recent cover story 
in New Orleans magazine carries the blurb, "What with the 
recent revelations about the CIA, the former D.A.'s theories 
seem a lot saner. Listen to them again" (Manguno, 1976) .
g
Bustemente, who received under 5% of the vote, is 
excluded from the analysis.
CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
This dissertation has been addressed at the most 
general level to one basic question: how is it that cer­
tain clusters of individuals come to act "collectively," 
that is, to share some behavioral pattern in common. After 
all, it is quite evident that a large number of character­
istics shared with others typically result in no such col­
lective action. For example, group consciousness among 
those who wear glasses is ordinarily quite low, and there 
have been few uprisings among those who write with the left 
hand. However, various forms of collective sentiment and 
action are, under certain circumstances, found among those 
with the same skin color or those who live in the same 
neighborhood. It is assumed that almost any discernible 
characteristic might be used to distinguish meaningful cate­
gories of individuals. It is also thought that these char­
acteristics tend to remain inert in the absence of socially 
attached meanings.
At the more specific level, the study deals with 
conditions relating to the emergence of certain forms of 
political action, namely, stages of political participation
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ranging from registering to vote to casting the ballot.
Here, too, it is expected that some characteristics by which 
individuals might be classified will be practically useless 
in generating adequate predictions and explanations of po­
litical activity. Candidate choice is not anticipated to 
very significantly between those with glasses and those with 
perfect eyesight. However, certain characteristics are ex­
pected to show a relationship with patterns of political 
participation. It is further anticipated that these char­
acteristics receive salience through the presence of some 
definitional agent.
The major factors thought to be related to the po­
litical participation variable are social class and race. 
However, individuals sharing given levels of income or a 
given skin pigment are not expected to automatically show 
similar participation patterns. Rather, it is argued that 
objective characteristics of class and race come to be de­
fined as socially meaningful and, hence, serve as a politi­
cal rallying point chiefly through the presence of an 
organizational variable. That is, organizations found in a 
community setting are said to play a major role in specify­
ing which differences among individuals are worth noting.
Simply stated, then, the electorate may be correct­
ly viewed as a series of aggregates, groups, and organizations 
rather than as a composite of individuals. A wide range of 
sociological literature has been shown to intimate the role 
of "groups" in disseminating, legitimating, and interpreting
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information for their members and sympathizers. The problem 
is only slightly modified if the concern is focused upon or­
ganizations. The model offered here assumes that, however 
an organization emerges or is structured, an important aspect 
of organizational maintenance is that of extending influence 
to appropriate categories of sympathetic nonmembers and of 
retaining the interest of current members. Aggregates of 
those sharing objective class and racial characteristics are 
merely said to provide an especially convenient and poten­
tially responsive target population for these tasks. Inso­
far as organizations are effective in defining and publicizing 
such themes, distinctive forms of political participation are 
expected to emerge along class and racial lines.
The ecological perspective was employed in developing 
the operationalization of these basic concepts. This approach 
is based upon the premise that certain distinctive facets of 
areal units constitute contextual circumstances which in­
fluence the types of behavior likely to occur. Applied to 
the problem at hand, it assumes that the distributions of 
objective class and racial characteristics in specified areas 
will, in the presence of an appropriate organizational factor, 
lead to distinctive patterns of political participation by 
class and race.
Operationalization of the class, race, and political 
participation variables was achieved in a relatively straight­
forward manner utilizing census materials and precinct data. 
Census tract and precinct boundaries proved to be coterminous
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enough to permit matching into usable areal units. The 
class and racial characteristics of areal units were further 
refined into a race/class index consisting of three dimen­
sions— black, lower white, and upper white neighborhoods. 
Precinct based data, including registration figures, turn 
out levels, and votes cast for candidates in selected elec­
tions from 1972 to 1974 in New Orleans, were compiled as 
indicators of the political participation variable.
Operationalization of the organizational variable 
as an attribute of areal units was more problematic. There 
is no corresponding data repository for this variable indi­
cating the organizational characteristics of the community. 
Thus, a large part of the dissertation is devoted to estab­
lishing this information through field interviews. Con­
sideration of the organizational factor was restricted to 
political organizations. Interview data was collected from 
nineteen political organizations active in recent New Orleans 
elections. Further, organizational leaders and candidates 
for office in these elections were asked to rate the po­
litical organizations in terms of their impact and effec­
tiveness in the elections. Composite ratings derived from 
this procedure were then used to apply the reputed effec­
tiveness labels of the organizations themselves to their 
corresponding areas of operation, thus converting organiza-
J
tional effectiveness into an ecological as well as organi­
zational characteristic.
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Descriptions of the basic structural and compositional 
characteristics of the nineteen organizations are detailed 
in chapter four. Basically, the organizations lend them­
selves to categorization on the basis of both organizational 
effectiveness ratings and their respective class and racial 
compositions. Contrary to expectations, the number and 
overall reputed effectiveness of political organizations in 
New Orleans is inversely related to the race/class dimension. 
That is, there is apparently much more formal political or­
ganizational activity and a higher reputation for organiza­
tional effectiveness among black than white areas and among 
lower white than upper white neighborhoods. The exact ex­
planation for this is not totally clear from the data. It 
was suggested that organizational participation levels among 
upper whites may indeed be greater than among lower whites 
and black areas if the term were broadened to include activ­
ity in nonpolitical organizations. Further, the relative 
absence of upper whites in formal political organizations 
may well belie a great deal of parapolitical organizational 
activity, that is, the operation of technically nonpolitical 
networks which, nonetheless, serve political ends.
Political organizations in New Orleans were identified 
within a typology of organizations based upon the compliance 
thesis. This thesis proposes that compliance with organiza­
tional directives is grounded in power options available to 
the organization (coercive, remunerative, and normative 
power options) and orientations of participants to the power
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of the organization (alienative, calculative, and moral 
involvement types). Three basic types of organizations, 
therefore, emerge: coercive organizations (coercive power,
alienative involvement), utilitarian organizations (re­
munerative power, calculative involvement), and normative 
organizations (normative power, moral involvement).
Although political organizations may fall into any 
one of the three classifications depending upon the styles 
and goals employed by them, no empirical examples of co­
ercive political organizations were identified in New Orleans. 
However, black and lower white organizations were generally 
said to have utilitarian compliance structures, while upper 
white organizations were more likely to exhibit normative 
compliance structures. This is not meant to imply that 
upper white organizations do not benefit materially from 
electoral activity. They may simply be more clever in dis­
guising their "true" intentions. It is also possible that 
the material rewards for the upper white category are 
realized in more subtle form. Finally, they may indeed be 
more "public-regarding." The utilitarian-normative distinc­
tion, however, reflects the difference between the recurrent 
references in black and lower white organizations to mone­
tary and patronage considerations and the typical "good 
government" themes of the upper white organizations.
Analyses of election related data allow further in­
sight into these issues. It was anticipated that areas 
supporting high organizational effectiveness ratings would
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show higher levels of voter registration and voter turn out 
for selected elections than would the lesser rated areas.
Also, the distribution of votes cast in high organizational 
effectiveness neighborhoods was expected to match more 
exactly the pattern of endorsements advanced by highly rated 
organizations, while the distribution of votes in areas with 
low effectiveness ratings were expected to exhibit greater 
departure from the pattern recommended by lower rated organ­
izations. On the basis of the previous discussion of the 
relationship between organizational composition and reputed 
organizational effectiveness, it was anticipated that regis­
tration, turn out, and candidate support levels would be 
inversely related to the race/class dimension, specifically, 
that these levels would be highest in black neighborhoods 
and lowest in upper white areas. To the extent that this is 
not found to be the case, the organizational thesis is called 
into question.
Examination of registration levels by the race/class 
designation and organizational effectiveness ratings of areal 
units generally indicated a positive relationship between 
race/class and registration levels and the absence of any 
relationship between organizational effectiveness and regis­
tration levels. Basically, overall registration levels 
declined from 1972 to 1974 rather uniformly across both race/ 
class and reputed organizational effectiveness characteristics 
of areal units. The decline is thought to be mainly attribu­
table to the peaking of a registration trend associated with
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the 1972 presidential campaign. This factor aside, however, 
registration was highest in upper white areas and lowest in. 
black neighborhoods, while differences between high and low 
organizational effectiveness areas were minimal. Thus, the 
variation in registration levels is not.accountable within 
the confines of the organizational variable, at least in 
terms of the manner in which it is defined here.
Levels of voter turn out, analyzed by the race/class 
designation and organizational effectiveness ratings of 
areal units, showed a slightly different pattern. Overall, 
voter turn out was highest in two of the years considered 
in upper white areas. However, in 1973, turn out in black 
and lower white areas matched that found in upper white 
neighborhoods and, in one primary, actually exceeded the 
upper white figure. Later analysis of votes cast indicated 
1973 to be a year of exceptionally high electoral interest 
in the black community.
Analyses of the distributions of votes cast in the 
selected elections across levels of race/class and organi­
zational effectiveness variables contain some rather inter­
esting trends. First, the pattern of endorsements by the 
organizations in these elections indicate the presence of 
three basic "coalitions." It was noted that in five of the 
eleven elections, black and upper white organizations sided 
against the candidate choice of lower white organizations. 
However, in two of the elections, black and lower white 
organizations found themselves basically supporting the same
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candidate in opposition to the choice of the upper white 
organizations. Finally, in the remaining four elections, 
the same candidate was endorsed by practically all of the 
organizations. These patterns reinforce the earlier find­
ings of a number of studies dealing with electoral trends 
in the New South, particularly those of Howard, Long, and 
Zdrazil (1971).
A second feature noted in the analysis of these elec­
tions concerns the distributions of the votes themselves. 
Voting cohesiveness, that is, the tendency to "bloc vote," 
was found to be greatest in black neighborhoods and also to 
be fairly pronounced in upper white areas as well. Such 
cohesiveness is negligible in lower white areas. However, 
voting cohesiveness is greater in higher rated organization­
al effectiveness areas than in lower rated neighborhoods 
only occasionally. To begin with, a fair amount of unanim­
ity in candidate preference was noted in all neighborhoods, 
irrespective of organizational effectiveness. Nonetheless, 
areas with a reputation for organizational effectiveness do 
show a significantly greater level of cohesiveness in can­
didate choice— especially, it seems, when the candidate 
involved is politically identified in either racial or class 
terminology beyond mere physical identification.
A factor analysis of the basic variables involved 
confirms these contentions. It clearly indicates that the 
voter registration, voter turn out, and candidate choice in­
dicators of political participation merit consideration as
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independent dimensions, at least as far as analysis within 
the context of the race/class and organizational effective­
ness variables are concerned. Further, black and upper 
white neighborhoods emerge as distinct factors comprising 
both their respective ecological characteristics and can­
didate choices. The pattern is more pronounced in the 
black areas than in the upper white. No independent factor 
was shown for the lower white areas.
Limitations of the Study
The major limitations incurred in the execution of 
this study involve the treatment of the organizational 
effectiveness variable as a characteristic of areal units. 
This circumstance is not entirely incidental. The strategy 
of applying the organizational variable in this way is con­
sistent with the theoretical tradition of political ecology. 
It has the further advantage of tapping a wide range of 
data already enumerated and available as characteristics 
of areal units. However, these positive attributes like­
wise spell some disadvantage.
The first limitation stems from the nature of the 
theoretical assumptions accompanying the ecological approach 
itself. The focus of an ecological analysis is placed 
squarely upon the characteristics and patterns of behavior 
found in areal units without regard for the subjective defi­
nitions, perceptions, and interactional content of the in­
dividuals involved. Such dynamics are simply assumed to 
be operating and are accepted as "givens." Thus, despite
the interest expressed here in the organizational factor, 
the researcher, nonetheless, has no firsthand evidence of 
(1) individual exposure to organizational activity leading 
to (2) individual behavior commensurate with organizational 
exhortations leading to (3) the organization's reputation 
for effectiveness. The study allows only statements of 
this order: it is highly unlikely that one would uncover
a series of incidences in which pattern A is found rather 
consistently under conditions B and C by chance alone. Thus, 
insofar as pattern A is observed under predictable circum­
stances, one's theoretical statements in which A, B, and C 
are integrated receive further credence. However, these 
items A, B, and C must, in discussion, be kept at the level 
of contextual variables rather than individual level ones 
(a, b, and c).
A second limitation revolves around the practical 
problems of defining organizational effectiveness as an 
attribute of areal units. Simply put, the organizational 
variable is not intrinsically an ecological characteristic 
in the sense that are population characteristics. Thus, 
an organization's target population may not be strictly de­
finable in areal terms. The political organization studied 
here, UNO-YD and its orientation toward the "youth vote," 
is an apt illustration. Further, the influence of the or­
ganization is not necessarily restricted to specified areal 
units. For example, a political organization may indeed 
operate exclusively and effectively in a given ward.
241
However, the organization's sphere of influence may, nonethe­
less, exceed the boundaries of that ward as manifested by 
positive and negative identifiers in other areas who orient 
their behavior accordingly.
The overall effect of these limitations may be summed 
as follows. In the instance of the first limitation, actual 
organization impact, while assessed indirectly, is nonethe­
less directly unknown. Thus, conclusions can be legitimately 
expressed only in the terms of ecological or contextual cir­
cumstances. The second limitation, on the other hand, is 
likely to result in an underestimation of the organizational 
effect. Thus, the registered organizational effect, as an 
ecological characteristic, is probably stronger than indi­
cated in this study.
Recommendations for Future Study
Ensuing research dealing with the substantive sorts 
of problems treated here is likely to be fruitful if oriented 
in two basic directions. One, further analyses of political 
organizations qua organizations are essential. Many de­
scriptive studies of organizations have been formulated by 
sociologists and political scientists. However, what is 
noticeably lacking are studies designed to test propositions 
about political organizations drawn from the wider organi­
zational literature in sociology. Further, attempts can be 
made here to establish the sphere of influence of political 
organizations using organizations as a base of social net­
works .
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Secondly, sociometric types of analysis focusing 
upon the individual are needed as well. This strategy seeks 
to establish the community's vital social networks by 
establishing and tracing the relationships of separate in­
dividuals to their usual clusters of primary and secondary 
acquaintances. Both of these types of analysis constitute 
efforts to establish the effect of the organizational var­
iable on the basis of firsthand and direct evidence.
Conclusions
The major conclusions of the study may be stated as
follows:
(1) The relative numbers and strengths of politi­
cal organizations in New Orleans were hypothesized to be 
positively related with the race/class dimension. Specif­
ically, upper white areas were expected to show the greatest 
evidence of organization and effectiveness, while decreas- 
ingly lower levels of these characteristics- were anticipated 
in lower white and black areas. Neither of these hypotheses 
were substantiated by the data. Rather, upper white organi­
zations were few in number and were not generally regarded 
as being every effective. Lower white organizations, while 
more numerous than upper white organizations, were consid­
ered as a group to be in a state of decline. Black organi­
zations were found in the greatest numbers and, in some 
instances, were regarded as having organized quite effective­
ly.
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(2) Cast within a typology of organizations, upper 
white organizations were said to exhibit normative compliance 
structures, while black and lower white organizations were 
characterized as utilitarian compliance organizations. Thus, 
upper white organizations tend to operate in terms of norma­
tive adherence to political ideals and quasi-ideological 
standards, especially those involving "reform" and "good 
government." Participants in these organizations are more 
likely to be idealistically motivated in their participation. 
Black and lower white organizations, on the other hand, tend 
to operate on the basis of the material benefits at stake. 
These benefits are typically allocated in a systematic fash­
ion in order to maintain organizational operations. Partic­
ipation in these organizations by members is more likely
to be calculative, that is, to be motivated in terms of 
the acquisition or loss of these rewards.
(3) Commensurate with expectations, voter registra­
tion, voter turn out, and candidate choice were found to be 
consistently and positively correlated with the race/class 
variable.
(a) It was found that upper whites were more 
likely to register and turn out to vote than were lower 
whites and blacks. With some exceptions, levels of voter 
registration and voter turn out did not vary significantly 
across levels of the organizational variable. The note­
worthy exception occurred in three elections in which race 
and class became very explicit issues. In these elections,.
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voter turn out in black and lower white areas approximated 
that found in upper white neighborhoods.
(b) In every election, the distribution of 
votes for the candidates considered was found to vary dis­
tinctively by race/class. However, only in elections in 
which candidates became politically identifiable in race or 
class terms did the distributions of the vote across levels 
of the race/class variable correspond to the pattern of 
organizational endorsements.
(c) These factors suggest that political or­
ganizations in New Orleans are able to mobilize sentiment 
mainly under a sepcialized set of conditions. Apparently, 
where the focus of the campaign can be cast in terms other 
than those of race or class, the organizations are less 
effective.
(4) All logical combinations of bloc votes among 
the black, lower white, and upper white areas occurred in 
the elections under study. In primary elections with more 
than one candidate, each bloc often voted independently of 
each other. In run-offs (and some first primaries), 
populist (black, lower white vs. upper white), white supre­
macy (black vs. lower white, upper white), and moderation- 
paternalism (black, upper white vs. lower white) coalitions 
were observed. These were not necessarily formal coalitions-- 
in fact, they most often were not. However, these patterns 
do indicate the practical air to the politics of New Orleans.
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(5) Upper white and black bloc votes emerge as 
independent dimensions in a factor analysis of all the char­
acteristics under study. An independent lower white 
dimension was not detected. Upper white organizations tend 
to be normatively structured, a stance apparently commen­
surate with the mood of the upper white areas. Black and 
lower white organizations tend to fall into the utilitarian 
compliance mode. However, the ability of lower white organ­
izations to operate effectively in this mode seems to have 
become seriously eroded. Both white migration patterns and 
the enfranchisement of the black voter have coupled to 
weaken the organizational base of the lower white organiza­
tions in their traditional areas of operation. Further, 
the rise of black organizations has sharply increased com­
petition for the spoils. Thus, the utilitarian posture of 
the lower white organizations is now only occasionally 
effective.
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JUXTAPOSITION OF WARD AND CENSUS TRACT 
BOUNDARIES, NEW ORLEANS, 1970
JUXTAPOSITION OF WARD AND CENSUS TRACT 
BOUNDARIES, NEW ORLEANS, 19703
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The seventeen political wards are 
demarcated by heavy solid lines where coterminous with' 
tract boundaries. Map exerpted from the United States 
Bureau of the Census (1972). Ward broundary information derived 
from maps provided by the Department of Streets for the City of 
New Orleans. 258
APPENDIX 2
MATCHED TRACTS/PRECINCTS FOR ORLEANS PARISH
aMatch Tracts/Precincts for Orleans Parish
WARD 1
1) Tract (Tr) 77 - Ward (Wd) 1: Precinct (Pet) 1; W l 2:
2) Tr 78 - Wd 1: Pets 2, 5.
3) Tr 79, Tr 80 - Wd 1: Pets 6, 7.
WARD 2
4) Tr 67 - Wd 2: Pets 2, 3.
5) Tr 68 - Wd 2: Pets 4, 5.
6) Tr 69 - Wd 2: Pets 6, 6A.
7) Tr 70 - Wd 2: Pet 7.
WARD 3
8) Tr 58, Tr 59, Wd 3: Pet. 1.
9) Tr 60 - Wd 3: Pets 4, 6.
10) Tr 63 - Wd 3: Pets 7, 9, 10.
11) Tr 64 - Wd 3: Pets 13, 14, 16.
12) Tr 65 - Wd 3: Pets 17, 18, 19, 20.
13) Tr 71 - Wd 3: Pets 8, 12, 15
14) Tr 49 - Wd 3: Pets 3, 3A,' 5; Wd 4: Pets 3, 4.
WARD 4
15) Tr 47, Tr 48 - Wd 4: Pet 2.
16) Tr 50, Tr 54 - Wd 4: Pets 5, 6, 7, 8.
17) Tr 55 - Wd 4: Pets 9, 10, 10A, 11, 12.
18) Tr 56.01 - Wd 4: Pets 19, 20, 20A, 21, 21A.
19) Tr 56.02 - Wd 4: Pets 17, 17A, 18, 18A.
20) Tr 56.03 - Wd 4: Pets 15, 16, 16A.
21) Tr 56.04 - Wd 4: Pets 13, 13A, 14, 14A.
22) Tr 133.01 - Wd 4: Pets 22, 23; Wd 5: Pets 17, 18,
WARD 5-
23) Tr 42 - Wd 5: Pet 1, 2, 3.
24) Tr 43 - Wd 5: Pet 4.
25) Tr 44 - Wd 5: Pets 5, 6, 7, 8.
26) Tr 45 - Wd 5: Pets 9, 10, 11.
27) Tr 46 - Wd 5: Pets 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.
WARD 6
28) Tr 38 - Wd 6: Pets 1, 2.
29) Tr 39 - Wd 6: Pet 4.
30) Tr 40 - Wd 6: Pet 5, 6, 7.
31) Tr 41 - Wd 6: Pet 8, 9.
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WARD 7
32)
33)
34)
35)
36)
37)
38)
39)
40)
41)
42)
43)
44)
45)
46)
WARD 8
47)
48)
49)
50)
51)
52)
53)
54)
55)
WARD 9
56)
57)
58)
59)
60) 
61) 
62)
63)
64)
65)
66)
67)
68)
69)
70)
71)
72)
73)
74)
Tr 26 - Wd 7: Pets 1, 2.
Tr 27, Tr 29 - Wd 7: Pets 4, 4A, 5, 7.
Tr 28 - Wd 7: Pets 10, 20.
Tr 30, Tr 31 - Wd 7: Pets 8, 9, 9A, 20A.
Tr 33.01 - Wd 7: Pets 32, 33A, 39, 40.
Tr 33.02 - Wd 7: Pets 28A, 30, 31, 33.
Tr 33.03, Tr 133.02, Tr 25.01 - Wd 7: Pets 37, 38, 
38A, 41, 42; Wd 8: Pets 26, 27, 28, 29.
Tr 33.04 - Wd 7: Pets 34, 35, 36, 36A.
Tr 33.05, Tr 33.06 - Wd 7: Pets 27, 27A, 27B, 28. 
Tr 33.07 - Wd 7: Pets 26A,. 29.
Tr 33.08 - Wd 7: Pets 23, 24, 25.
Tr 34 - Wd 7: Pet 6.
Tr 35, 36 - Wd 7: Pets 11, 12, 13, 14.
Tr 37.01 - Wd 7: Pets 18, 19.
Tr 37.02 - Wd 7: Pets 15, 16, 17, 17A, 21.
Tr 18 - Wd 8: Pets 1, 2.
Tr 19 - Wd 8: Pets 4, 5, 6 •
Tr 20 - Wd 8: Pets 7, 8.
Tr 21 - Wd 8: Pets 9, 11.
Tr 22 - Wd 8; Pets 10, 12.
Tr 2 3 - Wd 8: Pets 13, 14; Wd 7, Pets 22 , 26 •
Tr 24.01, Tr 24.02 - Wd 8: Pets 15, 16, 17, 18,
Tr 25.02 - Wd 8: Pets 26A, 27A, 30.
Tr 25.03, Tr 25.04 - Wd 8: Pets 21, 22, 23,
CM
19, 20. 
25, 25A.
Tr 7.01 - Wd 9: Pets 8, 8A.
Tr 7.02, Tr 8 - Wd 9: Pets 1, 1A, 2, 4, 7.
Tr 9.01 - Wd 9: Pets 3, 3A, 3B.
Tr 9.02, Tr 9.03 - Wd 9: Pets 6, 6A, 6B, 6C, 6D.
Tr 9.04 - Wd w: Pets 5, 5A.
Tr 11 - Wd 9: Pets 9, 10, 11.
Tr 12 - Wd 9: Pets 12, 13, 14.
Tr 13.01 - Wd 9: Pets 15, 19, 21.
Tr 13.02 - Wd 9: Pets 16, 17, 18.
Tr 14.01 - Wd 9; Pets 25, 25A, 26.
Tr 14.02 - Wd 9: Pets 22, 23.
Tr 15, Wd 9: Pets 20, 24.
Tr 16 - Wd 9: Pet 27.
Tr 17.01 - Wd 9: Pets 31B, 31C, 31D, 31E.
Tr 17.02 - Wd 9: Pets 29A, 30, 30A, 31, 31A.
Tr 17.03, Tr 17.04, Tr 17.05 - Wd 9: Pets 28, 28A, 28B, 
28C 29
Tr 17.07 - Wd 9: Pets 33, 33A, 42, 42A, 42B.
Tr 17.08 - Wd 9: Pets 34, 35, 36, 36A, 36B.
Tr 17.09 - Wd 9; Pets 37, 37A, 38, 38A, 39, 39A.
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WARD 9, Continued
75) Tr 17. 10 - Wd 9: Pets 39B, 40, 40A,
76) Tr 17. 11 - Wd 9: Pets 42C, 43, 43A,
44A.
77) Tr 17. 12 - Wd 9: Pets 41, 41A.
78) Tr 17. 13 - Wd 9: Pets 32, 45.
WARD 10
79) Tr 81 - Wd 10: Pets 3, 4, 5.
80) Tr 82, Tr 83 - Wd 10: Pets 6, 7 , 8,
81) Tr 84 - Wd 10: Pets 10, 11.
82) Tr 85, Tr 86 - Wd 10: Pets 12, 13,
WARD 11
83) Tr 87 - Wd 11: Pet 1.
84) Tr 88 - Wd 11: Pets 2, 4, 7.
85) TR 89 - Wd 11: Pets 3, 5.
86) Tr 90 - Wd 11: Pets 6, 8, 9.
87) Tr 91 - Wd 11: Pets 10, 11.
88) Tr 92 - Wd 11: Pets 12, 13.
89) Tr 93 - Wd 11: Pets 14, 15, 16.
90) Tr 94 - Wd 11: Pets 17, 18, 19.
WARD 12
91) Tr 96 - Wd 12: Pets 1, 2.
92) Tr 97 - Wd 12: Pets 3, 4.
93) Tr 99 - Wd 12: Pets 5, 6, 7, 8.
94) Tr 100 - Wd 12: Pets 9, 11, 13.
95) Tr 101 - Wd 12: Pets 10, 12.
96) Tr 102 - Wd 12: Pets 14, 15, 16 •
97) Tr 103 - Wd 12: Pets 17, 18, 19 , 20
WARD 13
98) Tr 105 - Wd 13: Pets 1, 3.
99) Tr 106 , Tr 108 - Wd 13: Pets 2, 4,
100) Tr 107 - Wd 13: Pets 5, 7.
101) Tr 109 - Wd 13: Pets 9, 10, 11, 12.
102) Tr 111 - Wd 13: Pets 13, 14, 14A.
103) Tr 112 - Wd 13: Pets 15, 16.
WARD 14
104) Tr 114 - Wd 14: Pets 1, 2.
105) Tr 115 - Wd 14: Pets 3, 4, 8.
106) Tr 116 - Wd 14: Pets 5, 6.
107) Tr 117 - Wd 14: Pets 7, 9, 14, 15.
108) Tr 119 - Wd 14: Pets 16, 17.
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WARD 14, Continued
109) Tr 120 - Wd 14: Pets 10, 11.
110) Tr 121.01 - Wd 14: Pets 18, 18A, 19.
111) Tr 121.02 - Wd 14: Pets 12, 13 (+13A in 1973, 1974).
112) Tr 122 - Wd 14: Pets 20, 21.
113) Tr 123 - Wd 14: Pets 22, 23, 24.
114) Tr 124 - Wd 14: Pets 24A, 25, 26.
115) Tr 72 - Wd 14: Pet 26A,; Wd 16: Pet 9: Wd 17: Pets 
12, 14.
WARD 15
115) Tr 1 - Wd 15: Pets 1, 2, 3, 4.
117) Tr 2, Tr 3, Tr 4, Tr 6.01 - Wd 15: Pets 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 11A.
118) Tr 6.02, Tr 6.04 - Wd 15: Pets 12, 12A, 13, 14.
119) Tr 6.03, Tr 5.08, Tr 5.10 - Wd 15: Pets 13A, 18, 18A,
18B, 18C, (+14C, 14D, and 18D in 1973 and 1974).
120) Tr 6.05, Tr 6.06 - Wd 15: Pets 14A , 14B, 15, 15A.
121) Tr 6.07 - Wd 15: Pets 16, 17, 17A, 17B.
122) Tr 6.09 - Wd 15: Pets 19, 19A.
WARD 16
123) Tr 125 - Wd 16: Pets 1, 1A.
124) Tr 126 - Wd 15: Pets 2, 3.
125) Tr 127 - Wd 16: Pets 4, 5, 6.
126) Tr 128 - Wd 16: Pets 7, 8.
WARD 17
127) Tr 75.01, Tr 75.02 - Wd 17: Pets 9, 11, 13, 13A.
128) Tr 76.01 - Wd 17: Pets 18, 18A, 19, 19A, 20, 21.
129) Tr 72.02 - Wd 17: Pets 15, 16, 17.
130) Tr 129, Tr 130, Tr 131 - Wd 17: Pets 1, 2, 3, 4,
5,6.
131) Tr 132 - Wd 17: Pets 7, 8, 10.
Maps used in generating these areal units derived from 
the United States Bureau of the Census (1972) and the Depart­
ment of Streets for the City of New Orleans.
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POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS FOUND TO BE ACTIVE IN RECENT 
LOCAL ELECTIONS IN NEW ORLEANS
1 - Alliance for Good Government (AGG)
2 - American's Changing Society Democratic Association
3 - Association of Independent Democrats (AID)
4 - Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD)
5 - Blacks United for Leadership League (BULL)
6 - Black Women's Caucus
7 - Black Youth for Progress (BYP)
8 - Brothers Improvement Association
9 - Central City Coalition for Urban Politics
10 - Civic Independent Association
11 - Community Organization of League (COOL)
12 - Community Organization for Urban Politics (COUP)
13 - Consolidated Independent Democrats of New Orleans
14 - Cresent City Democratic Association (CCDA)
15 - Cresent City Independent Voters League (CCIVL)
16 - Daneel Street Democrats
17 - Democratic Alliance of Louisiana
18 - Democratic Beavers of America, Inc.
19 - Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods
(DAWN)
20 - Eighth Ward Political Group
21 - Faith Beneficial Association
22 - Ghetto Democrats
23 - Greater Algiers Voters Education League (GAVEL)
24 - Greater New Orleans AFL-CIO
25 - Handicap Voters League
26 - Independent Women's Association (IWO)
27 - Louisiana Advancement Association
28 - Louisiana Concerned Citizens Council (LCCC)
29 - Mid-City Democrats (MCD)
30 - New Breed Civic Association
31 - New Orleans Coalition (NOC)
32 - New Orleans Public Housing Tenants Association
33 - New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA)
34 - New Orleans Voters League (NOVL)
35 - New Orleans Young Democrats
36 - Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League (NWCVL)
37 - Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL)
38 - Political Workers of America, Inc.
39 - Regular Democratic Organization (RDO)
40 - Seventh Ward Democratic Voters League
41 - Southern Democratic Association
42 - Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL)
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43 - Suburban Political and Social Club
44 - State-Wide Voters League
45 - Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal (TILT)
46 - Treme Independent Political Society (TIPS)
47 - United Black Brotherhood
48 - United Brothers League
49 - University of New Orleans Young Democrats (UNO-YD)
50 - Uptown Democratic Association (UDA)
51 - Voters Improvement Through Progress
52 - West New Orleans Democratic Civic Association
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Questionnaire for Organizational Leaders:
Q1 Let me begin with some general questions about your
organization.
How did the ________    come into being?
name of organization
INTERVIEWER: PROBE DATE, POL SETTING/SOC ISSUES
Q2 What is the stated purpose of your organization?
Q3 What regularly scheduled meetings or events does your
organization have?
Q4 Does the organization have any other programs or on­
going activities?
Q5 I realize that the size of an organization often
fluctuates during and between elections. On the average, 
approximately how many active members has your organi­
zation had during any given election in the past year 
or two?
Q7 Approximately how many members have been active in your
organization's meetings or activities in the last two 
or three months?
Q8 Do the members of your organization tend to live in any
particular area of the city?
IF YES, GO TO Qll 
IF NO, GO TO Q10
Q9 Could you pin down these areas for me, say in terms of
neighborhoods or precincts?
IF NO, GO TO Qll
Q10 So your membership tends to reside fairly evenly through­
out the city?
IF YES, GO TO Qll 
IF NO, RETURN TO Q10
Qll Is your membership predominantly "white" or "black"?
IF WHITE, GO TO Q12 
IF BLACK, GO TO Q13
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Q12 Approximately what percentage is white?
GO TO Q14
Q13 Approximately what percentage is black?
Q14 Would you say that the average member of your organi­
zation has "completed grade school," "completed some 
high school," "completed high school," or "attended 
college"?
Q15 Would you say that the average member of your organi­
zation is "upper class," "upper middle class," "middle 
class," "working class," or "lower class," as these 
terms are commonly used in New Orleans?
Q16 Do you see your organization as representing the in­
terests of any particular segment of the New Orleans 
population?
IF YES, ASK Q17 
IF NO, GO TO Q18
Q17 Can you identify this segment for me in terms of
neighborhoods or even precincts?
Q18 Could you briefly describe for me the staff positions
of your organization?
Q19 Of your staff positions, approximately what percentage 
are salaried?
IF SOME ARE SALARIED, ASK Q20 ■
IF NONE ARE SALARIED, GO TO Q21
Q20 Do any of the persons in these positions also hold jobs
with local or state government? Of these paid positions, 
approximately what percentage are considered full-time?
Q21 What is the affiliation of your organization with the
national Democratic party?
Q22 Were any members of your organization delegates to the 
national Democratic convention in either 1968 or 1972?
Q23 What is your current position in the organization?
Q24 How did you come to hold this position?
PROBE: HOW LONG POSITION HELD: APPOINTIVE VS. ELECTIVE
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Q25 What other occupational, professional, and/or advisory 
positions do you hold?
Q26 What would you say is the prime factor prompting your 
involvement in the organization?
Q27 Do any other factors prompting your involvement come 
to mind?
Q28 What is your current age?
Q29 What is the highest level of formal education you have
completed?
Q30 To which kinds of these clubs or organizations are 
you a member?
ASK FOR NAME OF EACH ORGANIZATION IN WHICH PARTICIPATION 
IS INDICATED; IF NONE, GO TO Q33
Q31 Do you hold an office or leadership position in any of 
these organizations?
Q32 Concerning your participation in ________________ , how
often have you participated in its meetings or functions 
in the last three months?
REPEAT FOR EACH ORGANIZATION IN WHICH PARTICIPATION IS 
INDICATED; RETRIEVE CARD A
Let's turn to some recent elections in New Orleans.
In these elections, many organizations such as yours 
endorsed and actively supported selected candidates.
Q33 Has your organization endorsed candidates in recent local 
elections?
IF YES, ASK Q34 
IF NO, GO TO Q52
Q34 What procedure has customarily been used to decide 
which candidate the organization endorsed?
GIVE RESPONDENT CARD B. Here is a summary list of 
candidates for office in selected recent, local elections.
Q35 In the 1972 Louisiana Supreme Court Justice first pri­
mary, did your organization endorse Calogero, Ortique, 
Redmann, or Sarpy?
Q36 In the run-off, did your organization endorse Calogero 
or Sarpy?
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Q37
Q38
Q39
Q40
Q41
Q42
Q43
Q44
Q45
Q46
Q47
Q48
Q49
What were the key considerations in the decision to 
endorse __________________ ?
REPEAT IF ENDORSEMENT CHANGED FROM PRIMARY TO RUN-OFF
In the 1973 Orleans Parish District Attorney first 
primary, did your organization endorse Connick, Garrison, 
Reese, or Scaccia?
In the run-off, did your organization endorse Connick 
or Garrison?
What were the key considerations in the decision to en­
dorse ________________ ?
REPEAT IF NECESSARY
In the 1973 Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff race, did 
your organization endorse Jackson, Sargent, or Stire?
What were the key considerations in the decision to 
endorse ___________________ ?
In the 1973 Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal Court first 
primary, did your organization endorse Bustamente, 
Haggerty, or Lombard?
In the run-off, did your organization endorse Haggerty 
or Lombard?
What were the key considerations in the decision to 
endorse _______________ ?
REPEAT IF NECESSARY
In the 1974 Louisiana Supreme Court Justice first primary, 
did your organization endorse Calogero, Cronvich, or 
Garrison?
In the run-off, did your organization endorse Calogero 
or Cronvich?
What were the key considerations in the decision to 
endorse ____________________ ?
REPEAT IF NECESSARY
In the 1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals first pri­
mary, did your organization endorse Beer, Bossetta, 
Grieshaber, or Reese?
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Q50 In the run-off, did your organization endorse Beer or 
Bossetta?
Q51 What were the key considerations in the decision to 
endorse ?
REPEAT IF NECESSARY: RETRIEVE CARD C FROM RESPONDENT
Q52 In your estimation, how does the average voter decide: 
a) whether to vote, and b) for whom to vote?
a)
b)
Q53 What role does an organization such as yours play in 
influencing whom the voters support?
IF ORGANIZATION DOES NOT ENDORSE, GO TO Q59
Q54 Why does your organization endorse candidates, i.e., 
what's in it for you?
GIVE RESPONDENT CARD C. Here is a list of campaign 
activities often performed by organizations such as 
yours in behalf of candidates they have endorsed.
These activities have been grouped into three categories.
Q55 What two or three activities best represent the primary 
efforts of your organization in behalf of candidates 
if endorsed?
IF A THRU G IS CITED, ASK Q56 
IF H OR I IS CITED, AS Q57 
IF NONE, GO TO Q58
Q56 Can you specify for me who was the target population of 
these campaign activities— in terms of segments of the 
electorate, neighborhoods, or even precincts?
Q57 What effect upon election outcomes do you feel that these 
campaign activities by your organization had in these 
areas of the city?
RETRIEVE CARD C FROM RESPONDENT
GIVE RESPONDENT CARD D. Campaign activities and day- 
to-day operations require some source of revenue. Here 
is a list of potential sources of revenue available to 
organizations such as yours.
Q58 Were there other organizations with whom you were in 
contact or worked?
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Q59 Which of these possible sources of income has your
organization used to raise money in the last year or 
so?
Q60 Which of these sources would you say is your organi­
zation's primary source of revenue?
RETRIEVE CARD D. I am interested in learning more 
about which organizations you feel exert the most 
influence in affecting the vote in New Orleans. Here
is a list of organizations which have made endorsements
in recent elections.
GIVE RESPONDENT CARD E
Q61 Which three or four groups are, in your opinion, the
most influential in affecting the vote in New Orleans?
Q61A In which specific area, i.e., neighborhoods and pre­
cincts, are these organizations influential?
Q62 In what ways would you say that they are influential?
Q63 Is there any political organization whom you regard as
influential whose name is not on the list?
IF YES, SPECIFY
Q64 Are there any social, civic, religious, business or 
other technically non-political organizations which 
you feel have in some way played a politically signif­
icant role in recent New Orleans elections?
IF YES, SPECIFY AND EXPLAIN
Q65 What would you say are the two or three most pressing 
issues facing the community which your organization is 
trying to do something about?
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CARD A
Here is a list of the types of clubs and organizations found 
in the New Orleans community:
A - church connected groups (Knights of Columbus, 
Brothers Zion, Knights of Peter Claver, etc.)
B - labor unions
C - veteran's associations (American Legion, VFW, etc.)
D - service organizations (Rotary, Lions, Kiwanis, etc.)
E - business or civic groups (YMBC, Chamber of Commerce, 
JC's, etc.)
F - civil rights organizations (NAACP, Urban League,
SCLC, etc.)
G - PTA's
H - clubs for people of same.nationality or race
I - sports clubs or recreational groups
J - country clubs
K - youth groups (Scouts, Big Brothers Program, etc.)
L - professional or occupational groups (AMA, Louisiana 
Bar Association, etc.)
M - political clubs or organizations
N - social clubs or groups, including Carnival krewes
0 - charity, health, or welfare organizations (Heart 
Fund, Sickle Cell Anemia Foundation, March of 
Dimes, Christian Relief Fund, etc.)
P - neighborhood improvement associations (Gentilly 
Neighborhood Association, Lower Ninth Ward Civic 
Association, Audubon Civic Association, etc.)
Q - other (please specify)
275
CARD B
Candidates for local office in selected recent elections.
1972 Louisiana Supreme Court Justice (1st District) race:
first primary second primary
Pascal Calogero Pascal Calogero
Revius Ortique Leon Sarpy
William Redmann 
Leon Sarpy
1973 Orleans Parish District Attory race:
first primary second primary
Harry Connick Harry Connick
Jim Garrison Jim Garrison
George Reese 
Ross T. Scaccia
1973 Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff race:
first primary second primary
Johnny Jackson, Sr.
Alvin J. Sargent 
Milton A. Stire
1973 Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal Court race:
first primary second primary
Herman Bustamente Daniel Haggerty
Daniel Haggerty Edwin Lombard
Edwin Lombard
1974 Louisiana Supreme Court Justice (1st District) race:
first primary second primary
Pascal Calogero Pascal Calogero
Alwynn Cronvich Alwynn Cronvich
Jim Garrison
1974 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judgeship race:
first primary second primary
Peter Beer Peter Beer
Joseph Bossetta Joseph Bossetta
Dominic Grieshaber 
Geroge Reese
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CARD - C
Here is a list of campaign activities often performed by
organizations such as yours in behalf of endorsed candidates.
A - hold or sponsor campaign rallies, picnics, or other 
get-togethers in behalf of endorsed candidates
B - place ads in newsletters or local newspapers en­
dorsing selected candidates
C - place or distribute campaign posters
D - distribute sample ballots endorsing selected candi­
dates
E - conduct house-to-house or telephone canvassing
F - place ads on radio or TV endorsing selected 
candidates
G - provide transportation to polls for voters
H - contact leaders of other political, social, civic, 
or religious groups in behalf of endorsed candidates
I - work through other political, social, civic, or 
religious groups in behalf of endorsed candidates
J - contribute money to the campaign funds of selected 
candidates
K - other (please specify)
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CARD D
Here is a list of potential sources of revenue often relied 
upon by organizations such as yours:
A - membership dues
B - fund-raising events (dinners, fairs, picnics, dances, 
and other events sponsored by organization)
C - contributions from candidates for office
D - revenue generating property owned by organization
E - contributions from individuals
F - contributions from groups and businesses
G - other (please specify)
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CARD F
Here is a list of organizations that have endorsed candidates 
in recent New Orleans elections:
A - AFL-CIO
B - Alliance for Good Government (AGG)
C - Association of Independent Democrats (AID)
D - Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD)
E - Community Organization for Unified Leadership (COUP)
F - Crescent City Democratic Association (CCDA)
G - Crescent City Independent Voters League (CCIVL)
H - Criminal Courts Bar Association
I - Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods 
(DAWN)
J - Independent Women's Organization (IWO)
K - Mid-City Democrats (MCD)
L - New Orleans Bar Association 
M - New Orleans Coalition (NOC)
N - New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA)
O - New Orleans Young Democrats 
P - Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League (NWCVL)
Q - Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL)
R - Regular Democratic Organization (RDO)
S - Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL)
T - Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal (TILT)
U - Treme Independent Political Society (TIPS)
V - University of New Orleans Young Democrats 
X - Uptown Democratic Association
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Questionnaire for Candidates from Selected Elections;
The following questions are in reference to your bid for 
office in the race.
Q1 What considerations prompted you to run for this office?
Q2 In your estimation, how does the average individual
decide
a) whether to vote, and b) for whom to vote?
a)
b)
Q3 What has been the role of political organizations in in­
fluencing which candidates the voters have supported in 
recent local elections?
Q4 From which political organizations did you or your staff 
actively seek support?
Q5 Which portions of the New Orleans electorate would you
say provided you with the strongest support? INTERVIEWER: 
PROBE AREAS OF SUPPORT.
Q5A In what way, if any, do you feel that political organi­
zations were a factor in the outcome of the 
race? INTERVIEWER: PROBE AREAS OF OPERATION.
Q6 Card A contains a list of political organizations which 
have endorsed candidates in recent elections. Of the 
organizations on the list, which three or four would you 
say are the most influential politically?
Q6A In what areas of the city are these (top 3 or 4) organi­
zations influential?
Q7 In what way are these organizations influential?
Q8 Is there any political organization whom you regard as
influential whose name is not on the list? If so, please 
indicate its name and specify its importance.
Q9 What "non-politiaal" organizations, i.e., social, civic,
religious, business, etc., organizations, do you feel
played a political significant role in the __________  race?
Please explain your answer.
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CARD A
Here is a list of organizations that have endorsed candidates 
in recent New Orleans elections:
A - AFL-CIO
B - Alliance for Good Government (AGG)
C - Association of Independent Democrats (AID)
D - Black Organization for Leadership Development (BOLD)
E - Community Organization for Unified Leadership (COUP)
F - Crescent City Democratic Association (CCDA)
G - Crescent City Independent Voters League (CCIVL)
H - Criminal Courts Bar Association
I - Development Association of Wards and Neighborhoods 
(DAWN)
J - Independent Women's Organization (IWO)
K - Mid-City Democrats (MCD)
L - New Orleans Bar Association 
M - New Orleans Coalition (NOC)
N - New Orleans Voters Association (NOVA)
0 - New Orleans Young Democrats 
P - Ninth Ward Citizens Voters League (NWCVL)
Q - Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League (OPPVL)
R - Regular Democratic Organization (RDO)
S - Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL)
T - Tough-Minded Independent Leadership Tribunal (TILT)
U - Treme Independent Political Society (TIPS)
V - University of New Orleans Young Democrats 
X - Uptown Democratic Association
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INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR NEW ORLEANS ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY
Candidates for Office:
Peter H. Beer, candidate, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., candidate, Louisiana Supreme 
Court Justice, 1972 and 1974 
Harry Connick, candidate, Orleans Parish District Attorney 
Dominic C. Grieshaber, candidate, Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals
Daniel B. Haggerty, incumbent, Orleans Parish Clerk of 
Criminal Court 
Johnny Jackson, Sr., candidate, Orleans Parish Civil 
Sheriff
Edwin Lombard, candidate, Orleans Parish Clerk of Criminal 
Court
Revius O. Ortique, Jr., candidate, Louisiana Supreme Court 
Justice, 1972 
George W. Reese, candidate, Orleans Parish District 
Attorney and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Leon Sarpy, candidate, Louisiana Supreme Court Justice, 
1972
Milton A. Stire, incumbent, Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff
Organizational Leaders;
Sandra Anderson, secretary to Lindsey Williams, president 
of Greater New Orleans AFL-CIO 
Richard Boseman, vice-president of Ninth Ward Citizens 
Voters League (NWCVL)
John Cassreino, president of Crescent City Democratic 
Association (CCDA)
Lawrence A. Comiskey, Jr., president of Mid-City Democrats 
(MCD)
Joseph Cangemelli, president of Regular Democratic Organi­
zation (RDO)
Waifred Daliet, president of Crescent City Independent 
Voters League (CCIVL)
Rev. A.L. Davis, president of Orleans Parish Progressive 
Voters League (OPPVL)
Bobby Dupont, president of New Orleans Coalition (NOC) 
Emilo Dupre, president of Community Organization for Urban 
Politics (COUP)
Gale Gagliano, president of Independent Women's Organi­
zation (IWO)
Donald A. Hoffman, president of Alliance for Good Govern­
ment (AGG)
Rev. Johnny Jackson, Sr., president of Development Assoc­
iation of Wards and Neighborhoods (DAWN)
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Darleen Jacobs, president of Association of Independent 
Democrats (AID)
Sen. Nat Kiefer, president of New Orleans Voters Associa­
tion (NOVA)
Susan Magee, president of New Orleans League of Women 
Voters
David Quidd, president of University of New Orleans Young 
Democrats (UNO-YD)
Norman Smith, vice-president of Treme Improvement Polit­
ical Society (TIPS)
Paul Valteau, president of Black Organization for Leader­
ship Development (BOLD)
Reference Persons:
James Chubbuck, director, Institute of Politics, Loyola 
University of New Orleans 
James K. Glassman, editor, Figaro, New Orleans 
Rosemary James, political analyst, WWL TV, New Orleans 
Marcel Trudeau, director, New Orleans Chapter of the 
Urban League
Joe Walker, research specialist, Walker Associates, New 
Orleans.
Freddie Warren, attorney and past assistant district 
attorney, New Orleans
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